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जन लोकपाल विधेयक का मसविदा

2011-06-17T10:32:00.001-07:00

जन लोकपाल विधेयक का मसविदा जिसे अन्ना हजारे के नेतृत्व वाली सिविल सोसायटी ने तैयार कर विचारार्थ विधेयक तैयार करने वाली समिति को प्रस्तुत किया है -

इस विधेयक का मसविदा केन्द्र में लोकपाल नामक संस्था की स्थापना के लिए तैयार किया गया है. लेकिन इस विधेयक के प्रावधान इस तरह के होंगे ताकि प्रत्येक राज्य में इसी तरह की लोकायुक्त संस्था स्थापित की जा सके.

जन लोकपाल विधेयक संस्करण 2.2

एक अधिनियम, जो केन्द्र में ऐसी प्रभावशाली भ्रष्टाचाररोधी और शिकायत निवारण प्रणाली तैयार करेगा, ताकि भ्रष्टाचार के विरुद्ध एक प्रभावी तन्त्र तैयार हो सके और भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वालों को प्रभावी सुरक्षा मुहैया कराई जा सके.

जन लोकपाल विधेयक का मसविदा

1. संक्षिप्त नाम और प्रारम्भ-

(1) इस अधिनियम को जन लोकपाल अधिनियम, 2010 कहा जा सकता है.

(2) अपने अधिनियमन के 120वें दिन यह प्रभावी हो जाएगा.

2. परिभाषाएं- इस अधिनियम में, जब तक कि सन्दर्भ से अन्यथा अपेक्षित न हो,-

(1) `कार्रवाई´ का अर्थ है किसी भी सरकारी कर्मचारी द्वारा अपने कर्र्तव्य के निर्वहन के लिए की गई कोई कार्रवाई और जिसमें निर्णय, संस्तुति या निष्कर्ष अथवा अन्य किसी प्रकार की कार्रवाई सम्मिलित है, इसमें जानबूझकर विफलता, चूक या इसी तरह की अभिव्यक्ति करने वाली कार्रवाई भी शामिल होगी

(2) `आरोप´ में किसी लोकसेवक के सम्बन्ध में निम्नलिखित में, से किसी भी बात की पुष्टि शामिल है-

क. वह सरकारी कर्मचारी है और कदाचार में लिप्त है

ख. भ्रष्टाचार में लिप्त है.

(3) `परिवाद´ में सम्मिलित है, कोई शिकायत या आरोप अथवा भ्रष्टाचार के विरुद्ध आवाज उठाने वाले व्यक्ति द्वारा सुरक्षा एवं उचित कार्रवाई के लिए किया गया अनुरोध.

(4) `भ्रष्टाचार´ के अन्तर्गत वे सभी कृत्य सम्मिलित है, जो भारतीय दण्ड संहिता के अध्याय 9 अथवा भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक अधिनियम, 1988 के तहत दण्डनीय तय किए गए हैं.

साथ ही यदि किसी व्यक्ति ने किसी कानून या नियम का उल्लंघन करते हुए सरकार से कोई लाभ लिया हो, वह व्यक्ति और उसके साथ ही वे लोक सेवक जिन्होंने प्रत्यक्ष या परोक्ष रूप से लाभ लेने में उस व्यक्ति की सहायता की हो, भ्रष्टाचार में लिप्त माने जाएंगे.

(5) `सरकार´ अथवा `केन्द्र सरकार´ से आशय है ‘भारत सरकार’.

(6) शासकीय कर्मचारी´ से आशय है कोई व्यक्ति, जिसकी नियुक्ति किसी भी समय लोक सेवा अथवा केन्द्र सरकार या उच्च न्यायालय या उच्चतम न्यायालय से सम्बन्धित किसी पद के लिए, प्रतिनियुक्ति अथवा स्थायी, अस्थायी या अनुबन्ध के आधार पर हुई है या हुई थी, लेकिन इसमें न्यायाधीश शामिल नहीं होंगे.

(7) `शिकायत´ का अर्थ है किसी व्यक्ति द्वारा यह दावा कि उसे सिटीजन्स चार्टर के अनुसार और उस विभाग के जन शिकायत अधिकारी से सम्पर्क के बाद भी सन्तोषजनक समाधान नहीं मिल पाया.

(8) `लोकपाल´ से आशय है -

क. इस अधिनियम के अधीन एवं इस अधिनियम के विभिन्न प्रावधानों के अन्तर्गत निर्धारित कार्य के पालन हेतु गठित पीठें, अथवा

ख. इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत, या इस अधिनियम के विभिन्न प्रावधानों के अन्तर्गत बनाये गये विभिन्न नियमों, विनियमों या आदेशों के अन्तर्गत नियत, तरीके और सीमा में, अपनी शक्तियों का उपयोग करने वाला और अपने कर्तव्यों एवं जिम्मेदारियों का निर्वहन करने वाला कोई अधिकारी या कर्मचारी

ग. अन्य सभी प्रयोजनों के लिए, संस्था के तौर पर संयुक्त रूप से कार्यरत अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्य;

(9) `अल्प दण्ड´ और `प्रमुख दण्ड´ से आशय वही होगा जो केन्द्रीय लोक सेवा आचरण नियमों में परिभाषित है.

(10) `कदाचार´ का अर्थ है वही होगा जैसा कि केन्द्रीय लोक सेवा (आचरण) नियम में परिभाषित है और जिसमें सतर्कता का दृष्टिकोण हो

(11) `लोक प्राधिकरण´ में सम्मिलित है कोई प्राधिकरण अथवा निकाय अथवा स्वशासी संस्था जिसकी स्थापना या गठन-

क. संविधान द्वारा अथवा संविधान के अन्तर्गत हुआ हो

ख. संसद द्वारा बनाए गए किसी अन्य कानून द्वारा हुआ हो;

ग. सरकार द्वारा जारी अधिसूचना अथवा आदेश, और सरकारी स्वामित्व, नियन्त्रित अथवा पर्याप्त अंश से वित्तपोषित संस्था

(12) `लोक सेवक´ का अर्थ है, वह व्यक्ति जो किसी भी समय था अथवा है,-

क. प्रधानमन्त्री;

ख. मन्त्री;

ग. संसद सदस्य;

घ. उच्च न्यायालयों और उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायाधीश;

ङ. सरकारी कर्मचारी;

च. अध्यक्ष अथवा उपाध्यक्ष (यथा नाम) अथवा स्थानीय प्राधिकरण का कोई सदस्य, जो कि केन्द्रीय सरकार के नियन्त्रण में हो अथवा एक सांविधिक निकाय अथवा निगम जिसका गठन भारतीय संसद द्वारा बनाए गए किसी कानून के अन्तर्गत हुआ हो, जिसमें सहकारी समिति भी सम्मिलित है, अथवा ऐसी सरकारी कम्पनी, जो कम्पनी अधिनियम 1956 की धारा 617 के अन्तर्गत अर्थ रखती हो, और सरकार द्वारा स्थापित कोई भी सांविधिक अथवा गैर सांविधिक समिति अथवा परिषद के सदस्य;

छ. इसमें वे सभी सम्मिलित हैं, जो भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक अधिनियम 1988 की धारा 2 (सी) में `लोकसेवक´ घोषित हैं.

ज. ऐसे अन्य प्राधिकारी, जो केन्द्र सरकार की अधिसूचना द्वारा, समय-समय पर उल्लिखित किए जाएं

(13) `सतर्कता दृष्टिकोण´ में सम्मिलित है-

क. भ्रष्टाचार की सभी गतिविधियां

ख. घोर लापरवाही अथवा जानबूझकर की गई लापरवाही, निर्णय लेने में कोताही, प्रणालियों और प्रकियाओं का घोर उल्लंघन, ऐसे मामलों में स्वविवेक अधिकार का अतिरेक जहां कोई प्रकट/सार्वजनिक हित स्पष्ट नहीं है, नियन्त्रणकर्ता अथवा वरिष्ठ अधिकारी को समय पर सूचित करने में चूक

ग. अपने अधीनस्थ कर्मचारियों द्वारा कर्तव्यों की उपेक्षा अथवा कार्यालय के दुरुपयोग की शिकायत मिलने पर भी कार्रवाई में असफलता/विलम्ब, यदि कानून के अन्तर्गत किसी अधिकारी का ऐसा दायित्व बनता है तो,

घ. प्रत्यक्ष अथवा अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से किसी के आचरण के माध्यम से भेदभाव में संलिप्तता.

ङ. भ्रष्टाचार के विरुद्ध आवाज उठाने वालों का उत्पीड़न

च. मामले के निस्तारण में किसी तरह का असंगत/अनुचित विलम्ब, सभी प्रासंगिक कारकों पर विचार करने के बाद, मामले में सतर्कता दृष्टिकोण की उपस्थिति निष्कर्ष को और सुदृढ़ता प्रदान करेगी.

छ. किसी से अनुचित पूछताछ या जांच, भ्रष्टाचार के दोषी को अनावश्यक मदद पहुंचाने अथवा निर्दोष को फंसाने के लिए.

ज. लोकपाल द्वारा समय-समय पर अधिसूचित कोई अन्य विषय सामग्री

(14) `भ्रष्टाचार के विरुद्ध आवाज उठाने वाला´ व्यक्ति वह है, जो किसी खतरे का सामना करता है -

क. पेशेगत नुकसान, जिसमें गैरकानूनी स्थानान्तरण, प्रोन्नति से इंकार, उपयुक्त अनुलाभ से इंकार, विभागीय कार्यवाही, भेदभाव सम्मिलित है पर सीमित नहीं अथवा

ख. शारीरिक क्षति अथवा

ग. वास्तव में इस तरह की क्षति;

जो कि या तो इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल से शिकायत करने, अथवा सूचना का अधिकार अधिनियम 2005 के अन्तर्गत याचिका दाखिल करने के कारण से सम्बन्धित है अथवा भ्रष्टाचार अथवा कुशासन को उजागर करने अथवा रोकने के उद्देश्य से की गई कोई अन्य विधिक कार्रवाई.

3. लोकपाल संस्था की स्थापना और लोकपाल की नियुक्ति:

(1) लोकपाल नामक एक संस्था होगी, जिसमें अपने अधिकारियों और कर्मचारियों के सहित एक अध्यक्ष और दस सदस्य होंगे.

(2) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष और सदस्यों का चुनाव उसी तरह होगा, जैसा कि इस अधिनियम में बताया गया है.

(3) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य के तौर पर नियुक्त व्यक्ति को, अपना कार्यभार सम्भालने से पूर्व, निर्धारित प्रारूप में राष्ट्रपति के समक्ष शपथ अथवा प्रतिज्ञान लेना होगा.

(4) इस अधिनियम के लागू होने के छ: माह के अन्दर सरकार पहले पहले लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्यों की नियुक्ति सरकार करेगी, और सभी प्रचालन तन्त्र एवं परिसम्पत्तियों के साथ संस्था का गठन हो जाएगा.

(5) सरकार -

क. सेवानिवृत्ति, सदस्य अथवा अध्यक्ष की सेवानिवृत्ति के तीन माह पूर्व, अथवा

ख. किसी अन्य अनपेक्षित कारण से इस तरह की रिक्ति उत्पन्न होने के एक माह के भीतर. लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष और सदस्य की नियुक्ति करेगी

4. लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष और सदस्यगण कुछ विशेष कार्यालयों से सबन्द्ध नहीं रहेंगे-लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्यगण संसद या किसी राज्य की विधायिका के मौजूदा सदस्य नहीं होंगे या किसी पद या लाभ के न्यास में (अध्यक्ष या सदस्य के पद के अलावा) नहीं रहेंगे या किसी अन्य व्यवसाय या पेशे में नहीं होंगे, अपना कार्यभार सम्भालने से पूर्व, लोकपाल का अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य चुना गया व्यक्ति -

(1) यदि वह किसी न्यास अथवा लाभ के पद पर है, उस पद से त्यागपत्र दे देगा, या

(2) यदि वह कोई व्यवसाय कर रहा है, उस व्यवसाय के कार्य व्यवहार अथवा प्रबन्धन से अपना सम्बन्ध समाप्त कर लेगा; या

(3) यदि वह किसी पेशे में है तो उस पेशे को स्थगित करना होगा

(4) यदि वह प्रत्यक्ष अथवा परोक्ष रूप से किसी अन्य गतिविधि से जुड़ा हुआ है, जिसकी वजह से लोकपाल में उसके दायित्वों के प्रदर्शन में हितों का टकराव सम्भव है, उसे उस गतिविधि से अपना जुड़ाव खत्म कर देना होगा.

उपबन्ध किया गया है कि यदि उस काम के छोड़ देने के बाद भी, उस गतिविधि से जिससे वह पूर्व में जुड़ा था, से लोकपाल में उसके प्रदर्शन पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव पड़ने की सम्भावना है, वह व्यक्ति लोकपाल का अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य नियुक्त नहीं किया जा सकेगा.

5. लोकपाल का कार्यकाल एवं अन्य सेवा शर्तें-

(1) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य के रूप में नियुक्त व्यक्ति का कार्यकाल कार्यभार ग्रहण करने की तिथि से पांच साल या 70 वर्ष की उम्र, जो भी पहले हो, होगा.

आगे यह भी उपबन्ध है कि

क. लोकपाल का अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य, राष्ट्रपति को सम्बोधित हस्तलिखित पत्र के जरिए पद त्याग सकता है;

ख. अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य को इस अधिनियम में निहित तरीके से पद से हटाया जा सकता है.

(2) अध्यक्ष और प्रत्येक सदस्य को प्रति माह क्रमश: भारत के मुख्य न्यायाधीश और उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायाधीशों के बराबर वेतन मिलेगा.

(3) अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य के लिए देय भत्ते व पेंशन और अन्य सेवा शर्तें वहीं होंगी, जैसा निर्धारित किया जाए.

परन्तु अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य को देय भत्ते व पेंशन और अन्य सेवा शर्तें उसकी नियुक्ति के बाद उसके लिए बदली नहीं जाएंगी.

(4) लोकपाल कार्यालय के प्रशासनिक व्यय, जिसमें देय वेतन, भत्ते और पेंशन शामिल हैं, अथवा उस कार्यालय में कार्य कर रहे व्यक्तियों के सम्बन्ध में, भारत की संचित निधि पर भारित होगा.

(5) `लोकपाल निधि´ के नाम से एक अलग निधि होगी, जिसमें लोकपाल द्वारा लगाए गए दण्ड/जुर्माने जमा होंगे और जिसमें इस अधिनियम की धारा 19 के अन्तर्गत वसूले गए सार्वजनिक धन के नुकसान का 10 फीसदी भी सरकार द्वारा जमा किया जाएगा. इस निधि का निस्तारण पूरी तरह लोकपाल के विवेक पर होगा और इस निधि का प्रयोग लोकपाल को बढ़ाने/उन्नयन/बुनियादी सुविधाओं के विस्तार के लिए ही किया जाएगा.

(6) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्यगण भारत सरकार या किसी राज्य सरकार अथवा ऐसे किसी निकाय, जो सरकार द्वारा वित्तपोषित हो, में किसी भी पद पर नियुक्ति या संसद, राज्यों की विधायिका अथवा स्थानीय निकायों का चुनाव लड़ने के पात्र नहीं होंगे, यदि उन्होंने अपने पद से इस्तीफा दे देने के बाद अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्य के तौर पर किसी भी अवधि के लिए कोई पद ग्रहण किया है. किसी सदस्य को अध्यक्ष नियुक्त किया जा सकता है, बशर्ते सदस्य और अध्यक्ष के तौर पर उसका कार्यकाल पांच वर्ष से अधिक न हो और कोई भी सदस्य अथवा अध्यक्ष पांच साल का कार्यकाल पूरा होने के बाद पुनर्नियुक्ति या सेवा विस्तार का पात्र नहीं होगा.

6. अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्यों की नियुक्ति

(1) अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्यों की नियुक्ति एक चयन समिति की संस्तुति पर राष्ट्रपति द्वारा की जाएगी.

(2) निम्नलिखित लोग लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्य बनने के पात्र नहीं होंगे:

क. कोई व्यक्ति, जो भारत का नागरिक नहीं है.

ख. कोई व्यक्ति जिसे भारतीय दण्ड संहिता, अपराध संहिता अथवा किसी अन्य अधिनियम के तहत आरोपित किया गया हो अथवा सीसीएस आचरण नियमों के तहत दण्डित किया गया हो.

ग. कोई व्यक्ति जिसकी उम्र 40 वर्ष से कम हो.

घ. कोई व्यक्ति जो किसी भी सरकार की सेवा में था और पिछले दो वर्षों के भीतर कार्यालय छोड़ दिया था, या तो त्यागपत्र अथवा सेवानिवृत्ति के माध्यम से.

(3) लोकपाल के कम से कम चार सदस्य विधिक पृष्ठभूमि के होंगे. अध्यक्ष सहित दो से अधिक सदस्य पूर्व नौकरशाह नहीं होंगे.

स्पष्टीकरण: ‘कानूनी पृष्ठभूमि’ का तात्पर्य है कि वह व्यक्ति भारत में कम से कम दस सालों तक न्यायिक सेवा में पद सम्भाल चुका हो अथवा उच्च न्यायालय या उच्चतम न्यायालय में कम से कम 15 साल तक अधिवक्ता रहा हो.

(4) सदस्यों और अध्यक्ष की निष्ठा असन्दिग्ध हो और पूर्व में उन्होंने भ्रष्टाचार से लड़ने के संकल्प का प्रदर्शन किया हो.

(5) चयन समिति में निम्नलिखित लोग होंगे

क. भारत के प्रधानमन्त्री

ख. लोकसभा में नेता विपक्ष

ग. उच्चतम न्यायालय के सबसे कम उम्र के दो न्यायाधीश

घ. उच्च न्यायालयों के सबसे कम उम्र के दो न्यायाधीश

ङ. भारत के नियन्त्रक एवं महालेखा परीक्षक

च. मुख्य निर्वाचन आयुक्त

छ. प्रथम चयन प्रक्रिया के बाद से लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष एवं सेवानिवृत्त होने वाले सदस्य,

(6) प्रधानमन्त्री चयन समिति के अध्यक्ष के रूप में कार्य करेगा.

(7) चयन समिति के विचारार्थ योग्य उम्मीदवारों की सूची तैयार करने हेतु एक खोज कमेटी होगी, जिसमें दस सदस्य होंगे

(8) खोज समिति के सदस्यों का चयन निम्नलिखित तरीके से होगा;

क. चयन समिति भारत के पूर्व नियन्त्रक एवं महालेखा परीक्षकों और भारत के मुख्य निर्वाचन आयुक्तों में से खोज समिति के पांच सदस्यों का चयन करेगी.

परन्तु निम्नलिखित लोग खोज समिति के सदस्य बनने के पात्र नहीं होंगे:

(i) कोई व्यक्ति जिसके विरुद्ध विधिवत (सारभूत) भ्रष्टाचार का आरोप लग चुका हो.

(ii) कोई व्यक्ति जो सेवानिवृत्ति के बाद किसी राजनीतिक दल में शामिल हो गया हो अथवा किसी राजनीतिक दल से उसका गहरा जुड़ाव रहा हो.

(iii) कोई व्यक्ति जो किसी भी रूप में सरकार की सेवा कर रहा हो.

(iv) कोई व्यक्ति जो सेवानिवृत्ति के बाद भी सरकारी कार्य कर रहा हो, उन कार्यों को छोड़कर जो कि उस पद के लिए आरक्षित हैं, जिससे वह सेवानिवृत्त हुआ हो.

ख. चयनित उपरोक्त पांच सदस्य, नागरिक समाज से पांच सदस्यों को मनोनीत करेंगे.

(9) खोज समिति ऐसे वर्ग के लोगों अथवा ऐसे व्यक्तियों से संस्तुति अमन्त्रित करेगी, जिन्हें वह इसके लिए उचित समझती हो. इस संस्तुति में अन्य विषयों के साथ-साथ अधोलिखित विवरण होने अनिवार्य हैं.

क. जिस प्रत्याशी की संस्तुति की गई है, उसका व्यक्तिगत विवरण.

ख. प्रत्याशी ने अतीत में अगर किसी कानूनी आरोप या नैतिक भ्रष्टाचार के आरोप का सामना किया है तो उसका पूरा विवरण.

ग. भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ अतीत में उसके द्वारा किए गए प्रयासों का लिखित प्रमाण.

घ. अतीत का ऐसा विवरण जो यह दर्शाता हो कि वह अपने विवेक से निर्णय करता है और किसी भी तरह उसे प्रभावित नहीं किया जा सकता, यदि कोई हो तो.

ङ. कोई अन्य सामग्री, जिसका निर्णय खोज समिति करे.

(10) चयन के लिए अधोलिखित प्रक्रिया का अनुसरण किया जाएगा -

क. प्रत्याशियों की सूची उनके समूचे विवरण के साथ, जो उन्होंने उपरोक्त प्रारूप में दिया हो, उसे वेबसाइट पर प्रदर्शित किया जाएगा.

ख. इन नामों पर जनता की प्रतिक्रिया मांगी जाएगी.

ग. खोज समिति इन प्रत्याशियों की पृष्ठभूमि और पहले किए गए कार्यों से सम्बन्धित सूचनाएं जुटाने के लिए कोई भी माध्यम इस्तेमाल कर सकती है.

घ. प्रत्याशियों के बारे में एकत्रित सभी सामग्री खोज समिति के हर सदस्य को अग्रिम तौर पर उपलब्ध कराई जाएगी. समिति के सदस्य हर प्रत्याशी का अपनी ओर से आंकलन करेंगे.

ङ. समिति मिलकर हरेक उम्मीदवार के बारे में प्राप्त सामग्रियों पर चर्चा करेगी. चयन मुख्यत: सर्वसम्मति के आधार पर किया जाएगा.

परन्तु जांच समिति के तीन या अधिक सदस्य अगर लिखित कारणों के आधार पर किसी सदस्य के चयन पर आपत्ति करते हैं तो उसका चयन नहीं किया जाएगा.

च. खोज समिति कुल रिक्तियों की तीन गुना संख्या के बराबर नामों की सूची बनाकर चयन समिति के विराचार्थ प्रस्तुत करेगी

छ. चयन समिति, रिक्तियों की संख्या के बराबर संख्या में प्रत्याशियों का चयन कर प्रधानमन्त्री को देगी. चयन मुख्यत: सर्वसम्मति के आधार पर किया जाएगा.

परन्तु अगर चयन समिति के तीन या अधिक सदस्य किसी सदस्य के चयन का विरोध लिखित रूप में देते हैं, तो उस व्यक्ति का चयन नहीं होगा.

ज. खोज समिति की सभी बैठकें और सभी चयन की वीडियो रिकॉर्डिंग होगी और इसे सार्वजनिक किया जाएगा.

(11) चयन समिति द्वारा तय किए गए नामों की अनुशंसा प्रधानमन्त्री तत्काल राष्ट्रपति से करेंगे, जो इस अनुशंसा प्राप्ति के एक महीने के भीतर नियुक्ति का आदेश जारी करेंगे.

(12) अगर चयन समिति का कोई सदस्य चयन प्रक्रिया के जारी रहने के दौरान ही सेवानिवृत हो जाता है तो उस स्थिति में वह सदस्य चयन समिति में तब तक बना रहेगा, जब तक कि चयन प्रक्रिया पूरी न हो जाए.

7. अध्यक्ष अथवा सदस्यों को हटाना -

(1) अध्यक्ष या किसी सदस्य को केवल राष्ट्रपति के आदेश से तभी उसके पद से हटाया जा सकता है जबकि निम्न में से कोई एक या अधिक आधार हो -

क. कदाचार प्रमाणित होने पर

ख. पेशागत, मानसिक या शारीरिक अक्षमता

ग. दिवालिया

घ. नैतिक भ्रष्टाचार से सम्बद्ध आरोप लगने पर

ङ. पद पर रहते हुए किसी दूसरे वैतनिक कार्यों में लिप्त पाए जाने पर

च. ऐसे आर्थिक लाभ या अन्य लाभ हासिल करने पर जो उस व्यक्ति के सदस्य या अध्यक्ष के रूप में कार्य को प्रभावित कर सकता है.

छ. अपने पास विचाराधीन मामले में, किसी का पक्ष लेने के उद्देश्य से अथवा किसी को फंसाने के उद्देश्य से, बाहरी प्रभाव द्वारा निर्देशित/संचालित होने पर

ज. किसी सरकारी अधिकारी को अनुचित रूप से प्रभावित करने या प्रभावित करने का प्रयास करने पर.

झ. ऐसी कोई चूक या ऐसा कोई कार्य करने पर, जो भ्रष्टाचार निरोधी कानून के तहत दण्डनीय है, या किसी कदाचार में लिप्त पाए जाने पर.

ञ. यदि कोई सदस्य या अध्यक्ष किसी भी तरीके से, भारत सरकार अथवा किसी प्रदेश सरकार द्वारा या उसके किसी अधिकारी या उसके प्रतिनिधि द्वारा स्थापित अनुबन्ध या समझौते में रुचि रखता हो या उससे सम्बद्ध हो, या उससे होने वाले लाभों से अथवा उससे होने वाली किसी तरह की आय से सदस्य के अलावा किसी और तरह से सम्बन्ध रखता हो, या किसी निगमित कम्पनी से सम्बद्ध हो, उसे कदाचार का दोषी समझा जाएगा.

(2) लोकपाल के किसी सदस्य या अध्यक्ष को निष्कासित करने के लिए अधोलिखित प्रक्रिया का अनुसरण करना होगा.

क. कोई भी व्यक्ति लोकपाल के एक या अधिक सदस्यों या अध्यक्ष के खिलाफ ठोस सबूत पेश करते हुए उसके निष्कासन की याचिका पेश कर सकता है.

ख. ऐसी याचिका प्राप्त होने पर सुप्रीम कोर्ट इसकी सुनवाई करेगा और अधोलिखित में से एक या एक से अधिक कदम उठा सकता है:

(i) सुप्रीम कोर्ट द्वारा नियुक्त विशेष जांच दल को जांच का आदेश, यदि प्रथम दृष्टया इसकी आवश्यकता महसूस होती है और अगर सम्बन्धित पक्षों द्वारा दायर हलफनामों से इसका निर्णय करना सम्भव न हो सके. विशेष जांच दल तीन महीने के अन्दर अपनी रिपोर्ट प्रस्तुत करेगा.

(ii) विशेष जांच दल द्वारा उपबन्ध (1) के तहत जांच लम्बित होने पर, उस सदस्य से आंशिक अथवा पूरा काम वापस ले लेने का आदेश देना

(iii) कोई मामला न बनने की स्थिति में याचिका रद्द करना

(iv) आधारों की पुष्टि होने पर, सम्बन्धित सदस्य अथवा अध्यक्ष को हटाने की अनुशंसा राष्ट्रपति के पास भेजना

(v) यदि प्रथमदृष्टया भ्रष्टाचार निरोधी कानून या किसी अन्य कानून के तहत किसी दण्डनीय अपराध का मामला बनता हो तो समुचित एजेंसी को केस दर्ज करने और जांच का निर्देश देना

ग. सुप्रीम कोर्ट के पांच वरिष्ठतम न्यायधीशों के पैनल की पीठ बनेगी. परन्तु अगर इन न्यायाधीशों में से कोई भी कभी चयन समिति का सदस्य रहा हो या जिसके खिलाफ कोई मामला लोकपाल के समक्ष लम्बित हो, वह उस पीठ का सदस्य नहीं हो सकेगा.

घ. सुप्रीम कोर्ट ऐसी याचिकाओं को इस आधार पर ख़ारिज नहीं कर सकता कि उसके खिलाफ पहले से ऐसा ही मामला विचाराधीन है.

ङ. अगर सुप्रीम कोर्ट को लगता है कि याचिका नुकसान पहुंचाने की मंशा या बुरी नीयत से दायर की गई है तो अदालत शिकायतकर्ता पर जुर्माना लगा सकती है या उसे एक साल तक कैद की सजा सुना सकती है.

च. सुप्रीम कोर्ट से उपयुर्क्त उपबन्ध (ख)(iv) में अनुशंसा मिलने की स्थिति में प्रधानमन्त्री, सदस्य या सदस्यों अथवा लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष को तत्काल हटाए जाने की अनुशंसा राष्ट्रपति से करनी होगी जो उस सदस्य या सदस्यों अथवा अध्यक्ष को अनुंशसा प्राप्त होने के एक महीने के भीतर हटाने का आदेश जारी करेंगे.

लोकपाल की शक्तियां एवं कार्य

8. लोकपाल के कार्य:

(1) लोकपाल ऐसी शिकायतों की प्राप्तियों के लिए उत्तरदायी होगा जिनमें-

क. जिसमें भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक कानून के अधीन चूक के आरोप हों या दण्डनीय — कृत्य के आरोप लगाए गए हों,

ख. जहां सरकारी सेवक पर दुर्व्यवहार के आरोप हों,

ग. शिकायत

घ. भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वालों से मिली शिकायतें,

ङ. लोकपाल के कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायतें

(1क) अपने कर्मचारियों की अखण्डता सुनिश्चित करना, चाहे वह स्थाई हों अथवा अन्य, लोकपाल का मुख्य कर्तव्य होगा. लोकपाल इसे यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए पूर्णत सक्षम एवं सशक्त होगा.

(2) लोकपाल, जांच एवं पूछताछ के बाद, जैसा वह उचित समझे, निम्नलिखित कार्यों में से एक या एकाधिक कार्रवाई कर सकता है:

क. अगर प्रथम दृष्टया शिकायत नहीं बनती है तो मामला बन्द करना, अथवा

ख. सरकारी कर्मचारी और साथ ही साथ उस व्यक्ति, जो इस कृत्य में पक्षकार है, के खिलाफ आरोप- पत्र दाखिल करना

ग. अगर सरकारी कर्मचारी भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक कानून के अधीन अन्तत: दोषी पाया जाता है तो सुसंगत आचार संहिता के तहत उस पर युक्तियुक्त दण्ड आरोपित करने की अनुशंसा करना और उस सरकारी कर्मचारी की बर्खास्तगी की भी सुनिश्चित सिफारिश करना

घ. जांच के अधीन विषयगत यदि किसी लाइसेंस या पट्टा या स्वीकृति या ठेका या समझौते को रद्द करने अथवा संशोधित करने का आदेश दे सकता है

ङ. अगर भ्रष्टाचार के कृत्य में सम्बन्धित प्रतिष्ठान या कम्पनी या ठेकेदार या किसी अन्य को शामिल पाया जाता है तो उसे प्रतिबन्धित सूची में डालने का आदेश देना

च. इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों के मुताबिक, समुचित अधिकारियों को शिकायतों के निवारण के लिए उपयुक्त दिशा निर्देश जारी करना

छ. अगर लोकपाल के आदेश का विधिवत अनुपालन नहीं होता है, तो उन आदेशों का अनुपालन सुनिश्चित करने के लिए इस अधिनियम के तहत आदेश जारी करना

ज. इस अधिनियम के विभिन्न प्रावधानों के अनुसार भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वालों को सुरक्षा प्रदान करने के लिए जरूरी कार्रवाई करना

(3) अगर किसी भी मामले में लोकपाल को किसी स्रोत से जानकारी हो है, तो वह इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत, अगर इस तरह का कोई मामला उपबन्ध (1) की धारा (क), (ख), (ग) या (घ) में उल्लेखित है, स्वत: संज्ञान लेते हुए कार्रवाई कर सकता है.

(4) समय-समय पर जरूरत पड़ने पर समुचित अधिकारी को उनके कामकाज, प्रशासन एवं अन्य व्यवस्था में परिवर्तन के लिए दिशा-निर्देश जारी कर सकता है, ताकि भ्रष्टाचार, दुर्व्यवहार, जन शिकायत एवं भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वालों की प्रताड़ना की गुंजाइश और सम्भावना कम हो सके

(5) इस धारा की उपधारा (2) (ग) के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल द्वारा जारी किए गए आदेश सरकार के लिए बाध्यकारी होंगे और आदेश मिलने के एक सप्ताह के अन्दर उसका कार्यान्वयन जरूरी होगा.

(6) भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक कानून की धारा 19 को समाप्त कर दिया जाएगा. इस अधिनियम के कार्यान्वयन में दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस संस्थापना अधिनियम की धारा 6-क लागू नहीं होगी.

(7) इस अधिनियम की किसी भी कार्यवाही में अपराध प्रक्रिया संहिता (सीआरपीसी) की धारा 197 लागू नहीं होगी. किसी भी कानून के तहत लोकपाल से एक बार स्वीकृति मिल जाने के बाद, ऐसी सभी स्वीकृतियां, जो आरम्भिक जांच के लिए जरूरी हैं, प्रदत्त मानी जाएंगी.

9. सर्च वारण्ट जारी होना आदि-

(1) जहां लोकपाल, अपने पास उपलब्ध सूचना के आधार पर

क. अगर यह यकीन करने का कोई कारण देखता है, कि कोई व्यक्ति-

(i) जिसे इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत सम्मन या नोटिस जारी किया गया है या जारी किया जा सकता है, जो किसी जांच के लिए ज़रूरी या उपयोगी कोई सम्पत्ति दस्तावेज या अन्य कोई वस्तु प्रस्तुत नहीं करेगा, या नहीं कर पाएगा, या प्रस्तुत नहीं करने की वजह होगा,

(ii) जिसके कब्जे में मुद्रा, स्वर्ण, आभूषण या दूसरी मूल्यवान चीजें या वस्तुएं हैं और ऐसी मुद्रा, स्वर्ण, आभूषण या दूसरी मूल्यवान चीजें हैं जिनकी घोषणा, सम्पत्ति की घोशणा करने सम्बन्धी किसी भी प्रभावी कानून के अन्तर्गत सक्षम प्राधिकार के समक्ष, अंशत: या पूर्णत: नहीं की गई है

ख. विचार करता हो कि उसके द्वारा आरम्भ की गई किसी भी जांच या अन्य कार्रवाई का उद्देश्य, सामान्य खोज या निरीक्षण द्वारा पूरा होगा,

सर्च वारण्ट के ज़रिए किसी ऐसे पुलिस अधिकारी को, जिसका ओहदा पुलिस इंस्पेक्टर से नीचे नहीं होगा, तलाशी लेने, निरीक्षण करने के लिए तदानुसार अधिकृत करेगा, और ऐसा करने के लिए वह अधिकारी-

(i) किसी भी इमारत या स्थान, जहां उसे ऐसी किसी सम्पत्ति, दस्तावेज, रकम, स्वर्ण, आभूषण या अन्य मूल्यवान वस्तु के रखे जाने के सन्देह का कारण हो, वह प्रवेश कर सकेगा और तलाशी ले सकेगा.

(ii) किसी ऐसे व्यक्ति की तलाशी ले सकेगा जिस पर कि स्वयं को छिपाने या किसी वस्तु को छिपाने का सन्देह हो.

(iii) वह उप नियम-(i) के अन्तर्गत प्राप्त शक्तियों के तहत ऐसा कोई भी दरवाजा, बक्सा, लॉकर, सेफ, आलमारी या अन्य पात्र धारक का ताला तोड़ सकेगा जिसकी चाबी उपलब्ध नहीं है.

(iv) ऐसी तलाशी में प्राप्त किसी सम्पत्ति, दस्तावेज, रकम, स्वर्ण, आभूषण या अन्य कीमती चीजों जब्त करे

(v) किसी भी सम्पत्ति या दस्तावेज पर पहचान के चिन्ह बनाए ताकि कोई उसे निकाल न सके अथवा उसकी नकल न कर सकें.

(vi) ऐसी किसी भी सम्पत्ति, दस्तावेज, पैसे, स्वर्ण, आभूषण या अन्य मूल्यवान वस्तुओं या चीजों को सूचीबद्ध कर दर्ज किया जाएगा.

(2) उपधारा (1) के तहत तलाशी एवं जब्ती में, यथासम्भव, अपराध प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1973 के सम्बन्धित प्रावधान लागू होंगे

(3) उपधारा (1) के अधीन सभी उद्देश्यों के लिए जारी सभी वारण्ट, अपराध प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1973 की धारा 93 के अधीन अदालत द्वारा जारी वारण्ट समझा जाएगा.

10. साक्ष्य-

(1) इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों के अन्तर्गत किसी भी जांच के उद्देश्य से, (अगर कोई प्रारम्भिक जांच है, सहित) लोकपाल किसी भी सरकारी कर्मचारी या कोई अन्य व्यक्ति, जो उनकी राय में किसी जांच के लिए प्रासंगिक सूचना उपलब्ध कराने या दस्तावेज देने में सक्षम है, सूचना देने अथवा दस्तावेज़ प्रस्तुत कराने के लिए तलब कर सकेगा.

(2) लोकपाल को नागरिक प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1908 के अन्तर्गत कोई याचिका दायर करते हुए, निम्नलिखित मामलों में, ऐसी किसी भी जांच के उद्देश्य से (आरम्भिक जांच सहित) वे सारी शक्तियां प्राप्त होंगी जो नागरिक प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1908 के अन्तर्गत किसी प्रकार का निपटारा करते हुए दीवानी न्यायालय को प्राप्त हैं -

क. किसी भी व्यक्ति को उपस्थित रहने के लिए बाध्य करने और उसे सम्मन जारी करने और उससे शपथ लेना;

ख. किसी भी दस्तावेज की खोज एवं उसे प्रस्तुत करना;

ग. हलफनामे पर साक्ष्य प्राप्त करना;

घ. किसी न्यायालय या कार्यालय से कोई सार्वजनिक रिकार्ड या उसकी प्रतिलिपि हासिल करना;

ङ. दस्तावेज या गवाह की जांच के के लिए आदेश जारी करना;

च. गलत या अफसोसनाक दावा या रक्षा के आलोक में क्षतिपूर्ति भुगतान का आदेश;

छ. देरी के लिए हर्जाने का आदेश

ज. ऐसे अन्य मामले, जिन्हें निर्धारित किया जा सकता है

(3) लोकपाल के सम्मुख कोई भी कार्रवाई भारतीय दण्ड संहिता की धारा 193 के अर्थ में एक न्यायिक कार्रवाई समझी जाएगी.

11. लोकपाल की रिपोर्ट इत्यादि-

(1) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष, प्रतिवर्ष, राष्ट्रपति को अपने कार्य निष्पादन पर, निर्धारित प्रारूप में प्रतिवेदन पेश करेंगे.

(2) राष्ट्रपति, प्रतिवेदन की प्रति, व्याख्यात्मक ज्ञापन देते हुए संसद के दोनों सदनों में रखवाएंगे.

(3) लोकपाल हरेक महीने अपनी वेबसाइट पर ऐसे मामलों की एक सूची, संक्षिप्त विवरण, परिणाम एवं कृत अथवा प्रस्तावित कार्रवाई के विवरण के साथ प्रकाशित करेगा, इस वेबसाइट पर पिछले एक महीने में लोकपाल द्वारा प्राप्त मामलों की सूची, निपटाए गए, और लम्बित पड़े मामलों की सूची भी भी प्रकाशित की जाएगी.

12. लोकपाल एक मान्य पुलिस अधिकारी होगा

(1) अपराध प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा 36 के उद्देश्य के लिए, लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष, सदस्य और इसकी जांच शाखा के अधिकारियों को पुलिस अधिकारी माना जाएगा.

(2) भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम 1988 के तहत किसी अपराध की छानबीन करते हुए वे उस मामले में किसी दूसरे कानून के अन्तर्गत किसी अपराध की जांच के लिए भी सक्षम होंगे.

13. आदेशों की अवज्ञा में लोकपाल की शक्ति-

(1) लोकपाल के प्रत्येक आदेश में उन अधिकारियों का नाम पूरी तरह स्पष्ट किया जाएगा, जो उसे अमल में लाएंगे, आदेश के अमल में लाने की प्रक्रिया और उसके अनुपालन की समय सीमा का विवरण भी स्पष्ट दिया जाएगा.

(2) अगर लोकपाल के आदेश का क्रियान्वयन निर्धारित प्रक्रिया और समय सीमा के भीतर नहीं होता है तो लोकपाल अवमानना के दोषी अधिकारियों पर जुर्माना लगाने का निर्णय ले सकता है.

(3) सम्बन्धित विभाग के आरेखण और संवितरण अधिकारी को, उपधारा (2) के तहत जारी आदेश में उल्लेखित, जुर्माना अधिकारियों के वेतन में से काटने का निर्देश दिया जाएगा.

परन्तु जिन अधिकारियों पर जुर्माना लगेगा, उन्हें सुनवाई का एक मौका दिए बिना उनका वेतन नहीं कटेगा. यह भी कि अगर आरेखण और संवितरण अधिकारी इन अधिकारियों का वेतन काटने में असमर्थ होता है तो वह स्वंय ही इस दण्ड के लिए उत्तरदायी होगा.

(4) अपने आदेश की अनुपालना कराने के लिए, लोकपाल के पास वे सभी अधिकार क्षेत्र, शक्तियां एवं अधिकार होंगे जोकि उच्च न्यायालय के पास हैं, और लोकपाल अपनी अवमानना के सम्बन्ध में इनका प्रयोग कर सकेगा, और इस उद्देश्य के लिए न्यायालय की अवमानना अधिनियम १९७१ (1971 का केन्द्रीय अधिनियम 70) को संशोधित करते उच्च न्यायालय के लिए निहित सन्दर्भ में लोकपाल की अवमानना को भी शामिल किया जाता है.

13क. भ्रष्टाचार अधिनियम की निवारण धारा 4 के तहत विशेष न्यायाधीश

(1) वार्षिक आधार पर, लोकपाल विशेष भ्रष्टाचार रोकथाम अधिनियम 1988 की धारा 4 के तहत हर क्षेत्र में न्यायाधीशों की संख्या का आंकलन करेगा और सिफारिश के तीन महीने के भीतर ही सरकार उतनी ही संख्या में न्यायाधीशों की नियुक्ति करेगी.

परन्तु यह भी कि लोकपाल विशेष न्यायाधीशों की उतनी ही संख्या की सिफारिश करेगा जितनी कि इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रत्येक मामले का निपटारा एक वर्ष के भीतर होने के लिए आवश्यक होंगी.

(2) कोई नई नियुक्ति करने से पहले, सरकार, उम्मीदवारों की निष्ठा सुनिश्चित करने हेतु, चयन प्रक्रिया पर लोकपाल से परामर्श करेगी. सरकार उन सिफारिशों को लागू भी करेगी.

13ख. अनुरोध पत्र जारी करना: लोकपाल की खण्डपीठ को लोकपाल में लम्बित किसी मामले में अनुरोध पत्र (एक न्यायाधीश को दूसरे न्यायाधीश द्वारा जारी किए जाना वाला) जारी करने का अधिकार होगा.

13ग. भारतीय तार अधिनियम के तहत अधिकार: लोकपाल की खण्डपीठ, भारतीय तार अधिनियम की धारा 5 के तहत पदनामित प्राधिकरण मान्य होगी. इस पीठ को टेलीफोन, इण्टरनेट अथवा भारतीय तार अधिनियम तथा, सूचना और प्रौद्योगिकी अधिनियम 2000 तथा भारतीय तार अधिनियम 1885 के तहत जारी नियमावली के सहित, दायरे में आने वाले अन्य माध्यम इत्यादि पर संचरित सन्देशों, आकड़ों और आवाजों पर निगरानी रखने या उन्हें रोककर सुनने का अधिकार होगा.

लोकपाल की कार्यप्रणाली

14. लोकपाल की कार्यप्रणाली:

(1) अध्यक्ष लोकपाल की संस्था के समग्र प्रशासन और पर्यवेक्षण के लिए उत्तरदायी होगा.

(2) नीति-नियम निर्धारण सहित लोकपाल के कामकाज के लिए आन्तरिक प्रणाली विकसित करने, लोकपाल में विभिन्न अधिकारियों को कार्य देने, लोकपाल में विभिन्न पदाधिकारियों को अधिकार देने जैसे कार्य लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष एवं सदस्यों द्वारा एक संस्था के तौर पर सामूहिक रूप से किए जाएंगे.

(3) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष की प्रधानमन्त्री के साथ वित्त और कर्मचारियों की जरूरत के आकलन के लिए वार्षिक बैठक होगी. इस बैठक में हुए निर्धारण के आधार पर सरकार द्वारा लोकपाल को संसाधन प्रदान कराए जाएंगे.

(3क) निर्धारित व्यय भारत के समेकित निधि से दिया जाएगा.

(3ख) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष और सदस्य अपने कर्मचारियों की अखण्डता और सभी तरह की पूछताछ और जांच की अखण्डता सुनिश्चित करने के लिए हर सम्भव कदम उठाएंगे. इस उद्देश्य के लिए वे अयोग्य अथवा भ्रष्ट कर्मियों को त्वरित सज़ा देने हेतु नियम बनाने, काम का मानदण्ड निर्धारित करने, प्रक्रिया निर्धारित करने अथवा अन्य कोई कदम उठाने के लिए सक्षम होंगे.

(3ग) लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष और सदस्य अधिनियम द्वारा सुनिश्चित समय सीमा का कड़ाई से पालन कराने के लिए ज़िम्मेदार होंगे और समुचित कदम उठाने के लिए सक्षम होगें.

(3घ) लोकपाल पूरी तरह से प्रशासनिक, वित्तीय और कार्यात्मक सहित सभी मामलों में सरकार के हस्तक्षेप से स्वतन्त्र होगा.

(4) लोकपाल तीन या अधिक सदस्यों की पीठ में कार्य करेगा. इस पीठ का गठन आक्रमिक तरीके से होगा और उन्हें मामले कम्प्यूटर के द्वारा आक्रमिक तरीके से सौंपे जाएंगे. प्रत्येक पीठ में कम से कम एक सदस्य विधिक पृष्ठभूमि वाला होगा.

(5) इन पीठों का दायित्व होगा :

क. कुछ विशिष्ट श्रेणी के मामलों में अभियोजन आरम्भ करने की अनुमति देना

ख. अपने कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायत सुनना

ग. लोकपाल के अधिकारियों द्वारा जांच अथवा सतर्कता के बन्द कर दिए मामले या लोकपाल द्वारा समय-समय पर निर्धारित की गई श्रेणी के, मामलों में अपील

घ. ऐसे अन्य आदेशों के लिए, जिनका निर्णय समय-समय पर लोकपाल द्वारा लिया जा सकता है.

परन्तु लोकपाल कि पूरी पीठ मापदण्ड बनाएगी कि किस तरह के मामले सदस्यों की पीठ देखेगी और कौन से मामलों का निर्णय मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी या सतर्कता अधिकारियों के स्तर पर होगा. ये मापदण्ड सरकार को हुए घाटे और/या जनता पर उसके असर और/या दोषी की स्थिति पर आधारित हो सकते हैं.

लोकपाल स्वत: जांच-पड़ताल करने का निर्णय ले सकता है.

(6) कैबिनेट के किसी भी सदस्य के खिलाफ लोकपाल की पूरी पीठ जांच-पड़ताल या अभियोग शुरू कर सकती है.

(7) इस अधिनियम के प्रावधान के अन्तर्गत कुछ मुद्दों पर लोकपाल की पूरी पीठ निर्णय लेगी. उस पीठ में कम से कम सात सदस्य होंगे.

(8) लोकपाल की बैठक के कार्य विवरण और दस्तावेज सार्वजनिक होंगे.

15. लोकपाल के पास शिकायत दर्ज कराना:

(1) इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों के अधीन, कोई भी व्यक्ति लोकपाल को इस अधिनियम के तहत शिकायत दर्ज करा सकता हैं.

बशर्ते इस शिकायत के मामले में, यदि व्यक्ति मर चुका है या किसी भी कारण से वह खुद यह कार्य करने में असमर्थ है, तो यह उस व्यक्ति के वैधानिक प्रतिनिधि या उसके द्वारा लिखित रूप से अधिकृत किसी अन्य व्यक्ति द्वारा शिकायत दर्ज कराई जा सकती है और यदि शिकायत हो चुकी है तो लिखित तौर अधिकृत प्रतिनिधि के द्वारा शिकायत को जारी रखा जा सकता हैं.

यह भी कि नागरिक अपनी शिकायत देश में कहीं भी लोकपाल के किसी भी कार्यालय में दर्ज करा सकते हैं. लोकपाल कार्यालय का यह कर्र्तव्य होगा कि वह अपने तहत किसी युक्तियुक्त लोकपाल अधिकारी को शिकायत पत्र हस्तान्तरित कर दे.

(2) शिकायत किसी सादे कागज पर भी लिखकर दर्ज कराई जा सकती है परन्तु उसमें लोकपाल द्वारा निर्धारित सभी विवरण शामिल होने चाहिए.

(2क) अपनी वार्षिक रिपोर्ट संसद में प्रस्तुत करने के बाद, भारत के नियन्त्रक एवं महालेखा परीक्षक ऐसे सभी मामलों को लोकपाल को अग्रेशित करेंगे, जो इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत आरोप निर्धारित करते हैं और लोकपाल उन पर इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों के अनुरूप ही कार्य करेगा.

(3) शिकायत प्राप्त होने पर, लोकपाल यह फैसला करेगा कि यह आरोप है या शिकायत या भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वाले की सुरक्षा के लिए अनुरोध है या दोनों का मिश्रण है या इससे कुछ अधिक है.

(4) लोकपाल को हर शिकायत अनिवार्य तौर पर निपटानी होगी.

परन्तु शिकायतकर्ता को सुनवाई का अवसर दिए बिना किसी शिकायत को बन्द नहीं किया जाएगा.

16. लोकपाल द्वारा जिन मामलों की जांच की जा सकती है- इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों के अधीन लोकपाल किसी ऐसे कार्य की जांच कर सकता है जो किसी लोकसेवक के द्वारा किया गया हो, अथवा उसकी सामान्य या विशिष्ट स्वीकृति से किया गया हो, जिसकी शिकायत की रिपोर्ट की गई हो अथवा ऐसे कार्य के बारे में कोई आरोप लगाया गया हो.

परन्तु लोकपाल इस तरह के कार्य की स्वत: अथवा सरकार द्धारा कहे जाने पर भी जांच कर सकता है, यदि उसकी लिखित राय में ऐसे काम में कोई शिकायत या आरोप हो या होने की सम्भावना हो.

17. वे मामले जो जांच के दायरे से बाहर होंगे

(1) लोकपाल, अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत निम्न कार्रवाई के सम्बन्ध में शिकायत के मामले में, कोई जांछ नहीं करेगा -

क. यदि शिकायतकर्ता के पास किसी अन्य कानून द्वारा प्रदत्त किसी प्राधिकरण के सामने अपील, पुनरीक्षण, समीक्षा या किसी अन्य माध्यम से कोई निवारण है, या था और उसने उसका उपयोग नहीं किया है.

ख. न्यायिक व अर्द्ध न्यायिक निकायों द्वारा लिए गए निर्णय जब तक कि शिकायतकर्ता दुर्भावनापूर्ण होने का आरोप न लगाए.

ग. यदि पूरी शिकायत तात्विक रूप में किसी न्यायालय या सक्षम न्याय अधिकार क्षेत्र की अर्ध- न्याययिक संस्था के समक्ष लम्बित है

घ. ऐसी कोई शिकायत जहां इसे निपटान करने में अत्यधिक एवं अबोध्य विलम्ब हो.

(2) इस अधिनियम में ऐसा कुछ भी नहीं है कि लोकपाल संसद के किसी सदन के पीठासीन अधिकारी की स्वीकृति लेने के बाद ही किसी कार्रवाई की जांच करेगा.

(3) इस अनुच्छेद की कोई बात लोकपाल को कदाचार या भ्रष्टाचार या भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वाले की सुरक्षा के खिलाफ शिकायत दर्ज करने से नहीं रोक सकती है.

18. शिकायत और जांच से सम्बन्धित प्रावधान-

(1) क. लोकपाल, किसी शिकायत, आरोप के रूप में प्राप्त किसी शिकायत अथवा दोनों, या स्वत: संज्ञान से उठाए गए किसी मामले में, दस्तावेज़ों को देखते हुए, जांच या पूछताछ की प्रक्रिया शुरू करने का निर्णय ले सकता है, या जांच और पूछताछ की प्रक्रिया की सुनवाई के पहले प्रारम्भिक जांच का निर्णय ले सकता है या किसी दूसरे व्यक्ति को प्रारम्भिक जांच करने का निर्देश दे सकता है ताकि किसी जांच के लिए उचित आधार है या नहीं यह तय किया जा सकें. प्राथमिक जांच के परिणाम आते ही इसकी जानकारी, और यदि मामले को बन्द करने का निर्णय लिया जाता है तो जांच के दौरान एकत्र की गई समस्त सामग्री शिकायकर्ता को उपलब्ध कराई जाएगी.

साथ ही यह भी कि यदि, किसी मामले को बन्द किया जाता है तो उससे सम्बन्धित सभी दस्तावेज सार्वजिनक माने जाएंगे. हर महीने, बन्द किए गए ऐसे मामलों की सूची, मामले को बन्द किए जाने के कारण सहित, वेबसाइट पर डाली जाएगी. इस तरह बन्द किए गए मामलों से सम्बन्धित सारी सामग्री सूचना के अधिकार के कानून के तहत, जानकारी मांगने वाले किसी भी व्यक्ति को, उपलब्ध कराई जाएगी

परन्तु साथ ही यह भी कि किसी भी शिकायत या आरोप को, शिकायतकर्ता के उद्देश्य अथवा प्रेरणा के आधार पर खारिज़ नहीं किया जा सकेगा.

साथ ही यह भी कि, लोकपाल के समक्ष की गई सभी सुनवाइयों की वीडियो रिकार्डिंग होगी और किसी भी व्यक्ति को, प्रतियां बनाने के मूल्य अदा करने पर, उपलब्ध कराई जाएगी.

ख. किसी शिकायत की प्रारम्भिक जांच के लिए प्रक्रिया लोकपाल द्वारा मामले की परिस्थियों के आधार पर तय की जाएगी और यदि आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है तो लोकपाल सम्बन्धित लोक सेवक से टिप्पणी भी आमन्त्रित कर सकता है.

परन्तु यह भी कि, प्राथमिक जांच पूरी करने और मुकदमे को बन्द करने या जांच के लिए आगे बढ़ाने का निर्णय शिकायत प्राओत करने के एक माह के अन्दर और निश्चित तौर पर तीन माह के अन्दर ले लिया जाएगा. यदि एक महीने में जांच पूरी नहीं हो पाती वहां जांच पूरी होने पर विलम्ब का कारण लिखित तौर पर दर्ज कर के सार्वजनिक किया जाएगा.

ग. इस अधिनियम के तहत कोई भी शिकायत गुमनाम स्वीकार नहीं की जाएगी. शिकायतकर्ता को लोकपाल के पास अपनी पहचान ज़ाहिर करनी होगी. तथापि यदि शिकायकर्ता चाहता है तो लोकपाल द्वारा उसकी पहचान गोपनीय रखी जाएगी.

(2) जहां लोकपाल सीधे सीधे या प्रारम्भिक जांच के बाद इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत जांच प्रस्तावित करता है, तो-

क. जरुरी समझने पर जांच से सम्बन्धित दस्तावेजों को सुरक्षित स्थान पर रखने का निर्देश दे सकता है.

ख. जांच के उचित चरण पर या खत्म होने पर, जांच रिपोर्ट की प्रति, उसके निष्कर्ष एवं निष्कर्ष से सम्बन्धित आधार सामिग्री की प्रति सम्बन्धित लोक सेवक और शिकायतकर्ता को अग्रेशित की जाएगी.

ग. सम्बन्धित लोक सेवक और शिकायतकर्ता को टिप्पणी और सुनवाई का मौका दिया जाएगा.

साथ ही यह भी कि अति विशिष्ट परिस्थितियों को छोड़ कर ऐसी सुनवाई सार्वजनिक रूप से की जाएगी, और उसे लिखित तौर पर रिकार्ड किया जाएगा, जहां यह सार्वजनिक हित में नहीं है, न्याय के हित के लिए इसे कैमरे में रिकार्ड कर सार्वजनिक किया जाएगा.

(3) इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत किसी कार्रवाई के सम्बन्ध में लोक सेवक के खिलाफ जांच करना उस कार्रवाई को, या जांच के अधीन किसी मामले के सम्बन्ध में आगे कोई कार्रवाई करने के लिए किसी अन्य लोक सेवक की शक्ति को प्रभावित नहीं करेगा.

(4) यदि इस अधिनियम के तहत प्रारम्भिक जांच के दौरान, लोकपाल प्रथम दृष्टया सन्तुष्ट है कि आरोपों या शिकायतों के परिप्रेक्ष्य में पूरी या आंशिक तौर पर किसी भी तरह की कार्रवाई की सम्भावना है तो वह एक अन्तरिम आदेश के माध्यम से, लोक प्राधिकरण को निर्णय या कार्रवाई के क्रियान्वयन या अमलीकरण पर रोक लगाने की सिफारिश कर सकता है, या ऐसे नियम व शर्तों पर वह बाध्यकारी या निवारक कार्रवाई कर सकता है, जो और ज्यादा नुकसान से रोकने के वह अपने आदेश में उल्लेखित करे. लोक प्राधिकरण इस उप अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत आदेश प्राप्त करने के 15 दिन के अन्दर लोकपाल की सिफारिशों पर या तो अमल करेगा या उन्हें नामंजुर करेगा. लोकपाल यदि आवश्यक समझे तो, लोक प्राधिकरण को उपयुक्त निर्देश देने की मांग करते हुए सम्बन्धित उच्च न्यायालय में जा सकता है.

(5) लोकपाल, यदि जांच के दौरान सन्तुष्ट होता है कि किसी मामले में अभियोग शुरू होने की सम्भावना है, या जांच की समाप्ति पर अभिय्ग शुरू करते समय, मामले में सभी आरोपियों की चल अचल सम्पित्ति की सूची बनाएगा और उसे अधिसूचित करेगा. अधिसूचना के पश्चात इस सम्पत्ति के हस्तान्तरण की अनुमति नहीं होगी. अन्तिम सजा की स्थिति में अदालत, अन्य उपायों के अलावा, इस अधिनियम की धारा 19 के अन्तर्गत, इस सम्पत्ति से भ्रष्टाचार के चलते हुई क्षति की वसूली कर सकता है.

(6) यदि शिकायतों की जांच और पूछताछ के दौरान, लोकपाल को लगता है कि सरकारी सेवक के पद पर बने रहना जांच या पूछताछ को प्रतिकूल ढंग से प्रभावित कर सकता है या वह सरकारी सेवक सबूतों को नष्ट या छेड़छाड़ या गवाहों को प्रभावित कर सकता है, तो लोकपाल उस सरकारी सेवक के स्थानान्तरण या निलम्बन की उपयुक्त सिफारिश जारी कर सकता है. लोक प्राधिकरण लोकपाल द्वारा की गई सिफारिश के मिलने के 15 दिन के भीतर इसे उप धारा के अन्तर्गत इसे मान भी सकता है या मना कर सकता है. यदि लोकपाल इसे महत्वपूर्ण मानता है तो वह सम्बन्धित उच्च न्यायालय में जा सकता है और लोक प्राधिकरण के लिए उपयुक्त निर्देश की मांग कर सकता है.

(7) लोकपाल, इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत पूछताछ अथवा जांच के किसी भी चरण में, अन्तरिम आदेश के ज़रिए, सक्षम प्राधिकारों को आवश्यक कार्रवाई करने, पूछताछ या जांच रोकने का निर्देश दे सकता है-

क. लोक सेवक के प्रशासनिक कार्य से सार्वजनिक राजस्व अपव्यय को रोकने या सार्वजनिक सम्पत्ति की क्षति के लिए

ख. सरकारी सेवक के कार्यों में कदाचार को रोकने के लिए

ग. सरकारी सेवक द्वारा भ्रष्ट तरीके से अर्जित सम्पत्ति को छिपाने से रोकने के लिए,

इस उप अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत लोक प्राधिकरण आदेश प्राप्त करने के 15 दिन के भीतर इस पर अमल करेगा अन्यथा नामंजूर करेगा. यदि लोकपाल इसे महत्वपूर्ण समझे तो वह सम्बन्धित उच्च न्यायालय में जा सकता है और लोक प्राधिकरण के लिए उपयुक्त निर्देश की मांग कर सकता है.

(8) जहां, शिकायत पर जांच के बाद, लोकपाल यह पाता है कि, मन्त्रियों, संसद सदस्यों एवं न्यायधीशों के अतिरिक्त, किसी लोक सेवक के खिलाफ शिकायत में शामिल आरोप की पुष्टि होती है और सम्बन्धित लोक सेवक को अपने पद पर कायम नहीं रहना चाहिए तो वह इस हेतु आदेश जारी कर सकता है, यदि लोकसेवक मन्त्री है तो लोकपाल राष्ट्रपति को ऐसी शिकायत करेगा. राष्ट्रपति द्वारा सिफारिश प्राओत करने के एक माह के अन्दर, उसे स्वीकार करने या नामंजूर करने का निर्णय लिया जाएगा.

परन्तु यह भी कि इस अनुच्छेद के प्रावधान प्रधानमन्त्री पर लागू नहीं होंगे.

(9) लोकपाल के सभी रिकार्ड और सूचनाएं सूचना का अधिकार कानून के तहत सार्वजनिक किए जाएंगे. और यहां तक कि जांच व पूछताछ की स्थिति भी, जब तक कि उस सूचना के जारी करने से किसी जांच व पूछताछ की प्रक्रिया पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव न पड़ता हो, उपलब्ध कराए जाएंगे.

भ्रष्टचार के चलते सरकार को होने वाले नुकसान की भरपाई और दण्ड

19. सरकार को होने वाले नुकसान की वसूली: भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक कानून 1988 की धारा 19 के तहत जब कोई व्यक्ति दोषी पाया जाता है, तब परीक्षण न्यायालय, सरकार को हुए नुकसान और दोषी द्वारा भ्रष्टाचार के माध्यम से अर्जित लाभ की गणना कर, इस तरह की कुल राशि को विभिन्न दोषियों के ऊपर आरोपित किया जाएगा और उनकी सम्पत्ति के ज़रिए वसूला जाएगा.

19क. अपराध के लिए सज़ा भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक कानून की उपधारा 2 (4) और उपधारा 28ए के अध्याय iii में विर्णत अपराध के लिए कम से कम एक वर्ष के सश्रम कारावास की सज़ा होगी और इसे उम्रकैद के तक भी बढ़ाया जा सकता है.

दोषी व्यक्ति के सरकार में उच्च पद पर आसीन होने की स्थिति में यह सज़ा और भी कठोर हो सकती है.

इसके अतिरिक्त, बशर्तें कि, अपराध इस अधिनियम की उपधारा 2(4) के तहत विर्णत है और लाभार्थी एक व्यावसायिक इकाई है तो, इस अधिनियम में वर्णित एवं भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत अन्य सजा के अलावा जनता को हुए नुकसान का की पांच गुना राशि दोषी से जुर्माने के रूप में वसूली जाएगी, अगर दोषी की सम्पत्ति अपर्याप्त है तो यह वसूली व्यावसायिक ईकाई और उसके निदेशकों की व्यक्तिगत सम्पत्ति से वसूली जा सकती है.

उच्च न्यायालय या उच्चतम न्यायालय के न्यायधीशों के खिलाफ शिकायतों का निपटान

19ख. हाईकोर्ट या सुप्रीमकोर्ट के जजों के खिलाफ शिकायतों की प्राप्ति व निपटाना:

(1) हाईकोर्ट या सुप्रीमकोर्ट के जजों के खिलाफ किसी भी शिकायत को केवल लोकपाल अध्यक्ष ही देखे.

(2) इस तरह की प्रत्येक शिकायत की प्रारम्भिक जांच होगी, जो प्रथम दृष्टया यह आकलन करेगी कि क्या भ्रष्टाचार निरोधक कानून के तहत पर्याप्त सबूत हैं. यह जांच लोकपाल के किसी एक सदस्य द्वारा की जाएगी, जो लोकपाल की पूर्ण पीठ के समक्ष इसे प्रस्तुत करेगा. परन्तु यह पूर्ण पीठ, विधिक पृष्टभूमि के कम से कम तीन कानूनी सदस्यों की होगी.

(3) कोई भी मामला विधिक पृष्ठभूमि के सदस्यों के बहुमत वाली पूर्ण पीठ के अनुमोदन के बगैर पंजीकृत नहीं किया जाएगा.

(4) इस तरह के मामलों की जांच एक विशेष टीम द्वारा होगी, जिसका नेतृत्व कम से कम पुलिस अधीक्षक स्तर का अधिकारी करेगा.

(5) अभियोजन आरम्भ करने अथवा न करने का निर्णय भी, लोकपाल की विधिक पृष्ठभूमि के सदस्यों के बहुमत वाली पूर्ण पीठ के द्वारा ही लिया जाएगा.

भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वालों का संरक्षण:

20. भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वालों का संरक्षण:

(1) भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वाला कोई व्यक्ति, यदि उसका व्यावसायिक या शारीरिक उत्पीड़न हो रहा हो या ऐसी धमकी दी गई हो तो लोकपाल से सुरक्षा मांग सकता है,

(2) इस तरह की कोई शिकायत मिलने पर लोकपाल निम्न कदम उठाएगा:

क. व्यावसायिक उत्पीड़न: उपयुक्त जांच के बाद अगर लोकपाल महसूस करता है कि इस अधिनियम के तहत आरोप लगाने के बाद भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज वाले को वास्तव में खतरा है तो वह यथाशीघ्र , लेकिन शिकायत मिलने के एक माह से अधिक नहीं, सक्षम अधिकारी को लोकपाल के निर्देशानुसार आवश्यक कदम उठाने का आदेश देगा.

ख. अगर भष्टाचार के विरूद्ध आवाज उठाने वाला शिकायत करता है कि इस अधिनियम के तहत आरोप लगाने के बाद उसका व्यावसायिक उत्पीड़न हुआ है अथवा उसे पेशेगत रूप से नुकसान पहुंचाया गया है और जांच के बाद लोकपाल की यह राय बनती है कि सूचनादाता को वास्तव में नुकसान पहुंचाया गया है तो यथाशीघ्र, लेकिन शिकायत मिलने के एक माह से अधिक नहीं, युक्तियुक्त अधिकारी को लोकपाल के निर्देशानुसार आवश्यक कार्रवाई करने का आदेश देगा.

प्रावधान (क) के तहत लोकपाल धमकी देने वाले या नुकसान पहुंचाने वाले सरकारी अधिकारी के विरुद्ध सुसंगत नियमों के तहत उचित दण्ड का आदेश निर्गत कर सकता है लेकिन प्रावधान (ख) के तहत निश्चित रूप से ऐसा करेगा.

परन्तु प्रभावित सरकारी सेवक को अपना पक्ष रखने का एक अवसर उपलब्ध कराए बिना दंड़ का निर्धारण नहीं किया जा सकेगा.

ग. शारीरिक नुकसान की धमकी: लोकपाल, युक्तियुक्त जांच कराएगा और अगर उसे लगे कि वास्तव में धमकी दी गई है और यह धमकी इस अधिनियम के तहत आरोपण या सूचना के अधिकार के तहत आवेदन करने के वजह से दी गई है, तो किसी भी अन्य कानून के बावजूद लोकपाल अधिकतम एक सप्ताह के अन्दर उपयुक्त अधिकारी के साथ पुलिस को उक्त व्यक्ति को उचित सुरक्षा उपलब्ध कराने के साथ, धमकी देने वालों के विरुद्ध आपराधिक मुकदमा दर्ज कर आवश्यक कार्रवाई करने का निर्देश देगा.

अगर धमकी गम्भीर एवं सिन्नकट है तो लोकपाल तत्काल कार्रवाई करते हुए, कुछ घण्टों के अन्दर उक्त व्यक्ति को शारीरिक हमले से बचाने का उपाय करेगा. अगर शिकायतकर्ता अध्यक्ष या किसी सदस्य से मिलना चाहता है तो वह उनसे फोन या वीडियो कांफ्रेंसिंग के जरिए बात करने या व्यक्तिगत रूप से मिलने के लिए अधिकृत होगा.

घ. यदि कोई व्यक्ति शिकायत करता है कि इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत आरोप लगाने की वजह से उस पर शारीरिक हमला हुआ है और लोकपाल जांच के बाद इस बात से आश्वस्त होता है कि उस व्यक्ति पर इस अधिनियम के तहत आरोपण या सूचना के अधिकार के तहत आवेदन करने की वजह से हमला हुआ है, तो किसी भी अन्य कानून के बावजूद, लोकपाल ,यथाशीघ्र लेकिन अधिक से अधिक 24 घण्टे के अन्दर सम्बन्धित अधिकारियों को – उक्त व्यक्ति को उचित सुरक्षा उपलब्ध कराने, हमलावरों के विरुद्ध आपराधिक मुकदमा दर्ज कराने के साथ साथ यह भी सुनिश्चित करने कि उस व्यक्ति के साथ दोबारा इस तरह की घटना न हो, के आदेश जारी करेगा. अगर शिकायतकर्ता अध्यक्ष या किसी सदस्य से मिलना चाहता है तो वह उनसे फोन या वीडियो कांफ्रेंसिंग के जरिए बात करने या व्यक्तिगत रूप से मिलने के लिए अधिकृत होगा.

(घ क) अगर भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वाला कोई व्यक्ति आरोप लगाता है कि इस अधिनियम के तहत आरोपण या सूचना के अधिकार अधिनियम के इस्तेमाल की वजह से उसके खिलाफ पुलिस या किसी प्राधिकारी ने मामला दर्ज कराया है या मामला दर्ज कराने का उपक्रम किया जा रहा है तो लोकपाल जांच के आधार पर उपयुक्त अधिकारियों को ऐसा मामला वापस लेने का आदेश निर्गत कर सकता है.

(घ ख) शारीरिक नुकसान की धमकी के मामले में या कोई ऐसा व्यक्ति जिस पर हमला हुआ है, देश में कहीं भी लोकपाल के कार्यालय में शिकायत कर सकता है और लोकपाल कार्यालय का यह कर्र्तव्य होगा कि वह उस शिकायत को तत्काल लोकपाल के उपयुक्त अधिकारी तक पहुंचा दे.

(घ ग) लोकपाल भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वाले को सुरक्षा प्रदान करने का उत्तरदायित्व अपने अधीन किसी सतर्कता अधिकारी को सौंप सकता है और इस मामले में उस अधिकारी को यह अधिकार होगा कि वह उपयुक्त प्राधिकारी जिसमें पुलिस भी शामिल होगी, को उक्त भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वाले की सुरक्षा सुनिश्चित कराने के लिए आवश्यक कदम उठाने का निर्देश दे सकता है.

(घ घ) अगर लोकपाल के पास शिकायत के बाद किसी व्यक्ति पर हमला किया जाता है तो लोकपाल के सम्बन्धित अधिकारी को कर्र्तव्य का निर्वहन न कर पाने या मिलीभगत या दोनों का दोषी ठहराया जाएगा, जब तक वह इसकी पुष्टि नहीं कर देता कि उसने अपनी ओर से कोई कोर कसर नहीं छोड़ी है.

ङ. अगर भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वाला व्यक्ति भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम के तहत दण्डनीय किसी कृत्या का आरोप लगाता है तो लोकपाल प्रावधान (ग) के मामले के तहत आरोपों की जांच के लिए एक विशेष दल का गठन कर सकता है जो प्राथमिकता के आधार पर एक महीने के भीतर मामले की जांच पूरा करेगा और प्रावधान (घ) के मामलों के तहत निश्चित रूप से ऐसा करेगा.

च. अगर भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज उठाने वाला कोई ऐसा आरोप लगाता है जो भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम से अलग किसी अन्य कानून के तहत दण्डनीय है, तो प्रावधान (ग) के अधीन आने वाले मामले में लोकपाल उस ऐजेंसी, जिसके पास उस कानून को लागू करने का अधिकार है, को सूचनादाता के अरोपों की जांच के लिए विशेष दल बनाने और प्राथमिकता के आधार पर लोकपाल द्वारा निर्धारित समय सीमा के भीतर जांच पूरी करने का निर्देश दे सकता है और प्रावधान (घ) के अधीन आने वाले मामले में लोकपाल निश्चित रूप से ऐसा करेगा.

छ. उपनियम (छ) के अधीन आने वाले मामलों में लोकपाल को उपयुक्त ऐजेंसी को इस तरह की जांच की निगरानी करने और अगर जरूरी हुआ तो लोकपाल के निर्देश के अनुरूप ऐजेंसी को खुद जांच करने का निर्देश जारी करने का अधिकार होगा.

ज. भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वाला, जिसे शारीरिक नुकसान पहुंचाने की धमकी दी गई है या उसे वास्तविक रूप से नुकसान पहुंचाया गया है, सीधे लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष से मिल सकता है और अध्यक्ष 24 घण्टे के भीतर उससे मिलेंगे और अधिनियम के प्रावधानों के मुताबिक उचित कर्रवाई करेंगे.

(3) अगर कोई शिकायतकर्ता अनुरोध करता है कि उसकी पहचान गुप्त रखी जाए तो लोकपाल ऐसा सुनिश्चित करेगा. लोकपाल इस बारे में विस्तृत प्रक्रिया निर्धारित करेगा कि इस तरह की शिकायतों को कैसे आगे बढ़ाया जाएगा.

(4) लोकपाल जुल्म की पुनरावृत्ति रोकने के लिए लोक प्राधिकारियों को नीतियों और प्रक्रिया में आवश्यक परिवर्तन का आदेश निर्गत करेगा.

(5) लोकपाल भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ आवाज़ उठाने वालों से शिकायत की प्राप्ति और निपटान के लिए उपयुक्त नियम बनाएगा.

शिकायत निवारण प्रणाली

21. नागरिक घोषणापत्र:

(1) प्रत्येक लोक प्राधिकरण इस अधिनियम के प्रभाव में आने के अधिकतम एक साल के भीतर नागरिक अधिकार पत्र की तैयारी और कार्यान्यवन सुनिश्चित करेगा.

(2) प्रत्येक नागरिक घोषणापत्र में उस लोक प्राधिकरण की कार्य की प्रतिबद्धता के बारे में, प्रत्येक कार्य प्रतिबद्धता को सुनिश्चित करने के लिए ज़िम्मेदार अधिकारियों के बारे में और इसके लिए समय सीमा के बारे में स्पष्ट विवरण होगा.

(3) प्रत्येक लोक प्राधिकरण एक प्राधिकारी नामित करेगा, जिसे लोक शिकायत निवारण अधिकारी कहा जाएगा, जिसके पास शिकायतकर्ता नागरिक घोषणापत्र के उल्लंघन की शिकायतें लेकर जाएंगे.

यह भी कि लोक प्राधिकरण ऐसी हर जगह पर, कम से कम एक लोक शिकायत निवारण अधिकारी नियुक्त करेगा जहां उसका कार्यालय होगा.

लोक शिकायत निवारण अधिकारी विभाग का प्रमुख होगा या उससे एक दर्जे नीचे का अधिकारी, लेकिन अगर किसी जगह विभाग प्रमुख नहीं है तो वहां के सबसे वरिष्ठ अधिकारी को लोक शिकायत निवारण अधिकारी नियुक्त किया जाएगा.

(4) प्रत्येक लोक प्राधिकरण साल में कम से कम एक बार अपने मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी की मौजूदगी में सार्वजनिक बैठक कर नागरिक घोषणापत्र की समीक्षा कर और उसमें संशोधन करेगा.

(5) लोकपाल किसी लोक प्राधिकरण को अपने नागरिक घोषणापत्र में परिवर्तन का आदेश निर्गत कर सकेगा और लोक प्राधिकरण को आदेश मिलने के एक सप्ताह के भीतर उक्त परिवर्तन करना होगा.

प्रावधानों के मुताबिक इस तरह के परिवर्तन को लोकपाल की कम से कम तीन सदस्यीय पीठ द्वारा अनुमोदित कराना होगा.

इस तरह के परिवर्तन में नागरिक घोषणापत्र की मौजूदा समय सीमा बढ़नी या वर्णित कार्यों की संख्या घटनी नहीं चाहिए.

21क. शिकायत प्राप्ति व निपटान:

(1) किसी लोक प्राधिकरण का मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी उस लोक प्राधिकरण से सम्बन्धित शिकायतों को प्राप्त करने एवं निपटाने के लिए उतनी संख्या में सतर्कता अधिकारी घोषित करेगा जितना उचित लगे, जो कि अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी के तौर पर जाने जाएंगे।

(2) यदि कोई नागरिक जन शिकायत निवारण अधिकारी के समक्ष शिकायत करने के एक माह के अन्दर शिकायत का सन्तुष्टिपूर्ण निवारण प्राप्त करने में विफल रहता है तो, अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी के समक्ष शिकायत कर सकता है।

परन्तु शिकायत की गम्भीरता एवं तात्कालिकता पर विचार करते हुए अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी को यदि महसूस होता है कि, ऐसा करना जरूरी है तो, वह ऐसी शिकायत को जल्द भी स्वीकार करने का निर्णय कर सकता है।

(3) यदि शिकायत उस लोक प्राधिकरण के नागरिक चार्टर में विर्णत मुद्दे से सम्बन्धित नहीं है तो, अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी, शिकायत प्राप्त करने के एक माह के अन्दर, या तो शिकायत को नामंजूर करने या आदेश में विर्णत तरीके से उस समय के अन्दर शिकायत के समाधान के लिए लोक प्राधिकरण को निर्देश देते हुए एक आदेश जारी करेगा.

परन्तु यह भी कि शिकायतकर्ता को सुनवाई का अवसर दिये बगैर कोई शिकायत नामंजूर नहीं की जाएगी.

(4) अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी को प्रेषित शिकायत को सतर्कता दृष्टिकोण वाली शिकायत समझा जाएगा, यदि:

क. शिकायतकर्ता, सिटिज़न चार्टर में वर्णित मुद्दों के लिए, जन शिकायत निवारण अधिकारी से सन्तुष्टिपूर्ण निवारण पाने में विफल रहा है, अथवा, और

ख. सिटीज़न चार्टर में विर्णत मुद्दों से अतिरिक्त के लिए, यदि इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (3) में निर्धारित अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी के आदेश का उल्लंघन होता है।

(5) इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (4) में वर्णित, हरेक मामले को निम्न तरीके से समाधान किया जाएगा:

क. सुनवाई का वाजिब अवसर देने के बाद, अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी शिकायकर्ता की शिकायत को निर्धारित समय में सन्तुष्टिपूर्ण निवारण में विफलता के लिए जिम्मेदारी तय करते हुए आदेश जारी कर सकता है और उस लोक प्राधिकरण के आरेखण एवं संवितरण अधिकारी को आदेश में विर्णत तरीके से उस अधिकारी के वेतन से जुर्माने की रकम वसूलने का निर्देश दे सकता है, अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी के निर्देश अनुसार, वह जुर्माना सिटीज़न चार्टर में निदिर्ष्ट समय सीमा पूरा होने के दिन से या उस शिकायत के निवारण के लिए इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (3) के अन्तर्गत जारी आदेश में निदिर्ष्ट समय सीमा के दिन से गणना करके प्रतिदिन विलम्ब के लिए रुपये 250 से कम नहीं होना चाहिए।

ख.कथित अधिकारियों के वेतन से वसूली गई रकमों को शिकायतकर्ता को क्षतिपूर्ति के लिए आरेखण एवं संवितरण अधिकारी को निर्देश देना।

(6) इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (5) की उपधारा(क) के अन्तर्गत जारी किए जाने वाले आदेश में उल्लेखित अधिकारियों को स्पष्ट करना आवश्यक होगा कि उन्होंने नेकनीयती से कार्य किया है और उनका कोई भ्रष्ट उद्देश्य नहीं है। यदि वे ऐसा करने में विफल रहते हैं तो, अपीलीय शिकायत अधिकारी कथित अधिकारियों के खिलाफ केन्द्रीय नागरिक सेवा विनियम के अन्तर्गत जुर्माना लगाने की सिफारिश करेगा.

21ख. वार्षिक अखण्डता लेखा परीक्षण : समय-समय पर लोकपाल की ओर से तय दिशानिर्देशों के अनुसार लोकपाल हरेक विभाग की वार्षिक अखण्डता लेखा परीक्षण करेगा।

बड़े या छोटे दण्ड का अधिरोपण

21ग. कदाचार के आरोप की शिकायतें सतर्कता अधिकारी के पास की जाएंगी. इन शिकायतों पर वही जांच भी करेगा.

21घ. अनुच्छेद 21क के अन्तर्गत सतर्कता दृष्टिकोण वाली कदाचार एवं जन शिकायतों के आरोप निम्न तरीके से हल किये जाएंगे:

(1) सतर्कता अधिकारी ऐसे हरेक मामले में उसे प्राप्त करने के तीन माह के अन्दर जांच करेगा और मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी को अपनी रिपोर्ट प्रस्तुत करेगा।

(2) रिपोर्ट प्राप्त करने के एक पखवाड़े के अन्दर, मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी उप मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारियों का तीन सदस्यीय पीठ गठित करेगा, इस पीठ में उपधारा (1) के अन्दर जांच करने वाला अधिकारी ‘शामिल नहीं होगा.

(3) यह पीठ जांच करने वाले सतर्कता अधिकारी, शिकायतकर्ता एवं आरोपी अधिकारी के साथ सारांश सुनवाई करेगी.

(4) यह पीठ दैनिक आधार पर सुनवाई करेगी और आरोपी सरकारी सेवकों पर एक या अधिक छोटे और बड़े दण्ड लगाते हुए आदेश जारी करेगी.

परन्तु ये आदेश पीठ गठित करने के एक माह के अन्दर जारी किये जाएंगे।

साथ ही यह भी कि ऐसे आदेश समुचित निनियोक्ता प्राधिकरण को सिफारिश के स्वरूप में होंगे।

(5) पीठ के आदेश के खिलाफ मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी के समक्ष अपील की जा सकेगी, जोकि आरोपी, शिकायतकर्ता एवं पूछताछ करने वाले सतर्कता अधिकारी को सुनवाई का वाजिब अवसर देने के बाद, अधिकतम एक माह के अन्दर अपना आदेश जारी करेगा.

लोकपाल में कर्मचारी और स्टाफ एवं अधिकारी

22. मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी:

(1) प्रत्येक लोक प्राधिकरण में एक मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी होगा जिसका चयन और नियुक्ति लोकपाल द्वारा की जाएगी.

(2) वह सम्बन्धित लोक प्राधिकरण से नहीं होगा.

(3) वह एक ईमानदार निष्ठावान और भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ सक्रिय कार्रवाई करने में योग्य व्यक्ति होगा.

(4) वह किसी भी लोक प्राधिकरण के खिलाफ शिकायत स्वीकार करने के लिए उतरादायी होगा और शिकायत प्राप्त होने के अधिकतम दो दिन के भीतर सम्बन्धित लोक अधिकारी के पास उसे स्थानान्तरित करेगा.

(5) लोकपाल द्वारा समय-समय पर दिए गए दायित्वों के निर्वाह के लिए वह उत्तरदायी होगा, जिनमें, लोकपाल द्वारा समय-समय पर निर्धारित किए गए तरीके से, शिकायतों का निपटान भी शामिल है.

परन्तु जिन शिकायतों के लिए भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम 1988 के तहत जांच आवश्यक है, उन्हें लोकपाल के जांच सम्भाग को स्थानान्तरित किया जाएगा.

साथ ही यह भी कि, संयुक्त सचिव या उससे ऊपर स्तर के अधिकारियों के खिलाफ, काम पूरा न होने की शिकायतों के अतिरिक्त परिवादों को मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी नहीं देखेगा और उन्हें लोकपाल को स्थानान्तरित किया जाएगा, जो कि किन्ही तीन अन्य प्राधिकारणों के मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारियों की एक कमेटी गठित करेगा जो इन शिकायतों की जांच करेगी.

(6) अगर किसी नागरिक को जन शिकायत अधिकारी से इस अधिनियम की धारा 21 के तहत सन्तोषजनक निवारण नहीं मिलता है तो लोकपाल की ओर से मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी सभी शिकायतों को प्राप्त करेगा और उसका निपटान करेगा.

(7) लोकपाल के निर्णय के अनुसार समय-समय पर कुछ सतर्कता अधिकारियों की नियुक्ति मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी के अधीन की जाएगी.

(8) सतर्कता अधिकारियों एवं मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी को ऐसे मामलों में लोकपाल द्वारा केन्द्रीय नागरिक सेवा (आचरण) नियम के अन्तर्गत और समय समय पर लोकपाल द्वारा तय किये जाने वाले नियमों के मुताबिक पूछताछ करने एवं जुर्माना लगाने का अधिकार होगा।

23. लोकपाल के कर्मचारी इत्यादि

(1) इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत ऐसे अधिकारी एवं कर्मचारी होंगे जो इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल को अपने कार्य को पूरा करने में मदद करने के लिए निर्धारित किये जा सकते हैं।

(2) अधिकारियों एवं कर्मचारियों की संख्या एवं श्रेणी का निर्णय लोकपाल द्वारा किया जाएगा।

(3) उप-अनुच्छेद (1) में वर्णित अधिकरियों, एवं कर्मचारियों की श्रेणियां, भर्ती एवं सेवा की शर्तें वे होंगी जो कि लोकपाल द्वारा निर्धारित की जा सकती हैं, इनमें विशेष शर्तें या विशेष वेतन शामिल हैं जो कि निडर होकर अपना कर्र्तव्य निभाने के लिए सक्षम बनाने के लिए जरूरी हो सकती हैं।

परन्तु यह कि जिस भी अधिकारी की निष्ठा सन्देहास्पद हो, उसे लोकपाल में नियुक्त करने के बारे में विचार नहीं किया जाएगा।

इसके अतिरिक्त यह भी कि सभी अधिकारी एवं कर्मचारी, जो कि लोकपाल में प्रतिनियुक्ति पर या किसी तरह से काम करते हैं, इस धारा के अन्तर्गत निर्धारित एकसमान नियमों एवं शर्तों के योग्य होंगे।

(4) उप-अनुच्छेद (1) के प्रावधानों के प्रति पूर्वाग्रह के बगैर, इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत जांच करने के उद्देश्य से लोकपाल निम्न की सेवाएं ले सकता है -

क. केन्द्र सरकार के किसी अधिकारी या जांच एजेंसी; या

ख. किसी अन्य सरकार की पूर्व सहमति से उनका कोई अधिकारी या जांच एजेंसी; या

ग. निजी व्यक्ति सहित, कोई व्यक्ति, या कोई अन्य एजेंसी।

(5) इस उप-अनुच्छेद में जिक्र किये गये अधिकारी एवं कर्मचारी लोकपाल के प्रशासनिक एवं अनुशासनिक नियन्त्रण में होंगे।

(6) लोकपाल को अपने अधिकारी चुनने की शक्ति होगी। लोकपाल सरकारी एजेंसियों से तय समय के लिए प्रतिनियुक्ति पर अधिकारी प्राप्त कर सकता है या अन्य सरकारी एजेंसियों से स्थायी आधार पर अधिकारी प्राप्त कर सकता है या स्थायी आधार पर नियत समय के लिए बाहर से व्यक्ति नियुक्त कर सकता है।

(7) कर्मचारी एवं अधिकारी ऐसे वेतनमान एवं भत्ते के हकदार होंगे, जो कि केन्द्र सरकार के साधारण वेतनमान से अलग एवं ज्यादा हो सकता है, जो कि समय समय पर लोकपाल द्वारा प्रधानमन्त्री के साथ विचार-विमर्श से तय किया जाएगा, ताकि लोकपाल में काम करने के लिए ईमानदार एवं सक्षम लोग आकर्षित हों।

(8) लोकपाल अपने सम्पूर्ण बजटीय बाधाओं के अन्तर्गत, अपने काम के बोझ के अनुसार एवं कार्यरत स्टाफों के सेवा की शर्तों को ध्यान में रखते हुए विभिन्न स्तरों पर अपने कर्मचारी कम करने या बढ़ाने के लिए सक्षम होगा।

24. निरस्त व बचाव करना-

(1) केन्द्रीय सर्तकता आयोग अधिनियम निष्प्रभावी हो जाएगा.

(2) निरस्त होने के बावजूद, इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत हुए कोई कार्य या चीज इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत की हुई समझी जाएंगी और इस अधिनियम के समतुल्य प्रावधानों के अन्तर्गत जारी और पूरी की जा सकती है।

(3) केन्द्रीय सतर्कता आयोग के समक्ष लंबित सभी पूछताछ एवं जांच और अन्य अनुशासनात्मक कार्यवाही और जिनका निपटारा नहीं हुआ है, वे लोकपाल को हस्तान्तरित की जाएंगी और जारी रहेंगी यदि वे इस अधिनियम के अंतर्गत उनके समक्ष शुरू होती हैं।

(4) किसी अधिनियम में कुछ व्यवस्था भी होने के बावजूद, केन्द्रीय सतर्कता आयोग के सचिव एवं अन्य अधिकारियों और कर्मचारियों का पद समाप्त किया जाता है और इसके बाद वे लोकपाल के सचिव एवं अन्य अधिकारियों और कर्मचारियों के तौर पर नियुक्त किये जाते हैं। उस सचिव, अधिकारियों एवं अन्य कर्मचारियों के वेतन, भत्ते एवं सेवा की अन्य नियम व शर्तें, जब तक कि उन्हें बदला न जाए, वहीं होंगी जो इस अधिनियम में शुरू करने के ठीक पहले वे हकदार रहे हैं।

(5) केन्द्र सरकार के सभी विभागों, केन्द्र सरकार के मन्त्रालयों, किसी केन्द्रीय अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत स्थापित निगम, सरकारी कम्पनियां, केन्द्र सरकार की या उनके द्वारा नियन्त्रित सोसायटी एवं स्थानीय प्राधिकरण के नियन्त्रण के अन्तर्गत सभी सतर्कता प्रशासन, सभी उद्देश्यों के लिए अपने अधिकारियों, सम्पत्तियों एवं दायित्त्वों सहित लोकपाल को हस्तान्तरित हो जाएंगे।

(6) उप-अनुच्छेद (5) में विर्णत एजेंसियों की सतर्कता शाखा में कार्यरत अधिकारी लोकपाल में स्थानान्तरित किये जाने वाले तारीख से पांच साल के लिए प्रतिनियुक्ति पर समझे जाएंगे। जबकि, लोकपाल उनमें से किसी को भी व कभी भी उनकी वापसी कर सकता है।

(7) उप-अनुच्छेद (5) के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल को स्थानान्तरित हुए अधिकारियों के विभाग का स्थानान्तरित अधिकारियों के प्रशासन एवं कार्य पर कोई भी नियन्त्रण बन्द हो जाएगा।

(8) लोकपाल अधिकारियों को एक के बाद बदलते रहेंगे और और हरेक विभाग का सतर्कता शाखा इस तरह बनाएंगे कि उसी विभाग का कोई अधिकारी उसी विभाग के सतर्कता कार्य के लिए नियुक्त न हो।

(9) वह व्यक्ति लोकपाल के साथ नियुक्त नहीं होगा जिन पर विचार करते समय उनके खिलाफ कोई भी सतर्कता पूछताछ या आपराधिक मामला लंबित या विचाराधीन हो।

25. लोकपाल की अन्वेषण शाखा-

(1) लोकपाल में एक अन्वेषण शाखा होगी.

(2) भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम के धारा 17 के प्रावधानों के बावजूद लोकपाल के स्तर निर्धारित किए गए अन्वेषण शाखा के ऐसे अधिकारी इस अधिनियम के अधीन शिकायतों के जांच के सिलसिले में पूरे देश में किसी व्यक्ति को गिरफ्तार कर सकते हैं. उन्हें वे सभी अधिकार, कर्र्तव्य, विशेषाधिकार और दायित्व हासिल होंगे जो किसी घटना की जांच के लिए दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना के सदस्यों को मिले हुए हैं.

(3) दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस स्थापना को का वह भाग जो भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम, 1988 के तहत सम्बन्धित अपराधों के अन्वेषण और अभियोजन के लिए प्रतिबद्ध होता है, अपने कर्मचारियों, साधनों और देनदारियों समेत सभी प्रयोजनों के लिए लोकपाल को हस्तान्तरित कर दिया जाएगा.

(4) उप-धारा (3) के तहत स्थानान्तरित किया गया दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस विभाग, लोकपाल के सतर्कता विभाग का हिस्सा होगा.

(5) केन्द्रीय सरकार का उस स्थानान्तरित प्रभाग व उनके कर्मचारियों पर कोई अधिकार नहीं होगा.

(6) स्थानान्तरित कर्मचारियों के वेतन, भत्ते और सेवा की अन्य नियम व शर्तें उप धारा (3) के तहत वहीं होंगी, जिनके वे इस अधिनियम के प्रारम्भ होने से तुरन्त पहले योग्य थे.

(7) वे सभी मामले जो कि दिल्ली विशेष पुलिस प्रभाग के पास थे, वे सभी उप धारा (3) के तहत लोकपाल को स्थानान्तरित हो जाएंगे.

(8) किसी मामले की जांच के पूरा होने के बाद, उस मामले को अन्वेषण शाखा लोकपाल की उपयुक्त पीठ के सामने प्रस्तुत करेगी ताकि यह निर्णय लिया जा सके कि उस पर अभियोजन करने की इजाजत है या नहीं.

25क. अभियोजन शाखा- लोकपाल की एक अभियोजन शाखा होगी. किसी मामले में जांच पूरी होने के बाद, जांच शाखा इसे अभियोजन शाखा को अग्रसित कर देगी, जिस पर अभियोजन करने या नहीं करने का निर्णय अभियोजन शाखा लेगी.

परन्तु यह कि लोकपाल द्वारा चिन्हित विशिष्ट श्रेणी के मामलों में लोकपाल की पीठ द्वारा यह निर्णय लिया जाएगा कि इसके अभियोजन की अनुमति देनी है या इंकार करना है.

यह भी कि जांच शाखा से मामला मिलने के दो सप्ताह के भीतर अभियोजन शाखा अभियोजन की अनुमति देने या नहीं देने का निर्णय लेगी, ऐसा नहीं होने की स्थिति में मान लिया जाएगा कि अभियोजन शाखा अभियोजन शुरू करने जा रही है.

26. लोकपाल के अधिकारियों और कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायत:

(1) लोकपाल के अधिकारियों और कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ की गई शिकायत की जांच, इस उपखंड के प्रावधानों के अनुसार , अलग से की जाएगी.

(2) ऐसी शिकायत अपराध के रूप में आरोपित, अथवा भ्रष्टाचार अधिनियम के अनुसार या दुराचार या बेईमानी के मामले की हो सकती है.

(3) लोकपाल में जैसे ही शिकायत दर्ज की जाएगी, शिकायत की सामग्री सहित लोकपाल की वेबसाइट पर प्रदर्शित किया जाएगा,

परन्तु शिकायतकर्ता अगर चाहेगा तो उसकी पहचान नहीं बताई जाएगी.

(4) हर शिकायत की जांच, उसके मिलने के एक माह के भीतर पूरी कर ली जाएगी.

(5) किसी अधिकारी पर लगे आरोपों की जांच भारतीय दण्ड संहिता की धारा 107, 166, 167, 177, 182, 191, 199, 200, 201, 204, 217, 218, 219, 463, 464, 468, 469, 470, 471, 474 के तहत की जाएगी.

(6) अगर जांच के दौरान ऐसा लगा कि लगाए गए आरोप सही हैं तो उस अधिकारी से सारे अधिकार और दायित्व छीन लिए जाएंगे और उसे निलम्बित कर दिया जाएगा.

(7) यदि पूछताछ या जांच पूरी होने के बाद, उस व्यक्ति पर भ्रष्टाचार निवारण अधिनियम-1988 के अन्तर्गत अभियोग चलाने का निर्णय लिया जाता है या वह किसी दुर्व्यवहार अथवा गलत तरीके से पूछताछ या जांच करने का दोषी पाया जाता है तो, वह व्यक्ति आगे से लोकपाल के साथ काम नहीं करेगा। यदि वह व्यक्ति लोकपाल में नौकरी पर है तो लोकपाल उस व्यक्ति को नौकरी से निकाल देगा, या यदि वह प्रतिनियुक्ति पर है तो, उसे नौकरी से निकालने की सिफारिश के साथ वापस भेज दिया जाएगा।

परन्तु इस अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत आरोपी व्यक्ति का पक्ष सुनने का वाजिब अवसर दिये बगैर कोई आदेश जारी नहीं किया जाएगा।

परन्तु इस अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत जांच पूरी करने के लिए 15 दिनों के अन्दर वह आदेश जारी कर दिया जाएगा।

(8) अपने स्टाफ एवं कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायतों के मामले के सुनवाई तीन सदस्यीय न्यायपीठ करेगी। जबकि, मुख्य सतर्कता अधिकारी या उससे ऊपर के स्तर के अधिकारियों के लिए, लोकपाल की पूर्ण पीठ द्वारा सुनवाई की जाएगी।

(9) लोकपाल यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए सारे कदम उठायेगा ताकि उसके अपने स्टाफ एवं कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायतों पर सभी पूछताछ एवं जांच अति पारदर्शी एवं ईमानदारी पूर्ण तरीके से की जाए।

27. बचाव:

(1) किसी अध्यक्ष या सदस्य या किसी अधिकारी के खिलाफ, कर्मचारी, एजेंसी, या व्यक्ति जो अपनी ड्यूटी करते समय अपना दायित्व नेकनीयती से निभाता है तो उसके खिलाफ इस निदिर्ष्ट धारा 14( 4) के तहत गलत आरोप लगाने पर कोई मुकदमा, अभियोग या अन्य कानूनी कार्रवाई नहीं की जाएगी.

विविध

28. सार्वजनिक अधिकारी अपनी सम्पत्ति का ब्यौरा प्रस्तुत करें:

(1) अनुच्छेद 2(12) (क) से (ग) में विर्णत के अलावा, प्रत्येक लोक सेवक इस अधिनियम के शुरू होने के तीन माह के अन्दर और उसके बाद हर साल 30 जून के पहले, लोकपाल द्वारा निर्धारित स्वरूप में, अपने लोक प्राधिकरण के प्रमुख को, अपनी एवं जो अपने परिवार के सदस्यों की सम्पत्तियों एवं जिम्मेदारियों का ब्यौरा प्रस्तुत करेगा। अनुच्छेद 2(12) (क) से (ग) में विर्णत लोकसेवक, लोकपाल को उपरोक्त समय अवधि में, लोकपाल द्वारा निर्धारित स्वरूप में रिटर्न प्रस्तुत करेगा, जिसमें उसकी आय के स्रोत भी शामिल होंगे।

(2) हरेक लोक प्राधिकरण का प्रमुख यह सुनिश्चित करेगा कि ऐसे सभी ब्यौरे उस वर्ष के 31 अगस्त तक वेबसाइट पर डाल दिये जाएं।

(3) यदि उस लोक प्राधिकरण के प्रमुख को उप-अनुच्छेद (1) में निर्धारित समय में किसी लोक सेवक से ऐसा ब्यौरा प्राप्त नहीं होता है तो, उस लोक प्राधिकरण का प्रमुख सम्बन्धित लोक सेवक को ऐसा तत्काल करने का निर्देश देगा। यदि अगले एक माह में, सम्बन्धित लोक सेवक ऐसा ब्यौरा प्रस्तुत नहीं करता है तो, प्रमुख उस लोक सेवक द्वारा वह ब्यौरा प्रस्तुत करने तक उसका वेतन एवं भत्ता रोक देगा.

स्पष्टीकरण – इस अनुच्छेद में “लोक सेवक का परिवार´´ का मतलब पत्नी एवं उसके बच्चे और लोक सेवक के माता पिता, जो उन पर आश्रित हों।

(4) लोकपाल उस लोक सेवक के खिलाफ भारतीय दण्ड संहिता की धारा 176 के अन्तर्गत अभियोग शुरू कर सकता है।

28क. सम्पत्तियों को भ्रष्ट तरीकों से प्राप्त किया गया समझा जाएगा:

(1) किसी लोक सेवक या उसके परिवार के किसी सदस्य के स्वामित्व में ऐसी कोई चल या अचल सम्पत्ति पायी जाती है, जिसे उस लोक सेवक द्वारा इस अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत घोषित नहीं की गई थी जो कि इस अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत पिछली रिटर्न दाखिल करने से पहले हासिल की गई हैं, तो उसे भ्रष्ट तरीके से अर्जित किया गया समझा जाएगा।

(2) किसी लोक सेवक या उसके परिवार के किसी सदस्य के कब्जे में ऐसी कोई चल या अचल सम्पत्ति पायी जाती है, जो कि इस अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत उस लोक सेवक द्वारा घोषित नहीं की गई थी, वह उस लोक सेवक के स्वामित्व में माना जाएगा एवं वह लोक सेवक द्वारा भ्रष्ट तरीके के माध्यम से हासिल किया हुआ समझा जाएगा, उसे अन्यथा साबित करने का दायित्व लोक सेवक का होगा।

(3) किसी लोक सेवक को 15 दिनों के अन्दर इस बात का स्पष्टीकरण देने का एक अवसर दिया जाएगा, कि –

क. इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (1) के अन्तर्गत सम्पत्ति होने की स्थिति में, क्या उसने किसी भी पिछले सालों में उस सम्पत्ति को घोषित किया था।

ख. इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (2) के अन्तर्गत सम्पत्ति होने की स्थिति में, स्पष्टीकरण देने के लिए कि उसे लोक सेवक के स्वामित्व में क्यों नहीं समझा जाना चाहिए।

(4) यदि लोक सेवक इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (3) के अन्तर्गत सन्तुष्टिपूर्ण जवाब प्रदान करने में विफल रहता है तो, लोकपाल ऐसी सभी सम्पत्तियों को जब्त कर लेगा।

(5) इस अनुच्छेद के उप-अनुच्छेद (3) के अन्तर्गत जिसके लिए नोटिस जारी की जाती है, उन सम्पत्तियों का हस्तान्तरण नोटिस जारी करने की तिथि के बाद अमान्य समझी जाएंगी।

(6) लोकपाल, उचित कार्रवाई के लिए ऐसी जानकारी आय कर विभाग को सूचित करेगा.

(7) लोकपाल के उस आदेश के खिलाफ अपील उपयुक्त अधिकार क्षेत्र के उच्च न्यायालय में किया जाएगा, जो अपील दाखिल करने के तीन माह के अन्दर मामले का निर्णय करेगा-

परन्तु, उप-अनुच्छेद (4) के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल के आदेश के 30 दिन बीत जाने के बाद किसी अपील पर विचार नहीं किया जाएगा.

(8) इस अनुच्छेद के अन्तर्गत जब्त समस्त सम्पत्तियों को नीलामी में सबसे ज्यादा बोली लगाने वाले को दी जाएगी। उसकी आधी आय को लोकपाल द्वारा भारत के समेकित कोष में जमा किया जाएगा। शेष रकम को लोकपाल द्वारा अपने खुद के प्रशासन के लिए इस्तेमाल किया जा सकता है.

परन्तु यदि किसी मामले में अपील दाखिल की गई है तो अपील के निपटारे तक कोई नीलामी नहीं होगी.

28ख (1) संसद के किसी चुनाव के पूरा होने के तीन माह के बाद, लोकपाल उम्मीदवार द्वारा भारत के चुनाव आयोग के पास प्रस्तुत सम्पत्ति के ब्यौरे की तुलना आयकर विभाग के उपलब्ध उसके आय के स्रोत से करेगा। जिन मामलों ज्ञात स्रोतों से ज्यादा सम्पत्ति पायी जाती है, वह उपयुक्त कार्यवाही शुरू करेगा।

(2) किसी संसद सदस्य के खिलाफ यह आरोप लगता है कि उसने संसद में मतदान करने या संसद में सवाल उठाने या अन्य किसी विषय सहित संसद के किसी व्यवस्था में रिश्वत ली है तो, संसद सदस्य जिस सदन का सदस्य है तदानुसार, लोकसभा स्पीकर या राज्य सभा अध्यक्ष के पास शिकायत की जा सकती है. ऐसी शिकायतों पर निम्न तरीके से सुनवाई होगी:

क. शिकायत प्राप्त होने के एक माह के अन्दर उसे आचारनीति समिति के पास आगे भेजा जाएगा।

ख. आचारनीति समिति एक माह के अन्दर निर्णय करेगी कि उस पर क्या किया जाना है।

29 प्रतिनिधियों को कार्यभार सौंपने की शक्ति:

(1) लोकपाल अपने मातहतों को शक्तियां और कार्य सौंपने का अधिकारी होगा.

(2) ऐसे अधिकारियों की ओर से अपनी शक्तियों का प्रयोग कर जो कार्य किए जाएगा, उसे लोकपाल द्वारा किया माना जाएगा.

परन्तु नीचे लिखे गए कार्य पीठ द्वारा ही पूरे किए जाएंगे और इन्हें किसी और पर प्रत्यायोजित नहीं किया जाएगा.

क. किसी मामले में अभियोजन शुरू करने का आदेश देना.

ख. सीसीएस संचालित नियमों के अनुसार किसी सरकारी कर्मचारी को बर्खास्त करना.

ग. अनुभाग 10 के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल के अधिकारियों और कर्मचारियों के खिलाफ शिकायत पर आदेश जारी करना.

घ. संयुक्त सचिव और उससे ऊपर के अधिकारियों के खिलाफ मामलों की शिकायतों पर आदेश जारी करना.

30. समय सीमा:

(1) अनुभाग 9 के उपभाग (1) के अंर्तगत इस अधिनियम में प्रारम्भिक जांच शिकायत प्राप्त होने के एक महीने में पूरी हो जानी चाहिए.

परन्तु अगर जांच निर्धारित समय सीमा के भीतर पूरी नहीं होती है, तो जांच अधिकारी को इसका कारण बताने के लिए ज़िम्मेदार माना जाएगा.

(2) किसी आरोप की जांच शिकायत मिलने से छह महीने और किसी भी परिस्थिति में एक वर्ष के भीतर पूरी की जाएगी .

(3) लोकपाल की ओर से दायर अभियोजन पर सुनवाई एक वर्ष के भीतर पूरी हो जानी चाहिए. स्थगन अति विशिष्ट परिस्थितियों में ही दिए जाने चाहिए.

30क. पारदर्शिता और सूचना के अधिकार के लिए प्रार्थना पत्र:

(1) लोकपाल हर सूचना को वेबसाइट पर मुहैया कराने का हर सम्भव प्रयास करेगा.

(2) किसी मामले की जांच पूरी हो जाने के बाद, उससे जुड़े सभी दस्तावेज आम जनता के लिए उपलब्ध होंगे. लोकपाल को यह दस्तावेज वेबसाइट पर डालने का यथासम्भव प्रयास करना होगा.

परन्तु, जानकारी देते समय इस तथ्य का ध्यान रखा जाए कि जिस व्यक्ति ने अपनी पहचान छुपाने की बात कही है और कोई ऐसी सूचना जिससे देश की आन्तरिक और बाह्य सुरक्षा को खतरा हो, को प्रकट नहीं किया जाएगा.

31. विशिष्ट शिकायतों पर जुर्माना:

(1) इस अधिनियम में उल्लेखित होने के बावजूद, यदि कोई व्यक्ति इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत कोई ऐसी शिकायत करता है, जिसमें कोई आधार या साक्ष्य का अभाव हो और वह किसी प्राधिकारों को तंग करने के लिए लोकपाल को की गई हो, तो, लोकपाल शिकायतकर्ता पर जो उचित समझे वह जुर्माना लगा सकता है, लेकिन किसी एक मामले में कुल जुर्माना रुपये एक लाख से ज्यादा नहीं होगा।

परन्तु सुनवाई का वाजिब अवसर दिये बगैर कोई जुर्माना नहीं लगाया जा सकता।

इसके साथ ही यह भी कि सिर्फ इसलिए कि इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत जांच के बाद मामला साबित नहीं हो पाया हो, तो इस अनुच्छेद के उद्देश्य के लिए शिकायतकर्ता के खिलाफ ऐसा नहीं किया जाएगा.

(2) वह जुर्माना भूमि राजस्व अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत बकाया अनुसार वसूले जा सकने योग्य होगा.

(3) इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत एक बार जो शिकायत या आरोप कर दी गई हो उसे वापस लेने की अनुमति नहीं होगी.

31क. निवारक उपाय:

(1) लोकपाल, नियमित समय अन्तराल पर, अपने अधिकार क्षेत्र में पड़ने वाले सभी लोक प्राधिकरण के कार्य पद्धति का या तो स्वयं अथवा किसी अन्य के माध्यम से अध्ययन करेगा और सम्बन्धित लोक प्राधिकरण से विचार-विमर्श करके, ऐसे निर्देश जारी करेगा जिसे वह भविष्य में भ्रष्टाचार की घटनाओं को रोकने के लिए उचित समझे।

(2) लोकपाल इस अधिनियम के बारे जागरूकता उत्पन्न करने एवं आम जनता को भ्रष्टाचार रोकने में शामिल करने के लिए भी उत्तरदायी होगा।

31ख. पुरस्योजना:

(1) लोकपाल को सरकार के भीतर और बाहर भ्रष्टाचार के खिलाफ शिकायत दर्ज कराने वाले व्यक्तियों को पुरस्कृत कर, आम जनता को प्रोत्साहित करना चाहिए.

(2) लोकपाल को इस तरह की योजना लागू करने के लिए भी तैयार रहना चाहिए जिसमें शिकायतकर्ता को आर्थिक तौर पर भी पुरस्कृत किया जा सके. लेकिन, यह पुरस्कार राशि भ्रष्टाचार से होने वाले नुकसान की 10 फीसदी से अधिक नहीं होनी चाहिए.

32. कानून बनाने का अधिकार:

(1) सरकार अधिकारिक गजट में अधिसूचना के द्वारा इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों को प्रभाव में लाने के उद्देश्य से नियम बनाएगी।

परन्तु ऐसे नियम केवल लोकपाल से विचार-विमर्श करके ही बनाये जाएंगे।

(2) खासकर, एवं पूर्वगामी प्रावधानों की व्यापकता पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव डाले बगैर, ऐसे नियम निम्न प्रदान कर सकते हैं :

क. लोकपाल के अध्यक्ष और सदस्यों को देय भत्ते, पेंशन और अन्य सेवा शर्तों के संबंध में;

ख. अनुभाग 11 के उपभाग (2) के खण्ड (एच) के अन्तर्गत लोकपाल के पास एक सिविल अदालत की शक्तियां प्राप्त होनीं चाहिए.

(2क) लोकपाल को सुचारू रूप से चलाने के लिए लोकपाल को अपने नियम बनाने की छूट होनी चाहिए.

क. लोकपाल के स्टाफ और कर्मचारियों आदि के वेतन, भत्ते, भर्ती और अन्य सेवाओं के बारे में;

ख. लोकपाल में मामले दर्ज कराने और कार्यवाही शुरू करने की प्रक्रिया.

ग. इसके साथ ही कोई अन्य विषय, जिसमें इस अधिनियम के अंर्तगत कानून बनाना जरूरी हो.

(3) इस अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत बने किसी नियम को पूर्वव्यापी प्रभाव के साथ बनाया जा सकता है और जब ऐसा नियम बनाया जाता है तो संसद के दोनों सदनो के समक्ष वक्तव्य में नियम बनाने की वजह को स्पष्ट किया जाएगा.

(4) लोकपाल इस अधिनियम में विभिन्न प्रावधानों में वर्णित समय सीमा का कड़ाई से पालन करेगा. इसे हासिल करने के लिए, लोकपाल हरेक स्तर के पदाधिकारी के लिए मानक तय करेगा और कार्य के बोझ के अनुसार अतिरिक्त संख्या में पदाधिकारियों एवं बजट की जरूरत का आकलन करेगा.

32क. यह लोकपाल का कर्र्तव्य होगा कि अपने स्टाफ को नियमित अन्तराल में प्रशिक्षित करे और उनके कौशल में सुधार के लिए अन्य सभी कदम उठाये और लोगों के साथ व्यवहार करने के सोच में बदलाव लाए।

लोकपाल को हर स्पर होने वाले कार्य के मानदण्डों को सूचीबद्ध करना होगा. इसके बाद कार्य की मात्रा को ध्यान में रखते हुए अतिरिक्त लोगों की भर्ती की जरूरत और बजट का हिसाब लगाना होगा.

33. कठिनाइयों को दूर करना :- इस अधिनियम में कुछ भी होने के बावजूद, राष्ट्रपति, लोकपाल के साथ विचार-विमर्श करके या लोकपाल के निवेदन पर निम्न आदेश, ऐसे प्रावधान कर सकता है-

(1) इस अधिनियम के प्रावधानों को प्रभावी संचालन में लाने के लिए

(2) केन्द्रीय सतर्कता आयोग के समक्ष लंबित पूछताछ एवं जांच को लोकपाल द्वारा जारी रखने के लिए।

34 . कानून बनाने की शक्ति :- संस्था के अबाध क्रियाकलाप एवं इस अधिनियम के विभिन्न प्रावधानों के प्रभावी क्रियान्वयन के लिए लोकपाल को अपने विनियम बनाने का अधिकार होगा।

35. यह अधिनियम अन्य सभी कानूनों के प्रावधानों से सर्वोपरि होगा।

(indiaagainstcorruption.org से साभार)

Live in Relation in the light of latest Judbment from Supreme Court of India

2010-10-21T20:46:00.000-07:00

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Bench: M Katju, T Thakur

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2028-2029__OF 2010

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.2273-2274/2010]

D. Velusamy -versus- D. Patchaiammal

Judgment Delivered on 21 October, 2010

Cites 17 docs - [View All]
The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
The Protection Of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 125 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 2(s) in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973

JUDGMENT

Markandey Katju, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant. None has appeared for the respondent although she has been served notice. We had earlier requested Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior counsel to assist us as Amicus Curiae in 2 the case, and we record our appreciation of Mr. Bhushan who was of considerable assistance to us.

3. These appeals have been filed against the judgment of the Madras High Court dated 12.10.2009.

4. The appellant herein has alleged that he was married according to the Hindu Customary Rites with one Lakshmi on 25.6.1980. Out of the wedlock with Lakshmi a male child was born, who is now studying in an Engineering college at Ooty. The petitioner is working as a Secondary Teacher in Thevanga Higher Secondary School, Coimbatore.

5. It appears that the respondent-D. Patchaiammal filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in the year 2001 before the Family Court at Coimbatore in which she alleged that she was married to the appellant herein on 14.9.1986 and since then the appellant herein and she lived together in her father's house for two or three years. It is alleged in the petition that after two or three years the appellant herein left the house of the respondent's father and started living in his native place, but would visit the respondent occasionally.

6. It is alleged that the appellant herein (respondent in the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.) deserted the respondent herein (petitioner in the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C.) two or three years after marrying her in 1986. In her petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. she alleged that she did not have any kind of livelihood and she is unable to maintain herself whereas the respondent (appellant herein) is a Secondary Grade Teacher drawing a salary of Rs.10000/- per month. Hence it was prayed that the respondent (appellant herein) be directed to pay Rs.500/- per month as maintenance to the petitioner.

7. In both her petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as in her deposition in the case the respondent has alleged that she was married to the appellant herein on 14.9.1986, and that he left her after two or three years of living together with her in her father's house.

8. Thus it is the own case of the respondent herein that the appellant left her in 1988 or 1989 (i.e. two or three years after the alleged marriage in 1986). Why then was the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. filed in the year 2001, i.e. after a delay of about twelve years, shall have to be satisfactorily explained by the respondent. This fact also creates some doubt about the case of the respondent herein.

9. In his counter affidavit filed by the appellant herein before the Family Court, Coimbatore, it was alleged that the respondent (appellant herein) was married to one Lakshmi on 25.6.1980 as per the Hindu Marriage rites and customs and he had a male child, who is studying in C.S.I. Engineering college at Ooty. To prove his marriage with Lakshmi the appellant produced the ration card, voter's identity card of his wife, transfer certificate of his son, discharge certificate of his wife Lakshmi from hospital, photographs of the wedding, etc.

10. The learned Family Court Judge has held by his judgment dated 5.3.2004 that the appellant was married to the respondent and not to Lakshmi. These findings have been upheld by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

11. In our opinion, since Lakshmi was not made a party to the proceedings before the Family Court Judge or before the High Court and no notice was issued to her hence any declaration about her marital status vis-`- vis the appellant is wholly null and void as it will be violative of the rules of natural justice. Without giving a hearing to Lakshmi no such declaration could have validly be given by the Courts below that she had not married the appellant herein since such as a finding would seriously affect her rights. And if no such declaration could have been given obviously no declaration could validly have been given that the appellant was validly married to the respondent, because if Lakshmi was the wife of the appellant then without divorcing her the appellant could not have validly married the respondent.

12. It may be noted that Section 125 Cr.P.C. provides for giving maintenance to the wife and some other relatives. The word `wife' has been defined in Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) of the Cr.P.C. as follows : "Wife includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried."

13. In Vimala (K) vs. Veeraswamy (K) [(1991) 2 SCC 375], a three- Judge Bench of this Court held that Section 125 of the Code of 1973 is meant to achieve a social purpose and the object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. Explaining the meaning of the word `wife' the Court held: "..the object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife. When an attempt is made by the husband to negative the claim of the neglected wife depicting her as a kept-mistress on the specious plea that he was already married, the court would insist on strict proof of the earlier marriage. The term `wife' in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, includes a woman who has been divorced by a husband or who has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. The woman not having the legal status of a wife is thus brought within the inclusive definition of the term `wife' consistent with the objective. However, under the law a second wife whose marriage is void on account of the survival of the first marriage is not a legally wedded wife, and is, therefore, not entitled to maintenance under this provision."

14. In a subsequent decision of this Court in Savitaben Somabhat Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 2005 SC 1809, this Court held that however desirable it may be to take note of the plight of an unfortunate woman, who unwittingly enters into wedlock with a married man, there is no scope to include a woman not lawfully married within the expression of `wife'. The Bench held that this inadequacy in law can be amended only by the Legislature.

15. Since we have held that the Courts below erred in law in holding that Lakshmi was not married to the appellant (since notice was not issued to her and she was not heard), it cannot be said at this stage that the respondent herein is the wife of the appellant. A divorced wife is treated as a wife for the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. but if a person has not even been married obviously that person could not be divorced. Hence the respondent herein cannot claim to be the wife of the appellant herein, unless it is established that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi.

16. However, the question has also be to be examined from the point of view of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Section 2(a) of the Act states :

"2(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent";

Section 2(f) states :

"2(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family"; Section 2(s) states :

"2(s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household."

Section 3(a) states that an act will constitute domestic violence in case it-

"3(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse;" or

(emphasis supplied)

17. The expression "economic abuse" has been defined to include : "(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance".

(emphasis supplied)

18. An aggrieved person under the Act can approach the Magistrate under Section 12 for the relief mentioned in Section 12(2). Under Section 20(1)(d) the Magistrate can grant maintenance while disposing of the application under Section 12(1).

19. Section 26(1) provides that the relief mentioned in Section 20 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court.

20. Having noted the relevant provisions in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, we may point out that the expression `domestic relationship' includes not only the relationship of marriage but also a relationship `in the nature of marriage'. The question, therefore, arises as to what is the meaning of the expression `a relationship in the nature of marriage'. Unfortunately this expression has not been defined in the Act. Since there is no direct decision of this Court on the interpretation of this expression we think it necessary to interpret it because a large number of cases will be coming up before the Courts in our country on this point, and hence an authoritative decision is required.

21. In our opinion Parliament by the aforesaid Act has drawn a distinction between the relationship of marriage and a relationship in the nature of marriage, and has provided that in either case the person who enters into either relationship is entitled to the benefit of the Act. 1

22. It seems to us that in the aforesaid Act of 2005 Parliament has taken notice of a new social phenomenon which has emerged in our country known as live-in relationship. This new relationship is still rare in our country, and is sometimes found in big urban cities in India, but it is very common in North America and Europe. It has been commented upon by this Court in S. Khushboo vs. Kanniammal & Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 600 (vide para 31).

23. When a wife is deserted, in most countries the law provides for maintenance to her by her husband, which is called alimony. However, earlier there was no law providing for maintenance to a woman who was having a live-in relationship with a man without being married to him and was then deserted by him.

24. In USA the expression `palimony' was coined which means grant of maintenance to a woman who has lived for a substantial period of time with a man without marrying him, and is then deserted by him (see `palimony' on Google). The first decision on palimony was the well known decision of the California Superior Court in Marvin vs. Marvin (1976) 18 C3d660. This case related to the famous film actor Lee Marvin, with whom a lady Michelle lived for many years without marrying him, and was then deserted by him and she claimed palimony. Subsequently in many decisions of the Courts in USA, the concept of palimony has been considered and developed. The US Supreme Court has not given any decision on whether there is a legal right to palimony, but there are several decisions of the Courts in various States in USA. These Courts in USA have taken divergent views, some granting palimony, some denying it altogether, and some granting it on certain conditions. Hence in USA the law is still in a state of evolution on the right to palimony.

25. Although there is no statutory basis for grant of palimony in USA, the Courts there which have granted it have granted it on a contractual basis. Some Courts in USA have held that there must be a written or oral agreement between the man and woman that if they separate the man will give palimony to the woman, while other Courts have held that if a man and woman have lived together for a substantially long period without getting married there would be deemed to be an implied or constructive contract that palimony will be given on their separation.

26. In Taylor vs. Fields (1986) 224 Cal. Rpr. 186 the facts were that the plaintiff Taylor had a relationship with a married man Leo. After Leo died Taylor sued his widow alleging breach of an implied agreement to take care of Taylor financially and she claimed maintenance from the estate of Leo. The Court of Appeals in California held that the relationship alleged by Taylor was nothing more than that of a married man and his mistress. It was held that the alleged contract rested on meretricious consideration and hence was invalid and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals relied on the fact that Taylor did not live together with Leo but only occasionally spent weekends with him. There was no sign of a stable and significant cohabitation between the two.

27. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Devaney vs. L' Esperance 195 N.J., 247 (2008) held that cohabitation is not necessary to claim palimony, rather "it is the promise to support, expressed or implied, coupled with a marital type relationship, that are indispensable elements to support a valid claim for palimony". A law has now been passed in 2010 by the State legislature of New Jersey that there must be a written agreement between the parties to claim palimony.

28. Thus, there are widely divergent views of the Courts in U.S.A. regarding the right to palimony. Some States like Georgia and Tennessee expressly refuse to recognize palimony agreements. 1

29. Written palimony contracts are rare, but some US Courts have found implied contracts when a woman has given up her career, has managed the household, and assisted a man in his business for a lengthy period of time. Even when there is no explicit written or oral contract some US Courts have held that the action of the parties make it appear that a constructive or implied contract for grant of palimony existed.

30. However, a meretricious contract exclusively for sexual service is held in all US Courts as invalid and unenforceable.

31. In the case before us we are not called upon to decide whether in our country there can be a valid claim for palimony on the basis of a contract, express or implied, written or oral, since no such case was set up by the respondent in her petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

32. Some countries in the world recognize common law marriages. A common law marriage, sometimes called de facto marriage, or informal marriage is recognized in some countries as a marriage though no legally recognized marriage ceremony is performed or civil marriage contract is entered into or the marriage registered in a civil registry (see details on Google).

33. In our opinion a `relationship in the nature of marriage' is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married :-

(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.

(b) They must be of legal age to marry.

(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.

(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.

(see `Common Law Marriage' in Wikipedia on Google) In our opinion a `relationship in the nature of marriage' under the 2005 Act must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a `shared household' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a `domestic relationship'.

34. In our opinion not all live in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriag8e to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a `keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage'

35. No doubt the view we are taking would exclude many women who have had a live in relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend the law. Parliament has used the expression `relationship in the nature of marriage' and not `live in relationship'. The Court in the grab of interpretation cannot change the language of the statute.

36. In feudal society sexual relationship between man and woman outside marriage was totally taboo and regarded with disgust and horror, as depicted in Leo Tolstoy's novel `Anna Karenina', Gustave Flaubert's novel `Madame Bovary' and the novels of the great Bengali writer Sharat Chandra Chattopadhyaya.

37. However, Indian society is changing, and this change has been reflected and recognized by Parliament by enacting The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

38. Coming back to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the learned Family Court Judge erred in law in holding that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without even issuing notice to Lakshmi. Hence this finding has to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Family Court which may issue notice to Lakshmi and after hearing her give a fresh finding in accordance with law. The question whether the appellant was married to the respondent or not can, of course, be decided only after the aforesaid finding.

39. There is also no finding in the judgment of the learned Family Court Judge on the question whether the appellant and respondent had lived together for a reasonably long period of time in a relationship which was in the nature of marriage. In our opinion such findings were essential to decide this case. Hence we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and Family Court Judge, Coimbatore and remand the matter to the Family Court Judge to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Appeals allowed.

....................................J.

(MARKANDEY KATJU)

.....................................J.

(T. S. THAKUR)

NEW DELHI;

21st OCTOBER, 2010

Judgment of Supreme Court of India on Female Foeticide

2010-03-02T11:35:00.000-08:00

Supreme Court of India
Writ Petition (civil) 301 of 2000

PETITIONER:
Centre for Enquiry Into Health And Allied Themes (CEHAT) & Others

RESPONDENT:
Union of India & Others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2003

BENCH: M.B. SHAH & ASHOK BHAN.

JUDGMENT: Shah, J.
It is an admitted fact that in Indian Society, discrimination
against girl child still prevails, may be because of prevailing
uncontrolled dowry system despite the Dowry Prohibition Act, as
there is no change in the mind-set or also because of insufficient
education and/or tradition of women being confined to household
activities. Sex selection/sex determination further adds to this
adversity. It is also known that number of persons condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms, and agree to pursue, by
appropriate means, a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women, still however, we are not in a position to change mental set-up
which favours a male child against a female. Advance technology is
increasingly used for removal of foetus (may or may not be seen as
commission of murder) but it certainly affects the sex ratio. The
misuse of modern science and technology by preventing the birth of
girl child by sex determination before birth and thereafter abortion is
evident from the 2001 Census figures which reveal greater decline in
sex ratio in the 0-6 age group in States like Haryana, Punjab,
Maharashtra and Gujarat, which are economically better off.

    Despite this, it is unfortunate that law which aims at preventing
such practice is not implemented and, therefore, Non-Governmental
Organisations are required to approach this Court for implementation
of the Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of
Misuse) Act, 1994 renamed after amendment as "The Pre-conception
and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection)
Act" (hereinafter referred to as 'the PNDT Act') which is the normal
function of the Executive.

In this petition, it was inter alia prayed that as the Pre-natal
Diagnostic Techniques contravene the provisions of the PNDT Act,
the Central Government and the State Governments be directed to
implement the provisions of the PNDT Act (a) by appointing
appropriate authorities at State and District levels and the Advisory
Committees; (b) the Central Government be directed to ensure that
Central Supervisory Board meets every 6 months as provided under
the PNDT Act; and (c) for banning of all advertisements of pre-natal
sex selection including all other sex determination techniques which
can be abused to selectively produce only boys either before or during
pregnancy.

    After filing of this petition, notices were issued and thereafter
various orders from time to time were passed to see that the Act is
effectively implemented.

A]    On 4th May 2001, following order was passed:—
    "It is unfortunate that for one reason or the other,
the practice of female infanticide still prevails despite the
fact that gentle touch of a daughter and her voice has
soothing effect on the parents. One of the reasons may
be the marriage problems faced by the parents coupled
with the dowry demand by the so-called educated and/or
rich persons who are well placed in the society. The
traditional system of female infanticide whereby female
baby was done away with after birth by poisoning or
letting her choke on husk continues in a different form by
taking advantage of advance medical techniques.
Unfortunately, developed medical science is misused to
get rid of a girl child before birth. Knowing full well that
it is immoral and unethical as well as it may amount to an
offence, foetus of a girl child is aborted by qualified and
unqualified doctors or compounders. This has affected
overall sex ratio in various States where female
infanticide is prevailing without any hindrance.

For controlling the situation, the Parliament in its
wisdom enacted the Pre-natal Diagonstic Techniques
(Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994
(hereinafter referred to as "the PNDT Act"). The
Preamble, inter alia, provides that the object of the Act is
to prevent the misuse of such techniques for the purpose
of pre-natal sex determination leading to female feoticide
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
The Act came into force from 1st January, 1996.

    It is apparent that to a large extent, the PNDT Act
is not implemented by the Central Government or by the
State Governments. Hence, the petitioners are required
to approach this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. One of the petitioners is the Centre
for Enquiry Into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT)
which is a research center of Anusandhan Trust based in
Pune and Mumbai. Second petitioner is Mahila
Sarvangeen Utkarsh Mandal (MASUM) based in Pune
and Maharashtra and the third petitioner is Dr. Sabu M.
Georges who is having experience and technical
knowledge in the field. After filing of this petition, this
Court issued notices to the concerned parties on 9.5.2000.
It took nearly one year for the various States to file their
affidavits in reply/written submissions. Prima facie it
appears that despite the PNDT Act being enacted by the
Parliament five years back, neither the State
Governments nor the Central Government has taken
appropriate actions for its implementation. Hence, after
considering the respective submissions made at the time
of hearing of this matter, as suggested by the learned
Attorney General for India, Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee
following directions are issued on the basis of various
provisions for the proper implementation of the PNDT
Act: -
I.    Directions to the Central Government

1.    The Central Government is directed to create
public awareness against the practice of pre-
natal determination of sex and female
foeticide through appropriate releases /
programmes in the electronic media. This
shall also be done by Central Supervisory
Board ("CSB" for short) as provided under
Section 16(iii) of the PNDT Act.

2.    The Central Government is directed to
implement with all vigor and zeal the PNDT
Act and the Rules framed in 1996. Rule 15
provides that the intervening period between
two meetings of the Advisory Committees
constituted under sub-section (5) of Section 17
of the PNDT Act to advise the appropriate
authority shall not exceed 60 days. It would
be seen that this Rule is strictly adhered to.

II.    Directions to the Central Supervisory Board
(CSB)

1.    Meetings of the CSB will be held at least once
in six months. [Re. Proviso to Section 9(1)]
The constitution of the CSB is provided under
Section 7. It empowers the Central
Government to appoint ten members under
Section 7(2)(e) which includes eminent
medical practitioners including eminent social
scientists and representatives of women
welfare organizations. We hope that this
power will be exercised so as to include those
persons who can genuinely spare some time
for implementation of the Act.

2.    The CSB shall review and monitor the
implementation of the Act. [Re. Section
16(ii)].

3.    The CSB shall issue directions to all State/UT.
Appropriate Authorities to furnish quarterly
returns to the CSB giving a report on the
implementation and working of the Act.
These returns should inter alia contain specific
information about: -

(i)    Survey of bodies specified in section 3
of the Act.

(ii)    Registration of bodies specified in
section 3 of the Act.

(iii)    Action taken against non-registered
bodies operating in violation of section
3 of the Act, inclusive of search and
seizure of records.

(iv)    Complaints received by the Appropriate
Authorities under the Act and action
taken pursuant thereto.

(v)    Number and nature of awareness
campaigns conducted and results
flowing therefrom.

4.    The CSB shall examine the necessity to
amend the Act keeping in mind emerging
technologies and difficulties encountered in
implementation of the Act and to make
recommendations to the Central Government.
[Re. Section 16]

5.    The CSB shall lay down a code of conduct
under section 16(iv) of the Act to be observed
by persons working in bodies specified therein
and to ensure its publication so that public at
large can know about it.

6.    The CSB will require medical professional
bodies/associations to create awareness
against the practice of pre-natal determination
of sex and female foeticide and to ensure
implementation of the Act.

III.    Directions to State Governments/UT
Administrations

1.    All State Governments/UT Administrations
are directed to appoint by notification, fully
empowered Appropriate Authorities at
district and sub-district levels and also
Advisory Committees to aid and advise the
Appropriate Authority in discharge of its
functions [Re. Section 17(5)]. For the
Advisory Committee also, it is hoped that
members of the said Committee as provided
under section 17(6)(d) should be such
persons who can devote some time for the
work assigned to them.

2.    All State Governments/UT Administrations
are directed to publish a list of the
Appropriate Authorities in the print and
electronic media in its respective State/UT.

3.    All State Governments/UT Administrations
are directed to create public awareness
against the practice of pre-natal
determination of sex and female foeticide
through advertisement in the print and
electronic media by hoarding and other
appropriate means.

4.    All State Governments/UT Administrations
are directed to ensure that all State/UT
appropriate Authorities furnish quarterly
returns to the CSB giving a report on the
implementation and working of the Act.
These returns should inter alia contain
specific information about: -

(i)    Survey of bodies specified in section 3 of
the Act.

(ii)    Registration of bodies specified in section 3
of the Act.

(iii)    Action taken against non-registered bodies
operating in violation of section 3 of the
Act, inclusive of search and seizure of
records.

(iv)    Complaints received by the Appropriate
Authorities under the Act and action taken
pursuant thereto.

(v)    Number and nature of awareness campaigns
conducted and results flowing therefrom.

IV.    Directions to Appropriate Authorities

1.    Appropriate Authorities are directed to take
prompt action against any person or body
who issues or causes to be issued any
advertisement in violation of section 22 of
the Act.

2.    Appropriate Authorities are directed to take
prompt action against all bodies specified in
section 3 of the Act as also against persons
who are operating without a valid certificate
of registration under the Act.

3.    All State/UT Appropriate Authorities are
directed to furnish quarterly returns to the
CSB giving a report on the implementation
and working of the Act. These returns
should inter alia contain specific information
about: -

(i)    Survey of bodies specified in section 3 of
the Act.

(ii)    Registration of bodies specified in section 3
of the Act including bodies using ultrasound
machines.

(iii)    Action taken against non-registered bodies
operating in violation of section 3 of the
Act, inclusive of search and seizure of
records.

(iv)    Complaints received by the Appropriate
Authorities under the Act and action taken
pursuant thereto.

(v)    Number and nature of awareness campaigns
conducted and results flowing therefrom.

             The CSB and the State Governments/Union
Territories are directed to report to this Court on or
before 30th July 2001. List the matter on 6.8.2001 for
further directions at the bottom of the list."

B]    Inspite of the above order, certain States/UTs did not file their
affidavits. Matter was adjourned from time to time and on 19th
September, 2001, following order was passed:—
    "Heard the learned counsel for the parties and
considered the affidavits filed on behalf of various States.
From the said affidavits, it appears that the directions
issued by this Court are not complied with.

1.    At the outset, we may state that there is total
slackness by the Administration in implementing the Act.
Some learned counsel pointed out that even though the
Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratories or
Genetic Clinics are not registered, no action is taken as
provided under Section 23 of the Act, but only a warning
is issued. In our view, those Centres which are not
registered are required to be prosecuted by the
Authorities under the provisions of the Act and there is
no question of issue of warning and to permit them to
continue their illegal activities.

It is to be stated that the Appropriate Authorities or
any officer of the Central or the State Government
authorised in this behalf is required to file complaint
under Section 28 of the Act for prosecuting the offenders.

Further wherever at District Level, appropriate
authorities are appointed, they must carry out the
necessary survey of Clinics and take appropriate action in
case of non-registration or non-compliance of the
statutory provisions including the Rules. Appropriate
authorities are not only empowered to take criminal
action, but to search and seize documents, records,
objects etc. of unregistered bodies under Section 30 of
the Act.

2.    It has been pointed out that the States/Union
Territories have not submitted quarterly returns to the
Central Supervisory Board on implementation of the Pre-
Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention
of Misuse) Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act"). Hence it is directed that the quarterly returns to
Central Supervisory Board should be submitted giving
the following information:-

(a)    Survey of Centres, Laboratories/Clinics,
(b)    Registration of these bodies,
(c)    Action taken against unregistered bodies,
(d)    Search and Seizure,
(e)    Number of awareness campaigns, and
(f) Results of campaigns"

C]    On 7th November, 2001, learned counsel for the Union of India
stated that the Central Government has decided to take concrete steps
for the implementation of the Act and suggested to set up National
Inspection and Monitoring Committee for the implementation of the
Act. It was ordered accordingly.

D]    On 11th December, 2001, it was pointed out that certain State
Governments have not disclosed the names of the members of the
Advisory Committee. Consequently, the State Governments were
directed to publish the names of advisory committee in various
districts so that if there is any complaint, any citizen can approach
them. The Court further observed thus:—
"For implementation of the Act and the rules, it
appears that it would be desirable if the Central
Government frames appropriate rules with regard to sale
of ultrasound machines to various clinics and issue
directions not to sell machines to unregistered clinics.
Learned counsel Mr. Mahajan appearing for Union of
India submitted that appropriate action would be taken in
this direction as early as possible.""
E]    On March 31, 2003, it was pointed out that in conformity with
the various directions issued by this Court, the Act has been amended
and titled as "The Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic
Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act". It was submitted that
people are not aware of the new amendment and, therefore, following
reliefs were sought:—
a)    direct the Union of India, State Governments / UTs
and the authorities constituted under the PNDT
Act to prohibit sex selection techniques and its
advertisement throughout the country;

b)    direct that the appropriate authorities shall also
include "vehicles" with ultra sound machines etc.,
in their quarterly reports hereinafter as defined
under Section 2(d);

c)    any person or institution selling Ultra Sound
machine should provide information to the
appropriate State Authority in furtherance of
Section 3-B of the Amended Act;

d)    direct that State Supervisory Boards be constituted
in accordance with the amended Section 16A in
order to carry out the functions enumerated
therein;

e)    direct appropriate authorities to initiate suo moto
legal action under the amended Section 17(iv)(e);

f)    direct that the Central Supervisory Board shall
publish half yearly consolidated reports based on
the quarterly reports obtained from the State
bodies. These reports should specifically contain
information on:

1)    Survey of bodies and the number of bodies
registered.

2)    Functioning of the regulatory bodies
providing the number and dates of meetings
held.

3)    Action taken against non-registered bodies
inclusive of search and seizure of records.

4)    Complaints received and action taken
pursuant thereto.

5)    Nature and number of awareness
programmes.

6)    Direct that the Central Supervisory Board
shall carry out all the additional functions as
given under the amended Section 16 of the
Act, in particular, to oversee the
performance of various bodies constituted
under the Act and take appropriate steps to
ensure its proper and effective
implementation.

As against this, Mr. Mahjan learned counsel
appearing for the Union of India submits that on the basis
of the aforesaid amendment, appropriate action has
already been taken by Union of India for implementation
and almost all State Governments/UTs are informed to
implement the said Act and the Rules and the State
Governments/UTs are directed to submit their quarterly
report to the Central Supervisory Board.

Considering the amendment in the Act, in our
view, it is the duty of the Union Government as well as
the State Governments/UTs to implement the same as
early as possible."

F]    At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that appropriate directions including the steps which are
required to be taken on the basis of PNDT Act and the suggestion as
given in the written submission be issued.

On this aspect, learned counsel for the parties were heard.

    In view of the various directions issued by this Court, as quoted
above, no further directions are required except that the directions
issued by this Court on 4th May, 2001, 7th November, 2001, 11th
December, 2001 and 31st March, 2003 should be complied with.   The
Central Government / State Governments / UTs are further directed
that:—

a)    For effective implementation of the Act, information
should be published by way of advertisements as well as
on electronic media. This process should be continued
till there is awareness in public that there should not be
any discrimination between male and female child.
b)    Quarterly reports by the appropriate authority, which are
submitted to the Supervisory Board should be
consolidated and published annually for information of
the public at large.
c)    Appropriate authorities shall maintain the records of all
the meetings of the Advisory Committees.
d)    The National Monitoring and Inspection Committee
constituted by the Central Government for conducting
periodic inspection shall continue to function till the Act
is effectively implemented. The reports of this
Committee be placed before the Central Supervisory
Board and State Supervisory Board for any further
action.
e)    As provided under Rule 17(3), public would have access
to the records maintained by different bodies constituted
under the Act.
f)    Central Supervisory Board would ensure that the
following States appoint the State Supervisory Board as
per the requirement of Section 16A.
1.    Delhi        2. Himachal Pradesh    3. Tamil Nadu
4.    Tripura        5.   Uttar Pradesh.

g)    As per requirement of Section 17(3)(a), the Central
Supervisory Board would ensure that the following States
appoint the multi-member appropriate authorities:
1.   Jharkhand    2. Maharashtra    3.    Tripura
    4.   Tamil Nadu    5.    Uttar Pradesh

    It will be open to the parties to approach this Court in case of
any difficulty in implementing the aforesaid directions.

    The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.

    In view of the aforesaid order, pending IAs have become
infructuous and are disposed of accordingly.

The focus of the judicial system should to be to wipe every tear of every waiting litigant.

2009-08-16T05:53:00.000-07:00

The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh's address to the Joint Conference of Chief Ministers and Chief Justices in New Delhi on 16th August 2009

I am very happy to be with you at this very important joint conference of Chief Ministers and Chief Justices. This is an extremely valuable institutional forum for fruitful interaction between two vital wheels of the chariot of good governance - the Executive and the Judiciary. The enormous and often non quantifiable benefits of such meaningful dialogue in such exchanges cannot be overemphasized. Institutional interactions like this create a deeper understanding of each others’ perspective, enhance trust and impart the necessary direction and momentum for processes of good governance.

The Indian legal and judicial system, in one sense, reflects a certain contradiction. India, the world’s largest democracy and home to the second largest pool of lawyers, has legislatures elected by the world’s largest electorate. It has the world’s longest and most comprehensive Constitution, a fiercely free press and institutional bulwarks of freedom like the Election Commission of India and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Its judiciary is dynamic and completely independent and we take pride in this. Despite its unelected character, the people’s faith has been reposed in the judicial organ in a very large measure. The legal system is manned by legal luminaries second to none in the world. Amazingly innovative legal doctrines and precepts have been the gift of the Indian legal system to the world. The “basic structure doctrine” and “public interest litigation” are but two examples. Judicial review has breached unprecedented frontiers. Yet, amidst such strengths, brilliance and dynamism, India has to suffer the scourge of the world’s largest backlog of cases and timelines which generate surprise globally and concern at home. The expeditious elimination of this scourge is the biggest challenge for such conferences and should constitute the highest priority for all of us.

The mammoth number of pending cases cannot be allowed to disillusion or dishearten us. It has to spur us to even higher peaks of achievement and bring out the best from every stakeholder, acting in coordination to progressively overcome this great challenge. In this war, a holistic and multipronged approach is vital. There is no space for piecemeal, patchy or sectoral responses. However, grand mega plans must be tempered and accompanied by common sense, nitty gritty solutions. Adapting Thomas Hardy’s admonition - if we take care of the small things, the big things will take care of themselves - we have to combine and harmonise both the big and the small. In this war on arrears, the entire legal system and each rung of it has to function as a seamless web and an indivisible whole. Naturally, the apex court has to discharge a vital role. It has to be a catalyst, an organiser, a mentor, an umpire, a participant , and, above all, a role model, all at the same time. I can assure this august gathering with all the emphasis at my command that my Government will not be found wanting at any level in this joint effort. We promise to match each step of the judiciary with two of our own. We will not hesitate to walk the extra mile at every opportunity.

The procedural, substantive, or attitudinal reforms which must be continuously and collectively applied to achieve results are diverse in nature. Meritorious individuals should be appointed timely to judicial posts, which have been enhanced at the High Court level by 150 in the last few years. The existing vacancies in High Courts are quite high in number and need to be filled up urgently. I would urge the Chief Justices of High Courts to initiate proposals for quickly filling up these posts. Vacancies at the subordinate level roughly comprise, I have been told, 20% to 25% of subordinate judicial posts. I am told that almost 3000 posts of judges in the country are vacant because of delay in recruitment. All these vacant posts at the subordinate levels need to be filled up without any further loss of time. The State Judicial Academies need to be strengthened for building capacities of judicial officers. Comprehensive computerisation and ultimate linking of all courts in the country into one mega judicial information grid needs to be tailored and adapted to enable screening of all pending cases. Such screening would facilitate disposal of many old cases as moot or infructuous. Despite the recent increases in judicial strength, there is scope for significant future increase in court strength to improve India’s low judge per million population ratio. This is subject, of course, to expeditious filling of existing vacancies. The mechanisms and processes for providing legal aid to the marginalised sections of the society need to be improved.

Consensual Dispute Resolution – whether by way of arbitration or diverse forms of mediation – is an effective bypass to litigation, with significant preventive and curative virtues. The Civil Procedure Code now offers an empowering menu of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) choices. I am happy to note that court annexed mediation centres are now being created at different levels. But they remain still a drop in the ocean. The plea bargaining provided for by the law since 2005 has not been fully utilised till now. There is a need to give it wider publicity to reduce the pendency of cases and the number of under-trials in the country.

The Honorable President of India in her address to the Joint Session of Parliament in June 2009 has directed that a roadmap for judicial reforms be outlined in the next six months and implemented in a time-bound manner. I am happy that the Ministry of Law and Justice is working on such a road map. Shri Moily has also informed me that consultations on the reform initiatives have started with the various stakeholders. A National Consultation with jurists and stakeholders will be held in New Delhi very shortly. This will throw up the broad contours and set the stage for reform. But a lot of work will still have to be done for crafting a detailed blueprint and ensuring its implementation thereafter.

At the last Conference, I had mentioned that we had introduced the Gram Nyayalays Bill in Parliament. Though the legislation has since been enacted in January this year, it is yet to be enforced. I would urge that the state governments initiate immediate action to operationalize the Gram Nyayalayas Act in their States. Once the Act is fully implemented, we will have more than 5000 courts at the intermediate panchayat level. These will bring justice to the doorstep of the common people, who currently feel that getting justice in India is not only time-consuming and costly but sometimes also an intractable proposition. The Central Government has committed assistance to States for setting up the Gram Nyayalays. While there could be differing views on the adequacy of the assistance being provided, this should not hold us from speedily bringing the Act into force.

I am very happy to inform you that the Government of India, on the advice of the Chief Justice of India, has agreed to establish 71 additional CBI Courts in different states. Fast Track Courts should conduct their business differently and faster than normal courts; only then we shall be able to tackle the pendency in cases.
A matter of concern, indeed, worry, is the large number of under-trials in our jails. Many such under-trials have been in jail for periods longer than they would have served had they been sentenced. This is indeed very disturbing. There have been pronouncements of the High Courts and the Supreme Court on this issue but still the number of under-trials in jails continues to be very large. I sincerely hope this Conference will devote some time to this issue.

Let me conclude by suggesting to this august gathering that we take a vow to ensure that the enormous global respect for the Indian judiciary for its path-breaking doctrines and consistent independence be soon matched by similar accolades for an arrear free judicial institution. Like Gandhiji’s common man, the focus of the judicial system should to be to wipe every tear of every waiting litigant. I hope your deliberations will be centred on the single most important stakeholder in this system- the consumer of justice. Unless we meet his or her legitimate demands and expectations in letter and spirit, we cannot rest in peace.

I congratulate the Chief Justice of India and my colleague, Shri Moily ji for having taken the initiative to organize this very important conference. Great importance is attached to your deliberations. Let me end by wishing you a very successful conference and all the very best in your endeavours.”

Homosexuality between adults an fundamental right -Delhi High Court's Historical Judgment

2009-07-02T05:09:00.000-07:00

The historical judgment from Delhi High Court on declaring consensual homosexuality between adults an fundamental right has 105 Pages, 132 para and 26397 words. It is very big to publish here. So we are publishing here only conclusion of the judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
WP(C) No.7455/2001
Date of decision : 2nd July, 2009

Naz Foundation .... Petitioner

versus
Government of NCT of Delhi
and Others .... Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE & HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR

JUDGMENT BY : AJIT PRAKASH SHAH, CHIEF JUSTICE:

.....................................
...................................
CONCLUSION
129. The notion of equality in the Indian Constitution flows from
the ‘Objective Resolution’ moved by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
on December 13, 1946. Nehru, in his speech, moving this
Resolution wished that the House should consider the
Resolution not in a spirit of narrow legal wording, but rather
look at the spirit behind that Resolution. He said, ”Words are
magic things often enough, but even the magic of words
[WP(C)7455/2001] Page 103 of 105
sometimes cannot convey the magic of the human spirit and
of a Nation’s passion…….. (The Resolution) seeks very
feebly to tell the world of what we have thought or dreamt
of so long, and what we now hope to achieve in the near
future.” [Constituent Assembly Debates: Lok Sabha
Secretariat, New Delhi: 1999, Vol. I, pages 57-65].

130. If there is one constitutional tenet that can be said to be
underlying theme of the Indian Constitution, it is that of
'inclusiveness'. This Court believes that Indian Constitution
reflects this value deeply ingrained in Indian society,
nurtured over several generations. The inclusiveness that
Indian society traditionally displayed, literally in every
aspect of life, is manifest in recognising a role in society for
everyone. Those perceived by the majority as “deviants' or
'different' are not on that score excluded or ostracised.

131. Where society can display inclusiveness and understanding,
such persons can be assured of a life of dignity and nondiscrimination.
This was the 'spirit behind the Resolution' of
which Nehru spoke so passionately. In our view, Indian
Constitutional law does not permit the statutory criminal law
to be held captive by the popular misconceptions of who the
LGBTs are. It cannot be forgotten that discrimination is antithesis
of equality and that it is the recognition of equality
which will foster the dignity of every individual.
[WP(C)7455/2001] Page 104 of 105

132. We declare that Section 377 IPC, insofar it criminalises
consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of
Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The provisions of
Section 377 IPC will continue to govern non-consensual
penile non-vaginal sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving
minors. By 'adult' we mean everyone who is 18 years of age
and above. A person below 18 would be presumed not to be
able to consent to a sexual act. This clarification will hold till,
of course, Parliament chooses to amend the law to
effectuate the recommendation of the Law Commission of
India in its 172nd Report which we believe removes a great
deal of confusion. Secondly, we clarify that our judgment
will not result in the re-opening of criminal cases involving
Section 377 IPC that have already attained finality.
We allow the writ petition in the above terms.

CHIEF JUSTICE
JULY 2, 2009 S.MURALIDHAR, J
“nm/v/pk”
[WP(C)7455/2001] Page 105 of 105

A social behaviour without intention may be offence of abetment- SC of India Judgment

2009-06-02T06:11:00.000-07:00

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 681 OF 2003

Dammu Sreenu Versus State of A.P.

JUDGMENT By-Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.
1. The appellant herein filed the present appeal seeking for his acquittal from the order of conviction under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as `the IPC') whereby he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years.

2. The appellant herein allegedly had illicit relationship with the wife of the deceased Bitra Nagarjuna Rao. The wife of the deceased was also made a co-accused in the same offence under Section 306 IPC and she was convicted for the aforesaid offence and was sentenced initially to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years which, however, later on was altered to one year of rigorous imprisonment by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The said sentence of one year has been served out by Accused No. 2, the wife of the deceased Bitra Nagarjuna Rao.

3. The prosecution has alleged in its case that the present appellant had developed an illicit intimacy with Accused No. 2, who was the wife of the deceased Bitra Nagarjuna Rao. On the night of 31.12.1995, accused No. 2, the wife of the deceased went out of her house and returned to her matrimonial home only on the next day. The deceased, Bitra Nagarjuna Rao was unhappy with the aforesaid conduct and so, naturally questioned her about her behaviour because of which there was a quarrel between the two. Being disturbed and perturbed on account of the behaviour of his wife (Accused No. 2), the deceased, Bitra Nagarjuna Rao called the father of Accused No. 2 and asked him to take her away so as to give her proper counselling. Accordingly, she was taken away by her father. On the same day the present appellant (Accused No. 1) came to the house of the deceased and when he was questioned by the inmates of the house of the deceased, he stated that he had illicit relations with the wife of the deceased and that he would keep coming to the house of the deceased so long she does not object to the same. When he was told that Accused No. 2 had gone with her father, Accused No. 1 went to the house of the brother of Accused No. 2 and took her away despite the protest of PW-5, brother of Accused No. 2, in whose house his father kept her. The appellant took her away and brought her back to the house of her brother only after 4 days and to her parents' house on 06.01.1996.

4. Having come to know about the aforesaid incident, the deceased felt humiliated and insulted. He committed suicide by hanging himself in the intervening night of 7th and 8th January, 1996. It is also to be noted, at this stage, that prior to his suicide, the deceased, Bitra Nagarjuna Rao expressed before his brother that it would be better to die as he felt very much insulted and humiliated. The deceased having committed suicide, his brother gave a report to the police which was registered as a case under Section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short `the CrPC') which was, during the course of investigation, altered to a case of Section 306 IPC.

5. The police after investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the accused. The accused, however, denied the charge. Accordingly, he was tried under the aforesaid charges. During the course of trial the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and the appellant-accused was also examined under Section 313 of the CrPC wherein he denied his involvement in the offence.

6. The trial court appreciated the materials available on record and, thereafter, passed a judgment and order of conviction. He convicted the present appellant under Section 306 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years with a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The trial court also convicted accused No. 2, i.e. wife of the deceased, under Section 306 IPC and sentenced her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years.

7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentence the appellant as also the wife of the deceased filed a common criminal appeal in the court of IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur which was registered as Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1998. The said appeal was allowed in part and the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court was altered and reduced by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to 3 years simple imprisonment.

8. In revision the High Court maintained the order of conviction against the accused-appellant but altered the sentence of Accused No. 2, i.e. the wife of the deceased to one year imprisonment which she has already undergone.

9. Now this appeal is, therefore, filed only by appellant No. 1, who was convicted and ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for three years. An order to release appellant No. 1 on bail was passed pursuant to which Accused No. 1 is on bail. The appeal was listed before us for hearing during the course of which we heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and were also taken through the records.

10.According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, ingredients of abetment are totally absent as envisaged under Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 of the IPC and, therefore, Accused No. 1 is liable to be acquitted. It was submitted by him that on a proper interpretation of the facts as also the provisions of Section 306 IPC it cannot be said that the appellant herein was in any manner responsible for abetting the suicide committed by the deceased which was an independent act of the deceased. It was also submitted by him that the appellant did not in any manner substantially assisted the deceased in committing the offence of suicide and since there was no such participation of the appellant in abetting the offence of suicide, the conviction and sentence under Section 306 IPC is required to be set aside and quashed.

11.The aforesaid submissions were, however, refuted by learned counsel appearing for the State contending inter alia that there is a concurrent find of facts by three courts below finding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC and, therefore, the said findings cannot be said to be in any manner as untenable or unjustified. 12.The fact that the appellant had illicit relationship with Accused No. 2, who was the wife of the deceased, is an admitted position for which there was no cross-examination on the point which was clearly stated by PW-5, who is the brother of Accused No. 2, in his statement on 2.1.1996 which is reproduced herein below :

"On 2-1-1996 my father brought A2 to my house at Tsunduru and he informed that she is having illicit contact with A1 to change her behaviour brought her to my house to keep some time. On the same day evening A1 came to my house and took away A2. Some discussion take place between myself and A1 regarding coming to my house. Due to fear, I could not resist for taking away A2."

13. We have carefully examined the aforesaid statement of PW-5 and on perusal of the statement we do not find that any suggestion was made to the said PW-5 that there did not exist an illicit relationship between Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2. Besides, the close relatives of the deceased who were also examined as witnesses had categorically stated in their statements that on coming to know of the fact that Accused No. 1 has taken Accused No. 2 from the house of PW-5 and left her only on 06.01.1996 at her parents house, the deceased stated before the said inmates of his house that because of the said insult and humiliation he does not like to live. It is also proved that immediately thereafter in the night intervening 7th and 8th of January, 1996 the deceased committed suicide. The aforesaid fact leads to only one conclusion that it is on account of humiliation and insult due to the behaviour and conduct of Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2 that he proceeded to commit the suicide.

14.The facts which are disclosed from the evidence on record clearly establish that Accused No. 1 had illicit relationship with Accused No. 2 who is the wife of the deceased. It is also not in dispute that Accused No. 1 was visiting the house of the deceased to meet Accused No. 2 and that he even went to the house of deceased when he came to know that the wife of the deceased was sent with her father for counselling and advise. He loudly stated that he would continue to have relationship with Accused No. 2 and would come to her house so long she does not object to the same. He also took her away from the house of PW-5, her brother and kept her with him for 4 days. Immediately after the said incident the deceased committed the suicide. Therefore, there is definitely a proximity and nexus between the conduct and behaviour of Accused No. 1 and Accused No. 2 with that of the suicide committed by the deceased. Besides, there is clear and unambiguous findings of fact of three courts that the appellant is guilty of the offence under Section 306 of IPC. Such findings do not call for any interference in our hand. This Court also does not generally embark upon reappreciation of evidence on facts which are found and held against the appellant.

15.Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the order of conviction as also the order of sentence passed against the accused-appellant. We uphold the order of the High Court and dismiss this appeal. The bail bond of the accused-appellant stands cancelled. He shall surrender forthwith to serve out the remaining period of the sentence.

                                                             .................................J.
                                                                (Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)
                                                              ................................J.
                                                                (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)

New Delhi,
May 28, 2009

Criminal Medical Negligence, Jacob Mathew’s Case

2009-05-17T11:03:00.000-07:00

2005 AIR 3180 SC,
CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 144-145 of 2004

PETITIONER:
Jacob Mathew

RESPONDENT:
State of Punjab & Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/08/2005

BENCH:
CJI R.C. LAHOTI,G.P. MATHUR & P.K.BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T

R.C. LAHOTI, CJI

Ashok Kumar Sharma, the respondent no.2 herein filed a First
Information Report with police station, Division No. 3, Ludhiana,
whereupon an offence under Section 304A read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC") was registered. The gist of the
information is that on 15.2.1995, the informant's father, late Jiwan Lal
Sharma was admitted as a patient in a private ward of CMC Hospital,
Ludhiana. On 22.2.1995 at about 11 p.m., Jiwan Lal felt difficulty in
breathing. The complainant's elder brother, Vijay Sharma who was
present in the room contacted the duty nurse, who in her turn called
some doctor to attend to the patient. No doctor turned up for about
20 to 25 minutes. Then, Dr. Jacob Mathew, the appellant before us
and Dr.Allen Joseph came to the room of the patient. An oxygen
cylinder was brought and connected to the mouth of the patient but
the breathing problem increased further. The patient tried to get up
but the medical staff asked him to remain in the bed. The oxygen
cylinder was found to be empty. There was no other gas cylinder
available in the room. Vijay Sharma went to the adjoining room and
brought a gas cylinder therefrom. However, there was no
arrangement to make the gas cylinder functional and in-between, 5 to
7 minutes were wasted. By this time, another doctor came who
declared that the patient was dead. The latter part of the FIR states
(as per the translation in English as filed by the complainant):_

"________the death of my father
was occurred due to the carelessness of
doctors and nurses and non availability of
oxygen cylinder and the empty cylinder was
fixed on the mouth of my father and his
breathing was totally stopped hence my
father died. I sent the dead body of my
father to my village for last cremation and
for information I have come to you. Suitable
action be done Sd/-     ---- As per statement
of intimator the death of Jiwan Lal Sharma
has occurred due to carelessness of doctors
and nurses concerned and to fit empty gas
cylinder."

    On the abovesaid report, an offence under Section 304A/34 IPC
was registered and investigated. Challan was filed against the two
doctors.

    The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana framed charges
under Section 304A, IPC against the two accused persons, both
doctors. Both of them filed a revision in the Court of Sessions Judge
submitting that there was no ground for framing charges against
them. The revision was dismissed. The appellant filed a petition in the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
praying for quashing of the FIR and all the subsequent proceedings.

    It was submitted before the High Court that there was no
specific allegation of any act of omission or commission against the
accused persons in the entire plethora of documents comprising the
challan papers filed by the police against them. The learned single
Judge who heard the petition formed an opinion that the plea raised by
the appellant was available to be urged in defence at the trial and,
therefore, a case for quashing the charge was not made out. Vide
order dated 18.12.2002, the High Court dismissed the petition. An
application for recalling the abovesaid order was moved which too was
dismissed on 24.1.2003. Feeling aggrieved by these two orders, the
appellant has filed these appeals by special leave.

According to the appellant, the deceased Jiwan Lal was suffering
from cancer in an advanced stage and as per the information
available, he was, in fact, not being admitted by any hospital in the
country because his being a case of cancer at terminal stage. He was
only required to be kept at home and given proper nursing, food, care
and solace coupled with prayers. But as is apparent from the records,
his sons are very influential persons occupying important positions in
Government.   They requested the hospital authorities that come what
may, even on compassionate grounds their father may be admitted in
the hospital for regulated medical treatment and proper management
of diet. It was abundantly made clear to the informant and his other
relations who had accompanied the deceased that the disease was of
such a nature and had attained such gravity, that peace and solace
could only be got at home. But the complainant could prevail over the
doctors and hospital management and got the deceased admitted as
an in-patient. Nevertheless, the patient was treated with utmost care
and caution and given all the required medical assistance by the
doctors and para-medical staff. Every conceivable effort was made by
all the attending staff comprising of doctors and nurses and other
para-medicals to give appropriate medical treatment and the whole
staff danced attendance on the patient but what was ordained to
happen, did happen. The complainant and his relations, who were
misguided or were under mistaken belief as to the facts, lodged police
report against the accused persons _ wholly unwarranted and
uncalled for.

    The matter came up for hearing before a Bench of two learned
judges of this Court. Reliance was placed by the appellant on a recent
two-judge Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Govt.
of NCT of Delhi and Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 422. The Bench hearing this
appeal doubted the correctness of the view taken in Dr. Suresh
Gupta's case and vide order dated 9.9.2004 expressed the opinion
that the matter called for consideration by a Bench of three Judges.
This is how the case has come up for hearing before this Bench.

In Dr. Suresh Gupta's case, the patient, a young man with no
history of any heart ailment, was subjected to an operation performed
by Dr. Suresh Gupta for nasal deformity. The operation was neither
complicated nor serious. The patient died. On investigation, the cause
of death was found to be "not introducing a cuffed endotracheal tube
of proper size as to prevent aspiration of blood from the wound in the
respiratory passage". The Bench formed an opinion that this act
attributed to the doctor, even if accepted to be true, could be
described as an act of negligence as there was lack of due care and
precaution. But, the Court categorically held _ "for this act of
negligence he may be liable in tort, his carelessness or want of due
attention and skill cannot be described to be so reckless or grossly
negligent as to make him criminally liable".

    The referring Bench in its order dated 9.9.2004 has assigned
two reasons for their disagreement with the view taken in Dr. Suresh
Gupta's case which are as under:-

(1)    Negligence or recklessness being 'gross' is not a requirement of
Section 304A of IPC and if the view taken in Dr. Suresh
Gupta's case is to be followed then the word 'gross' shall have
to be read into Section 304A IPC for fixing criminal liability on a
doctor. Such an approach cannot be countenanced.

(2)     Different standards cannot be applied to doctors and others. In
all cases it has to be seen whether the impugned act was rash
or negligent. By carrying out a separate treatment for doctors
by introducing degree of rashness or negligence, violence would
be done to the plain and unambiguous language of section
304A. If by adducing evidence it is proved that there was no
rashness or negligence involved, the trial court dealing with the
matter shall decide appropriately. But a doctor cannot be
placed at a different pedestal for finding out whether rashness
or negligence was involved.

We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the
respondent-State and the respondent complainant. As the question of
medical negligence arose for consideration, we thought it fit to issue
notice to Medical Council of India to assist the Court at the time of
hearing which it has done. In addition, a registered society _ 'People
for Better Treatment', Kolkata; Delhi Medical Council, Delhi Medical
Association and Indian Medical Association sought for intervention at
the hearing as the issue arising for decision is of vital significance for
the medical profession. They too have been heard. Mainly, the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the
intervenors have centred around two issues : (i) Is there a difference
in civil and criminal law on the concept of negligence?; and (ii)
whether a different standard is applicable for recording a finding of
negligence when a professional, in particular, a doctor is to be held
guilty of negligence?

    With the awareness in the society and the people in general
gathering consciousness about their rights, actions for damages in tort
are on the increase. Not only civil suits are filed, the availability of a
forum for grievance redressal under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 having jurisdiction to hear complaints against professionals for
'deficiency in service', which expression is very widely defined in the
Act, has given rise to a large number of complaints against
professionals, in particular against doctors, being filed by the persons
feeling aggrieved.    Criminal complaints are being filed against doctors
alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 304A or
Sections 336/337/338 of the IPC alleging rashness or negligence on
the part of the doctors resulting in loss of life or injury (of varying
degree) to the patient. The present one is such a case. The order of
reference has enabled us to examine the concept of 'negligence', in
particular 'professional negligence', and as to when and how it does
give rise to an action under the criminal law. We propose to deal with
the issues in the interests of settling the law.

Negligence as a tort
    The jurisprudential concept of negligence defies any precise
definition. Eminent jurists and leading judgments have assigned
various meanings to negligence. The concept as has been acceptable
to Indian jurisprudential thought is well-stated in the Law of Torts,
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (Twenty-fourth Edition 2002, edited by Justice G.P.
Singh). It is stated (at p.441-442) ___ "Negligence is the breach of a
duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Actionable negligence consists in the
neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom
the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by
which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to his person or
property. _______ The definition involves three constituents of
negligence: (1) A legal duty to exercise due care on the part of the
party complained of towards the party complaining the former's
conduct within the scope of the duty; (2) breach of the said duty; and
(3) consequential damage. Cause of action for negligence arises only
when damage occurs; for, damage is a necessary ingredient of this
tort."

    According to Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (Tenth Edition,
2001), in current forensic speech, negligence has three meanings.
They are: (i) a state of mind, in which it is opposed to intention; (ii)
careless conduct; and (iii) the breach of duty to take care that is
imposed by either common or statute law. All three meanings are
applicable in different circumstances but any one of them does not
necessarily exclude the other meanings. (Para 1.01) The essential
components of negligence, as recognized, are three: "duty", "breach"
and "resulting damage", that is to say:-
1.    the existence of a duty to take care, which is
owed by the defendant to the complainant;

2.    the failure to attain that standard of care,
prescribed by the law, thereby committing a
breach of such duty; and

3.    damage, which is both causally connected
with such breach and recognized by the law,
has been suffered by the complainant. (Para
1.23)

If the claimant satisfies the court on the evidence that these three
ingredients are made out, the defendant should be held liable in
negligence. (Para 1.24)

Negligence __ as a tort and as a crime
    The term 'negligence' is used for the purpose of fastening the
defendant with liability under the Civil Law and, at times, under the
Criminal Law. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that in
both the jurisdictions, negligence is negligence, and jurisprudentially
no distinction can be drawn between negligence under civil law and
negligence under criminal law. The submission so made cannot be
countenanced inasmuch as it is based upon a total departure from the
established terrain of thought running ever since the beginning of the
emergence of the concept of negligence upto the modern times.
Generally speaking, it is the amount of damages incurred which is
determinative of the extent of liability in tort; but in criminal law it is
not the amount of damages but the amount and degree of negligence
that is determinative of liability. To fasten liability in Criminal Law, the
degree of negligence has to be higher than that of negligence enough
to fasten liability for damages in Civil Law. The essential ingredient of
mens rea cannot be excluded from consideration when the charge in a
criminal court consists of criminal negligence. In R. v. Lawrence,
[1981] 1 All ER 974 (HL), Lord Diplock spoke in a Bench of five and
the other Law Lords agreed with him. He reiterated his opinion in R.
v. Caldwell 1981(1) All ER 961 (HL) and dealt with the concept of
recklessness as constituting mens rea in criminal law. His Lordship
warned against adopting the simplistic approach of treating all
problems of criminal liability as soluble by classifying the test of
liability as being "subjective" or "objective", and said "Recklessness on
the part of the doer of an act does presuppose that there is something
in the circumstances that would have drawn the attention of an
ordinary prudent individual to the possibility that his act was capable
of causing the kind of serious harmful consequences that the section
which creates the offence was intended to prevent, and that the risk of
those harmful consequences occurring was not so slight that an
ordinary prudent individual would feel justified in treating them as
negligible. It is only when this is so that the doer of the act is acting
'recklessly' if, before doing the act, he either fails to give any thought
to the possibility of there being any such risk or, having recognized
that there was such risk, he nevertheless goes on to do it."

    The moral culpability of recklessness is not located in a desire to
cause harm. It resides in the proximity of the reckless state of mind
to the state of mind present when there is an intention to cause harm.
There is, in other words, a disregard for the possible consequences.
The consequences entailed in the risk may not be wanted, and indeed
the actor may hope that they do not occur, but this hope nevertheless
fails to inhibit the taking of the risk. Certain types of violation, called
optimizing violations, may be motivated by thrill-seeking. These are
clearly reckless.

    In order to hold the existence of criminal rashness or criminal
negligence it shall have to be found out that the rashness was of such
a degree as to amount to taking a hazard knowing that the hazard was
of such a degree that injury was most likely imminent. The element of
criminality is introduced by the accused having run the risk of doing
such an act with recklessness and indifference to the consequences.
Lord Atkin in his speech in Andrews v. Director of Public
Prosecutions, [1937] A.C. 576, stated, "Simple lack of care _ such
as will constitute civil liability is not enough; for purposes of the
criminal law there are degrees of negligence; and a very high degree
of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is
established." Thus, a clear distinction exists between "simple lack of
care" incurring civil liability and "very high degree of negligence" which
is required in criminal cases. Lord Porter said in his speech in the
same case ___ "A higher degree of negligence has always been
demanded in order to establish a criminal offence than is sufficient to
create civil liability. (Charlesworth & Percy, ibid, Para 1.13)

    The fore-quoted statement of law in Andrews has been noted
with approval by this Court in Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka
(1980) 1 SCC 30. The Supreme Court has dealt with and pointed out
with reasons the distinction between negligence in civil law and in
criminal law. Their Lordships have opined that there is a marked
difference as to the effect of evidence, viz. the proof, in civil and
criminal proceedings. In civil proceedings, a mere preponderance of
probability is sufficient, and the defendant is not necessarily entitled to
the benefit of every reasonable doubt; but in criminal proceedings, the
persuasion of guilt must amount to such a moral certainty as
convinces the mind of the Court, as a reasonable man, beyond all
reasonable doubt. Where negligence is an essential ingredient of the
offence, the negligence to be established by the prosecution must be
culpable or gross and not the negligence merely based upon an error
of judgment.

    Law laid down by Straight, J. in the case Reg v. Idu Beg
(1881) 3 All. 776, has been held good in cases and noticed in
Bhalchandra Waman Pathe v. State of Maharashtra 1968 Mh.L.J.
423 ? a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court. It has been held
that while negligence is an omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do; criminal
negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that
reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury
either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which
having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has
arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have
adopted.

    In our opinion, the factor of grossness or degree does assume
significance while drawing distinction in negligence actionable in tort
and negligence punishable as a crime. To be latter, the negligence has
to be gross or of a very high degree.

Negligence by professionals
    In the law of negligence, professionals such as lawyers, doctors,
architects and others are included in the category of persons
professing some special skill or skilled persons generally. Any task
which is required to be performed with a special skill would generally
be admitted or undertaken to be performed only if the person
possesses the requisite skill for performing that task. Any reasonable
man entering into a profession which requires a particular level of
learning to be called a professional of that branch, impliedly assures
the person dealing with him that the skill which he professes to
possess shall be exercised and exercised with reasonable degree of
care and caution. He does not assure his client of the result. A lawyer
does not tell his client that the client shall win the case in all
circumstances. A physician would not assure the patient of full
recovery in every case. A surgeon cannot and does not guarantee that
the result of surgery would invariably be beneficial, much less to the
extent of 100% for the person operated on. The only assurance which
such a professional can give or can be understood to have given by
implication is that he is possessed of the requisite skill in that branch
of profession which he is practising and while undertaking the
performance of the task entrusted to him he would be exercising his
skill with reasonable competence. This is all what the person
approaching the professional can expect. Judged by this standard, a
professional may be held liable for negligence on one of two findings:
either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to
have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence
in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be
applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or
not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising
ordinary skill in that profession. It is not necessary for every
professional to possess the highest level of expertise in that branch
which he practices. In Michael Hyde and Associates v. J.D.
Williams & Co. Ltd., [2001] P.N.L.R. 233, CA, Sedley L.J. said that
where a profession embraces a range of views as to what is an
acceptable standard of conduct, the competence of the defendant is to
be judged by the lowest standard that would be regarded as
acceptable. (Charlesworth & Percy, ibid, Para 8.03)

    Oft'quoted passage defining negligence by professionals,
generally and not necessarily confined to doctors, is to be found in the
opinion of McNair J. in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management
Committee, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586 in the following words:
    "Where you get a situation which involves the
use of some special skill or competence, then the
test as to whether there has been negligence or not
is not the test of the man on the top of a Clapham
omnibus, because he has not got this special skill.
The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man
exercising and professing to have that special skill .
. . A man need not possess the highest expert skill;
it is well established law that it is sufficient if he
exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary
competent man exercising that particular art."
(Charlesworth & Percy, ibid, Para 8.02)

    The water of Bolam test has ever since flown and passed under
several bridges, having been cited and dealt with in several judicial
pronouncements, one after the other and has continued to be well
received by every shore it has touched as neat, clean and well-
condensed one. After a review of various authorities Bingham L.J. in
his speech in Eckersley v. Binnie, [1988] 18 Con.L.R. 1, 79
summarised the Bolam test in the following words:-
    "From these general statements it follows that a
professional man should command the corpus of
knowledge which forms part of the professional
equipment of the ordinary member of his
profession. He should not lag behind other
ordinary assiduous and intelligent members of his
profession in knowledge of new advances,
discoveries and developments in his field. He
should have such an awareness as an ordinarily
competent practitioner would have of the
deficiencies in his knowledge and the limitations on
his skill. He should be alert to the hazards and
risks in any professional task he undertakes to the
extent that other ordinarily competent members of
the profession would be alert. He must bring to
any professional task he undertakes no less
expertise, skill and care than other ordinarily
competent members of his profession would bring,
but need bring no more. The standard is that of
the reasonable average. The law does not require
of a professional man that he be a paragon
combining the qualities of polymath and prophet."
(Charlesworth & Percy, ibid, Para 8.04)

    The degree of skill and care required by a medical practitioner is
so stated in Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, Vol.30,
Para 35):-
    "The practitioner must bring to his task a
reasonable degree of skill and knowledge, and
must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither
the very highest nor a very low degree of care and
competence, judged in the light of the particular
circumstances of each case, is what the law
requires, and a person is not liable in negligence
because someone else of greater skill and
knowledge would have prescribed different
treatment or operated in a different way; nor is he
guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance
with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible
body of medical men skilled in that particular art,
even though a body of adverse opinion also existed
among medical men.

    Deviation from normal practice is not
necessarily evidence of negligence. To establish
liability on that basis it must be shown (1) that
there is a usual and normal practice; (2) that the
defendant has not adopted it; and (3) that the
course in fact adopted is one no professional man
of ordinary skill would have taken had he been
acting with ordinary care."

Abovesaid three tests have also been stated as determinative of
negligence in professional practice by Charlesworth & Percy in their
celebrated work on Negligence (ibid, para 8.110)

In the opinion of Lord Denning, as expressed in Hucks v. Cole,
[1968] 118 New LJ 469, a medical practitioner was not to be held
liable simply because things went wrong from mischance or
misadventure or through an error of judgment in choosing one
reasonable course of treatment in preference of another. A medical
practitioner would be liable only where his conduct fell below that of
the standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field.

    The decision of House of Lords in Maynard v. West Midlands
Regional Health Authority, [1985] 1 All ER 635 (HL) by a Bench
consisting of five Law Lords has been accepted as having settled the
law on the point by holding that it is not enough to show that there is
a body of competent professional opinion which considers that decision
of the defendant professional was a wrong decision, if there also exists
a body of professional opinion, equally competent, which supports the
decision as reasonable in the circumstances. It is not enough to show
that subsequent events show that the operation need never have been
performed, if at the time the decision to operate was taken, it was
reasonable, in the sense that a responsible body of medical opinion
would have accepted it as proper. Lord Scarman who recorded the
leading speech with which other four Lords agreed quoted the
following words of Lord President (Clyde) in Hunter v. Hanley 1955
SLT 213 at 217, observing that the words cannot be bettered _ "In the
realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine
difference of opinion and one man clearly is not negligent merely
because his conclusion differs from that of other professional men_The
true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the
part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such
failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with
ordinary care_". Lord Scarman added _ "a doctor who professes to
exercise a special skill must exercise the ordinary skill of his speciality.
Differences of opinion and practice exist, and will always exist, in the
medical as in other professions. There is seldom any one answer
exclusive of all others to problems of professional judgment. A court
may prefer one body of opinion to the other, but that is no basis for a
conclusion of negligence." His Lordship further added "that a judge's
'preference' for one body of distinguished professional opinion to
another also professionally distinguished is not sufficient to establish
negligence in a practitioner whose actions have received the seal of
approval of those whose opinions, truthfully expressed, honestly held,
were not preferred."

    The classical statement of law in Bolam's case has been widely
accepted as decisive of the standard of care required both of
professional men generally and medical practitioners in particular.   It
has been invariably cited with approval before Courts in India and
applied to as touchstone to test the pleas of medical negligence. In
tort, it is enough for the defendant to show that the standard of care
and the skill attained was that of the ordinary competent medical
practitioner exercising an ordinary degree of professional skill. The
fact that a defendant charged with negligence acted in accord with the
general and approved practice is enough to clear him of the charge.
Two things are pertinent to be noted. Firstly, the standard of care,
when assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of
knowledge available at the time (of the incident), and not at the date
of trial. Secondly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure
to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the
equipment was not generally available at that point of time on which it
is suggested as should have been used.

    A mere deviation from normal professional practice is not
necessarily evidence of negligence. Let it also be noted that a mere
accident is not evidence of negligence. So also an error of judgment
on the part of a professional is not negligence per se. Higher the
acuteness in emergency and higher the complication, more are the
chances of error of judgment. At times, the professional is confronted
with making a choice between the devil and the deep sea and he has
to choose the lesser evil. The medical professional is often called upon
to adopt a procedure which involves higher element of risk, but which
he honestly believes as providing greater chances of success for the
patient rather than a procedure involving lesser risk but higher
chances of failure. Which course is more appropriate to follow, would
depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. The usual
practice prevalent nowadays is to obtain the consent of the patient or
of the person incharge of the patient if the patient is not be in a
position to give consent before adopting a given procedure. So long
as it can be found that the procedure which was in fact adopted was
one which was acceptable to medical science as on that date, the
medical practitioner cannot be held negligent merely because he chose
to follow one procedure and not another and the result was a failure.

    No sensible professional would intentionally commit an act or
omission which would result in loss or injury to the patient as the
professional reputation of the person is at stake. A single failure may
cost him dear in his career. Even in civil jurisdiction, the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is not of universal application and has to be applied with
extreme care and caution to the cases of professional negligence and
in particular that of the doctors. Else it would be counter productive.
Simply because a patient has not favourably responded to a treatment
given by a physician or a surgery has failed, the doctor cannot be held
liable per se by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence which in reality belongs to
the law of torts. Inference as to negligence may be drawn from
proved circumstances by applying the rule if the cause of the accident
is unknown and no reasonable explanation as to the cause is coming
forth from the defendant. In criminal proceedings, the burden of
proving negligence as an essential ingredient of the offence lies on the
prosecution. Such ingredient cannot be said to have been proved or
made out by resorting to the said rule (See Syad Kabar v. State of
Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30). Incidentally, it may be noted that in
Krishnan and Anr. v. State of Kerala (1996) 10 SCC 508 the Court
has observed that there may be a case where the proved facts would
themselves speak of sharing of common intention and while making
such observation one of the learned judges constituting the Bench has
in his concurring opinion merely stated "res ipsa loquitur'. Nowhere it
has been stated that the rule has applicability in a criminal case and an
inference as to an essential ingredient of an offence can be found
proved by resorting to the said rule. In our opinion, a case under
Section 304A IPC cannot be decided solely by applying the rule of res
ipsa loquitur.

A medical practitioner faced with an emergency ordinarily tries
his best to redeem the patient out of his suffering. He does not gain
anything by acting with negligence or by omitting to do an act.
Obviously, therefore, it will be for the complainant to clearly make out
a case of negligence before a medical practitioner is charged with or
proceeded against criminally. A surgeon with shaky hands under fear
of legal action cannot perform a successful operation and a quivering
physician cannot administer the end-dose of medicine to his patient.

    If the hands be trembling with the dangling fear of facing a
criminal prosecution in the event of failure for whatever reason_
whether attributable to himself or not, neither a surgeon can
successfully wield his life-saving scalper to perform an essential
surgery, nor can a physician successfully administer the life-saving
dose of medicine. Discretion being better part of valour, a medical
professional would feel better advised to leave a terminal patient to his
own fate in the case of emergency where the chance of success may
be 10% (or so), rather than taking the risk of making a last ditch
effort towards saving the subject and facing a criminal prosecution if
his effort fails. Such timidity forced upon a doctor would be a
disservice to the society.

    The purpose of holding a professional liable for his act or
omission, if negligent, is to make the life safer and to eliminate the
possibility of recurrence of negligence in future. Human body and
medical science _ both are too complex to be easily understood. To
hold in favour of existence of negligence, associated with the action or
inaction of a medical professional, requires an in-depth understanding
of the working of a professional as also the nature of the job and of
errors committed by chance, which do not necessarily involve the
element of culpability.

    The subject of negligence in the context of medical profession
necessarily calls for treatment with a difference. Several relevant
considerations in this regard are found mentioned by Alan Merry and
Alexander McCall Smith in their work "Errors, Medicine and the Law"
(Cambridge University Press, 2001). There is a marked tendency to
look for a human actor to blame for an untoward event _ a tendency
which is closely linked with the desire to punish. Things have gone
wrong and, therefore, somebody must be found to answer for it. To
draw a distinction between the blameworthy and the blameless, the
notion of mens rea has to be elaborately understood. An empirical
study would reveal that the background to a mishap is frequently far
more complex than may generally be assumed. It can be
demonstrated that actual blame for the outcome has to be attributed
with great caution. For a medical accident or failure, the responsibility
may lie with the medical practitioner and equally it may not. The
inadequacies of the system, the specific circumstances of the case, the
nature of human psychology itself and sheer chance may have
combined to produce a result in which the doctor's contribution is
either relatively or completely blameless. Human body and its working
is nothing less than a highly complex machine. Coupled with the
complexities of medical science, the scope for misimpressions,
misgivings and misplaced allegations against the operator i.e. the
doctor, cannot be ruled out. One may have notions of best or ideal
practice which are different from the reality of how medical practice is
carried on or how in real life the doctor functions. The factors of
pressing need and limited resources cannot be ruled out from
consideration. Dealing with a case of medical negligence needs a
deeper understanding of the practical side of medicine.

    At least three weighty considerations can be pointed out which
any forum trying the issue of medical negligence in any jurisdiction
must keep in mind. These are: (i) that legal and disciplinary
procedures should be properly founded on firm, moral and scientific
grounds; (ii) that patients will be better served if the real causes of
harm are properly identified and appropriately acted upon; and (iii)
that many incidents involve a contribution from more than one person,
and the tendency is to blame the last identifiable element in the chain
of causation _ the person holding the 'smoking gun'.

    Accident during the course of medical or surgical treatment has
a wider meaning. Ordinarily, an accident means an unintended and
unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the
usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated
(See, Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition). Care has to be taken to see
that the result of an accident which is exculpatory may not persuade
the human mind to confuse it with the consequence of negligence.

Medical Professionals in Criminal Law
    The criminal law has invariably placed the medical professionals
on a pedestal different from ordinary mortals. The Indian Penal Code
enacted as far back as in the year 1860 sets out a few vocal examples.
Section 88 in the Chapter on General Exceptions provides exemption
for acts not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for
person's benefit. Section 92 provides for exemption for acts done in
good faith for the benefit of a person without his consent though the
acts cause harm to a person and that person has not consented to
suffer such harm. There are four exceptions listed in the Section
which is not necessary in this context to deal with. Section 93 saves
from criminality certain communications made in good faith. To these
provisions are appended the following illustrations:-

Section 88
A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation
is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under
a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z's
death and intending in good faith, Z's benefit,
performs that operation on Z, with Z's consent. A
has committed no offence.

Section 92
Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a
surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned. A,
not intending Z's death, but in good faith, for Z's
benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his
power of judging for himself. A has committed no
offence.

    A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident
which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation be
immediately performed. There is no time to apply
to the child's guardian. A performs the operation in
spite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in
good faith, the child's benefit.   A has committed
no offence.

Section 93
A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a
patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient
dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed
no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the
communication might cause the patient's death.

     It is interesting to note what Lord Macaulay had himself to say
about Indian Penal Code. We are inclined to quote a few excerpts from
his speech to the extent relevant for our purpose from "Speeches and
Poems with the Report and Notes on the Indian Penal Code" by Lord
Macaulay (Houghton, Mifflin and Company, published in 1874).

"Under the provisions of our Code, this case would
be very differently dealt with according to
circumstances. If A. kills Z. by administering
abortives to her, with the knowledge that those
abortives are likely to cause her death, he is guilty
of voluntary culpable homicide, which will be
voluntary culpable homicide by consent, if Z.
agreed to run the risk, and murder if Z. did not so
agree. If A causes miscarriage to Z., not intending
to cause Z.'s death, nor thinking it likely that he
shall cause Z.'s death, but so rashly or negligently
as to cause her death, A. is guilty of culpable
homicide not voluntary, and will be liable to the
punishment provided for the causing of
miscarriage, increased by imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years. Lastly, if A took such
precautions that there was no reasonable
probability that Z.'s death would be caused, and if
the medicine were rendered deadly by some
accident which no human sagacity could have
foreseen, or by some peculiarity in Z.'s constitution
such as there was no ground whatever to expect,
A. will be liable to no punishment whatever on
account of her death, but will of course be liable to
the punishment provided for causing miscarriage.

    It may be proper for us to offer some arguments in
defence of this part of the Code.

    It will be admitted that when an act is in itself
innocent, to punish the person who does it because
bad consequences, which no human wisdom could
have foreseen, have followed from it, would be in
the highest degree barbarous and absurd." (P.419)

    "To punish as a murderer every man who, while
committing a heinous offence, causes death by
pure misadventure, is a course which evidently
adds nothing to the security of human life. No man
can so conduct himself as to make it absolutely
certain that he shall not be so unfortunate as to
cause the death of a fellow-creature. The utmost
that he can do is to abstain from every thing which
is at all likely to cause death. No fear of
punishment can make him do more than this; and
therefore, to punish a man who has done this can
add nothing to the security of human life. The only
good effect which such punishment can produce
will be to deter people from committing any of
those offences which turn into murders what are in
themselves mere accidents. It is in fact an addition
to the punishment of those offences, and it is an
addition made in the very worst way." (p.421)

    "When a person engaged in the commission of an
offence causes death by rashness or negligence,
but without either intending to cause death, or
thinking it likely that he shall cause death, we
propose that he shall be liable to the punishment of
the offence which he was engaged in committing,
superadded to the ordinary punishment of
involuntary culpable homicide.

    The arguments and illustrations which we have
employed for the purpose of showing that the
involuntary causing of death, without either
rashness or negligence, ought, under no
circumstances, to be punished at all, will, with
some modifications, which will readily suggest
themselves, serve to show that the involuntary
causing of death by rashness or negligence, though
always punishable, ought, under no circumstances
to be punished as murder."                        (P.422)

The following statement of law on criminal negligence by
reference to surgeons, doctors etc. and unskillful treatment contained
in Roscoe's Law of Evidence (Fifteenth Edition) is classic:
"Where a person, acting as a medical man, &c.,
whether licensed or unlicensed, is so negligent in
his treatment of a patient that death results, it is
manslaughter if the negligence was so great as to
amount to a crime, and whether or not there was
such a degree of negligence is a question in each
case for the jury. "In explaining to juries the test
which they should apply to determine whether the
negligence in the particular case amounted or did
not amount to a crime, judges have used many
epithets, such as 'culpable,' 'criminal', 'gross',
'wicked', 'clear', 'complete.' But whatever epithet
be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in
order to establish criminal liability the facts must
be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the
negligence of the accused went beyond a mere
matter of compensation between subjects and
showed such disregard for the life and safety of
others as to amount to a crime against the State
and conduct deserving punishment." (p. 848-849)
       xxx                  xxx                   xxx

"whether he be licensed or unlicensed, if he display
gross ignorance, or gross inattention, or gross
rashness, in his treatment, he is criminally
responsible. Where a person who, though not
educated as an accoucheur, had been in the habit
of acting as a man-midwife, and had unskilfully
treated a woman who died in childbirth, was
indicted for the murder, L. Ellenborough said that
there was no evidence of murder, but the jury
might convict of man-slaughter. "To substantiate
that charge the prisoner must have been guilty of
criminal misconduct, arising either from the
grossest ignorance or the [most?] criminal
inattention. One or other of these is necessary to
make him guilty of that criminal negligence and
misconduct which is essential to make out a case of
manslaughter."                     (p.849)

A review of Indian decisions on criminal negligence
    We are inclined to, and we must - as duty bound, take note of
some of the relevant decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court.
We would like to preface this discussion with the law laid down by the
Privy Council in John Oni Akerele v. The King AIR 1943 PC 72. A
duly qualified medical practitioner gave to his patient the injection of
Sobita which consisted of sodium bismuth tartrate as given in the
British Pharmacopoea. However, what was administered was an
overdose of Sobita. The patient died. The doctor was accused of
manslaughter, reckless and negligent act. He was convicted. The
matter reached in appeal before the House of Lords. Their Lordships
quashed the conviction. On a review of judicial opinion and an
illuminating discussion on the points which are also relevant before us,
what their Lordships have held can be summed up as under:-

(i)    That a doctor is not criminally responsible for a
patient's death unless his negligence or
incompetence went beyond a mere matter of
compensation between subjects and showed such
disregard for life and safety of others as to amount
to a crime against the State.;

(ii)    That the degree of negligence required is that it
should be gross, and that neither a jury nor a court
can transform negligence of a lesser degree into
gross negligence merely by giving it that
appellation. ____ There is a difference in kind
between the negligence which gives a right to
compensation and the negligence which is a crime.

(iii)    It is impossible to define culpable or
criminal negligence, and it is not possible to make
the distinction between actionable negligence and
criminal negligence intelligible, except by means of
illustrations drawn from actual judicial opinion.
__.. The most favourable view of the conduct of an
accused medical man has to be taken, for it would
be most fatal to the efficiency of the medical
profession if no one could administer medicine
without a halter round his neck."
(emphasis supplied)

Their Lordships refused to accept the view that criminal negligence
was proved merely because a number of persons were made gravely ill
after receiving an injection of Sobita from the appellant coupled with a
finding that a high degree of care was not exercised. Their Lordships
also refused to agree with the thought that merely because too strong
a mixture was dispensed once and a number of persons were made
gravely ill, a criminal degree of negligence was proved.

    The question of degree has always been considered as relevant
to a distinction between negligence in civil law and negligence in
criminal law. In Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v.
State of Maharashtra (1965) 2 SCR 622, while dealing with Section
304A of IPC, the following statement of law by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in
Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap 4 Bom LR 679, was cited with
approval:-
"To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A,
Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the death
should have been the direct result of a rash and
negligent act of the accused, and that act must be
the proximate and efficient cause without the
intervention of another's negligence. It must be
the causa causans; it is not enough that it may
have been the causa sine qua non."

    K.N. Wanchoo, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court,
observed that the abovesaid view of the law has been generally
followed by High Courts in India and was the correct view to take of
the meaning of Section 304A. The same view has been reiterated in
Kishan Chand & Anr. v. The State of Haryana (1970) 3 SCC 904.

    In Juggankhan v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1965) 1
SCR 14, the accused, a registered Homoeopath, administered 24 drops
of stramonium and a leaf of dhatura to the patient suffering from
guinea worm. The accused had not studied the effect of such
substances being administered to a human being. The poisonous
contents of the leaf of dhatura, were not satisfactorily established by
the prosecution. This Court exonerated the accused of the charge
under Section 302 IPC.   However, on a finding that stramonium and
dhatura leaves are poisonous and in no system of medicine, except
perhaps Ayurvedic system, the dhatura leaf is given as cure for guinea
worm, the act of the accused who prescribed poisonous material
without studying their probable effect was held to be a rash and
negligent act. It would be seen that the profession of a Homoeopath
which the accused claimed to profess did not permit use of the
substance administered to the patient. The accused had no knowledge
of the effect of such substance being administered and yet he did so.
In this background, the inference of the accused being guilty of rash
and negligent act was drawn against him. In our opinion, the principle
which emerges is that a doctor who administers a medicine known to
or used in a particular branch of medical profession impliedly declares
that he has knowledge of that branch of science and if he does not, in
fact, possess that knowledge, he is prima facie acting with rashness or
negligence.

    Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu Godbole
and Anr. (1969) 1 SCR 206 was a case under Fatal Accidents Act,
1855. It does not make a reference to any other decided case. The
duties which a doctor owes to his patients came up for consideration.
The Court held that a person who holds himself out ready to give
medical advice and treatment impliedly undertakes that he is
possessed of skill and knowledge for that purpose. Such a person
when consulted by a patient owes him certain duties, viz., a duty of
care in deciding whether to undertake the case, a duty of care in
deciding what treatment to be given or a duty of care in the
administration of that treatment. A breach of any of those duties
gives a right of action for negligence to the patient. The practitioner
must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge and
must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest
nor a very low degree of care and competence judged in the light of
the particular circumstances of each case is what the law requires. The
doctor no doubt has a discretion in choosing treatment which he
proposes to give to the patient and such discretion is relatively ampler
in cases of emergency. In this case, the death of patient was caused
due to shock resulting from reduction of the fracture attempted by
doctor without taking the elementary caution of giving anaesthetic to
the patient. The doctor was held guilty of negligence and liability for
damages in civil law. We hasten to add that criminal negligence or
liability under criminal law was not an issue before the Court _as it
did not arise and hence was not considered.

    In the year 1996, there are 3 reported decisions available.
Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and Ors. (1995) 6
SCC 651 is a three-Judge Bench decision.     The principal issue which
arose for decision by the Court was whether a medical practitioner
renders 'service' and can be proceeded against for 'deficiency in
service' before a forum under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The
Court dealt with how a 'profession' differs from an 'occupation'
especially in the context of performance of duties and hence the
occurrence of negligence. The Court noticed that medical professionals
do not enjoy any immunity from being sued in contract or tort (i.e. in
civil jurisdiction) on the ground of negligence. However, in the
observation made in the context of determining professional liability
as distinguished from occupational liability, the Court has referred to
authorities, in particular, Jackson & Powell and have so stated the
principles, partly quoted from the authorities :-

"In the matter of professional liability professions
differ from occupations for the reason that
professions operate in spheres where success
cannot be achieved in every case and very often
success or failure depends upon factors beyond the
professional man's control. In devising a rational
approach to professional liability which must
provide proper protection to the consumer while
allowing for the factors mentioned above, the
approach of the Courts is to require that
professional men should possess a certain
minimum degree of competence and that they
should exercise reasonable care in the discharge of
their duties. In general, a professional man owes
to his client a duty in tort as well as in contract to
exercise reasonable care in giving advice or
performing services. (See : Jackson & Powell on
Professional Negligence, 3rd Edn., paras 1-04, 1-05,
and 1-56)."

    In Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel and Ors., (1996) 4 SCC
332 a doctor registered as medical practitioner and entitled to practice
in Homoeopathy only, prescribed an allopathic medicine to the patient.
The patient died. The doctor was held to be negligent and liable to
compensate the wife of the deceased for the death of her husband on
the ground that the doctor who was entitled to practice in
homoeopathy only, was under a statutory duty not to enter the field of
any other system of medicine and since he trespassed into a
prohibited field and prescribed the allopathic medicine to the patient
causing the death, his conduct amounted to negligence per se
actionable in civil law. Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi's case (supra)
was followed. Vide para 16, the test for determining whether there
was negligence on the part of a medical practitioner as laid down in
Bolam's case (supra) was cited and approved.

    In Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 634 the Court noticed that in
the very nature of medical profession, skills differs from doctor to
doctor and more than one alternative course of treatment are
available, all admissible. Negligence cannot be attributed to a doctor
so long as he is performing his duties to the best of his ability and with
due care and caution. Merely because the doctor chooses one course
of action in preference to the other one available, he would not be
liable if the course of action chosen by him was acceptable to the
medical profession. It was a case where a mop was left inside the lady
patient's abdomen during an operation. Peritonitis developed which
led to a second surgery being performed on her, but she could not
survive. Liability for negligence was fastened on the surgeon because
no valid explanation was forthcoming for the mop having been left
inside the abdomen of the lady. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
held applicable 'in a case like this'.

    M/s Spring Meadows Hospital and Anr. v. Harjol
Ahluwalia through K.S. Ahluwalia and Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 39 is
again a case of liability for negligence by a medical professional in civil
law. It was held that an error of judgment is not necessarily
negligence. The Court referred to the decision in Whitehouse &
Jorden, [1981] 1 ALL ER 267, and cited with approval the following
statement of law contained in the opinion of Lord Fraser determining
when an error of judgment can be termed as negligence:-

"The true position is that an error of
judgment may, or may not, be negligent, it
depends on the nature of the error. If it is
one that would not have been made by a
reasonably competent professional man
professing to have the standard and type of
skill that the defendant holds himself out as
having, and acting with ordinary care, then it
is negligence. If, on the other hand, it is an
error that such a man, acting with ordinary
care, might have made, then it is not
negligence."

    In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Smt. Santra, (2000) 5 SCC
182 also Bolam's test has been approved. This case too refers to
liability for compensation under civil law for failure of sterilisation
operation performed by a surgeon. We are not dealing with that
situation in the case before us and, therefore, leave it to be dealt
within an appropriate case.

Before we embark upon summing up our conclusions on the
several issues of law which we have dealt with hereinabove, we are
inclined to quote some of the conclusions arrived at by the learned
authors of "Errors, Medicine and the Law" (pp. 241-248), (recorded at
the end of the book in the chapter titled _ 'Conclusion') highlighting
the link between moral fault, blame and justice in reference to medical
profession and negligence. These are of significance and relevant to
the issues before us. Hence we quote :-

(i)    The social efficacy of blame and related sanctions in particular
cases of deliberate wrongdoings may be a matter of dispute, but
their necessity _ in principle _ from a moral point of view, has
been accepted. Distasteful as punishment may be, the social,
and possibly moral, need to punish people for wrongdoing,
occasionally in a severe fashion, cannot be escaped. A society
in which blame is overemphasized may become paralysed. This
is not only because such a society will inevitably be backward-
looking, but also because fear of blame inhibits the uncluttered
exercise of judgment in relations between persons. If we are
constantly concerned about whether our actions will be the
subject of complaint, and that such complaint is likely to lead to
legal action or disciplinary proceedings, a relationship of
suspicious formality between persons is inevitable. (ibid, pp.
242-243)

(ii)    Culpability may attach to the consequence of an error in
circumstances where substandard antecedent conduct has been
deliberate, and has contributed to the generation of the error or
to its outcome. In case of errors, the only failure is a failure
defined in terms of the normative standard of what should have
been done. There is a tendency to confuse the reasonable
person with the error-free person. While nobody can avoid
errors on the basis of simply choosing not to make them, people
can choose not to commit violations. A violation is culpable.
(ibid, p. 245).

(iii)    Before the court faced with deciding the cases of professional
negligence there are two sets of interests which are at stake :
the interests of the plaintiff and the interests of the defendant.
A correct balance of these two sets of interests should ensure
that tort liability is restricted to those cases where there is a
real failure to behave as a reasonably competent practitioner
would have behaved. An inappropriate raising of the standard of
care threatens this balance. (ibid, p.246). A consequence of
encouraging litigation for loss is to persuade the public that all
loss encountered in a medical context is the result of the failure
of somebody in the system to provide the level of care to which
the patient is entitled. The effect of this on the doctor-patient
relationship is distorting and will not be to the benefit of the
patient in the long run. It is also unjustified to impose on those
engaged in medical treatment an undue degree of additional
stress and anxiety in the conduct of their profession. Equally, it
would be wrong to impose such stress and anxiety on any other
person performing a demanding function in society. (ibid,
p.247). While expectations from the professionals must be
realistic and the expected standards attainable, this implies
recognition of the nature of ordinary human error and human
limitations in the performance of complex tasks. (ibid, p. 247).

(iv)    Conviction for any substantial criminal offence requires that the
accused person should have acted with a morally blameworthy
state of mind. Recklessness and deliberate wrongdoing, are
morally blameworthy, but any conduct falling short of that
should not be the subject of criminal liability. Common-law
systems have traditionally only made negligence the subject of
criminal sanction when the level of negligence has been high _ a
standard traditionally described as gross negligence. In fact,
negligence at that level is likely to be indistinguishable from
recklessness. (ibid, p.248).

(v)    Blame is a powerful weapon. Its inappropriate use distorts
tolerant and constructive relations between people.
Distinguishing between (a) accidents which are life's misfortune
for which   nobody is   morally responsible, (b) wrongs
amounting to culpable conduct and constituting grounds for
compensation, and (c) those (i.e. wrongs) calling for
punishment on account of being gross or of a very high degree
requires and calls for careful, morally sensitive and scientifically
informed analysis; else there would be injustice to the larger
interest of the society. (ibid, p. 248).

Indiscriminate prosecution of medical professionals for criminal
negligence is counter-productive and does no service or good to the
society.

Conclusions summed up
         We sum up our conclusions as under:-

(1)    Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do
something which a reasonable man guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as
given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P.
Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence
becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act
or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person
sued. The essential components of negligence are three: 'duty',
'breach' and 'resulting damage'.

(2)    Negligence in the context of medical profession necessarily calls
for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or
negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor,
additional considerations apply. A case of occupational
negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A
simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not
proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So
long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical
profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence
merely because a better alternative course or method of
treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled
doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice
or procedure which the accused followed. When it comes to the
failure of taking precautions what has to be seen is whether
those precautions were taken which the ordinary experience of
men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or
extraordinary precautions which might have prevented the
particular happening cannot be the standard for judging the
alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, while
assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of
knowledge available at the time of the incident, and not at the
date of trial. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises out
of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would
fail if the equipment was not generally available at that
particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which it is
suggested it should have been used.

(3)    A professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the
two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill
which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise,
with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he
did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether
the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of
an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that
profession. It is not possible for every professional to possess
the highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he
practices. A highly skilled professional may be possessed of
better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis or the
yardstick for judging the performance of the professional
proceeded against on indictment of negligence.

(4)     The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in
Bolam's case [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586 holds good in its
applicability in India.

(5)     The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and
criminal law. What may be negligence in civil law may not
necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to
amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown
to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree
of negligence should be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high
degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree
may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the
basis for prosecution.

(6) The word 'gross' has not been used in Section 304A of IPC, yet it
is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be
so held, must be of such a high degree as to be 'gross'. The
expression 'rash or negligent act' as occurring in Section 304A
of the IPC has to be read as qualified by the word 'grossly'.

(7)    To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under
criminal law it must be shown that the accused did something or
failed to do something which in the given facts and
circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses
and prudence would have done or failed to do. The hazard
taken by the accused doctor should be of such a nature that the
injury which resulted was most likely imminent.

(8)     Res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence and operates in the
domain of civil law specially in cases of torts and helps in
determining the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. It
cannot be pressed in service for determining per se the liability
for negligence within the domain of criminal law. Res ipsa loquitur
has, if at all, a limited application in trial on a charge of criminal
negligence.

In view of the principles laid down hereinabove and the
preceding discussion, we agree with the principles of law laid down in
Dr. Suresh Gupta's case (2004) 6 SCC 422 and re-affirm the same.
Ex abundanti cautela, we clarify that what we are affirming are the
legal principles laid down and the law as stated in Dr. Suresh Gupta's
case. We may not be understood as having expressed any opinion on
the question whether on the facts of that case the accused could or
could not have been held guilty of criminal negligence as that question
is not before us. We also approve of the passage from Errors,
Medicine and the Law by Alan Merry and Alexander McCall Smith which
has been cited with approval in Dr. Suresh Gupta's case (noted vide
para 27 of the report).

Guidelines _ re: prosecuting medical professionals
    As we have noticed hereinabove that the cases of doctors
(surgeons and physicians) being subjected to criminal prosecution are
on an increase. Sometimes such prosecutions are filed by private
complainants and sometimes by police on an FIR being lodged and
cognizance taken. The investigating officer and the private
complainant cannot always be supposed to have knowledge of
medical science so as to determine whether the act of the accused
medical professional amounts to rash or negligent act within the
domain of criminal law under Section 304-A of IPC. The criminal
process once initiated subjects the medical professional to serious
embarrassment and sometimes harassment. He has to seek bail to
escape arrest, which may or may not be granted to him. At the end
he may be exonerated by acquittal or discharge but the loss which he
has suffered in his reputation cannot be compensated by any
standards.

     We may not be understood as holding that doctors can never be
prosecuted for an offence of which rashness or negligence is an
essential ingredient. All that we are doing is to emphasize the need
for care and caution in the interest of society; for, the service which
the medical profession renders to human beings is probably the
noblest of all, and hence there is a need for protecting doctors from
frivolous or unjust prosecutions. Many a complainant prefers recourse
to criminal process as a tool for pressurizing the medical professional
for extracting uncalled for or unjust compensation. Such malicious
proceedings have to be guarded against.

     Statutory Rules or Executive Instructions incorporating certain
guidelines need to be framed and issued by the Government of India
and/or the State Governments in consultation with the Medical Council
of India. So long as it is not done, we propose to lay down certain
guidelines for the future which should govern the prosecution of
doctors for offences of which criminal rashness or criminal negligence
is an ingredient. A private complaint may not be entertained unless
the complainant has produced prima facie evidence before the Court in
the form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to
support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the
accused doctor. The investigating officer should, before proceeding
against the doctor accused of rash or negligent act or omission, obtain
an independent and competent medical opinion preferably from a
doctor in government service qualified in that branch of medical
practice who can normally be expected to give an impartial and
unbiased opinion applying Bolam's test to the facts collected in the
investigation. A doctor accused of rashness or negligence, may not be
arrested in a routine manner (simply because a charge has been
levelled against him). Unless his arrest is necessary for furthering the
investigation or for collecting evidence or unless the investigation
officer feels satisfied that the doctor proceeded against would not
make himself available to face the prosecution unless arrested, the
arrest may be withheld.

Case at hand
Reverting back to the facts of the case before us, we are
satisfied that all the averments made in the complaint, even if held to
be proved, do not make out a case of criminal rashness or negligence
on the part of the accused appellant. It is not the case of the
complainant that the accused-appellant was not a doctor qualified to
treat the patient whom he agreed to treat. It is a case of non-
availability of oxygen cylinder either because of the hospital having
failed to keep available a gas cylinder or because of the gas cylinder
being found empty. Then, probably the hospital may be liable in civil
law (or may not be _ we express no opinion thereon) but the accused
appellant cannot be proceeded against under Section 304A IPC on the
parameters of Bolam's test.
Result

    The appeals are allowed. The prosecution of the accused
appellant under Section 304A/34 IPC is quashed.

    All the interlocutory applications be treated as disposed of.

Judgment between "No innocent man is punished". & "A guilty man does not escape"

2009-05-12T13:11:00.000-07:00

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1502 OF 2007

Narendra V/s State of Karnataka

JUDGMENT
By Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.         Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court setting aside the judgment of acquittal recorded by learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Bangalore. Learned Sessions Judge have found the accused appellant guilty of offence punishable under Section 498(A) and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (In short the `IPC').

2.         Background facts leading to the prosecution of the appellant are as follows: On 13/14.2.1994 Smt. Mythradevi (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased') was done to death in the bedroom of the matrimonial home of the deceased. According to 'the investigation reports by about 6 a.m. on 14.2.1994 the inmates of the matrimonial home of the deceased learnt about the suspicious death of the deceased. By 9.30 a.m. on the very same day parents of the deceased came to the matrimonial home of the deceased after hearing the news of death of their daughter Mythradevi. Father of the deceased (P.W.6) informed the same to the Jurisdictional Police i.e., Srirampura Police Station as per complaint Ex. P.6. Thereafter, first part of investigation under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code') proceedings took place at about 2 p.m. on the same date after arrival of Taluk Executive Magistrate Mr. Y.M. Ramachandra Murthy (P.W.1). His inquest report is at Ex. P.1. The investigating agency kept watch over the dead body till the inquest proceedings were conducted, then the dead body was shifted for post mortem to Victoria hospital. As it was late in the night, autopsy was done on the dead body on 15.2.1994 by Dr. S.B. Patil (P.W.2). He gave postmortem report as per Ex. P2 and his opinion is at Ex. P 3. According to him, death was due to asphyxia as a result of compression of neck by human hands. The parents, sisters and other relatives of the deceased were examined. Their statements revealed after marriage between the parties, deceased started living in the matrimonial home,. Parents visited the deceased on 4 to 5 occasions. The last time the parents saw her alive was on 12.2.1994 i.e. about two days prior to her death. During this 12 months period of her stay at matrimonial home, according to kith and kin, deceased was very depressed, unhappy and was even scared to talk to any of kith and kin including the parents, whenever they visited her at matrimonial home. During her visits to the parents house, on enquiry they found the cause of her depression and unhappiness. It was due to improper treatment at the hands of her husband. Her husband was not talking to her. He was not looking after her well and he did not even like her. This was made known to her by coming home at very late hours and not talking to her in the normal way. Last visit of her parents on 12.2.94 to invite the deceased and the respondent for their first wedding anniversary at the parenta1 house of the deceased was rejected by the husband of the deceased. After that, they got the news about her death on 14.2.1994 at about 9 am The accused was not found at home. Therefore a search to apprehend him commenced. According to P.W. 3 on 15.2.1994 he was apprehended and produced before the Police Inspector (P.W. 11) as per the report at Ex.P 4. Prior to that the PSI (PW5) on the basis of the complaint of father of the deceased, registered Crime No. 71/94 for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. A spot mahazar was conducted under Ex.P-7, under which M.Os. 6 to 8, blood stained bed sheets, pillow cover and saree of the deceased were seized. During the inquest proceedings personal ornaments of the deceased found on the dead body i.e., M.Os. 1 to 13 including gold bangles and chain came to be seized. Ex. P.8 is the wedding card. Exs. P.9 and 10 are the photographs, which were taken at the time of inquest proceedings to show the exact position of the dead body in the bedroom of the matrimonial home of the deceased. P.W. 7 is the mother of the deceased. P.W. 8 is the elder sister of the deceased, whose statements were also recorded by the Taluk Executive Magistrate. P.W. 9 is the panch witness for the inquest proceedings. P.W. 10 is the witness for spot mahazar (Ex. P.7), but he resiled from the statement given during investigation. P.W.11 is the investigating officer, who took up further investigation from P.W.5 and filed the charge sheet against the appellant-accused. After completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. Trial court found the evidence not to be cogent and directed acquittal. It is to be noted that eleven witnesses were examined by the prosecution and two witnesses by the defence. Accused took the plea that he had gone to another place for purchase of milk on 13.2.1994 in the morning and returned only on 14.2.1994 at about 10.45 am and therefore he was not in any way involved with the crime. The High Court by the impugned order set aside the acquittal and found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 and 498(A) IPC. The High Court found that the analysis made by the trial court was erroneous. The trial court should not have placed reliance on the evidence of DWs 1 & 2 to accept the plea of alibi. Therefore the trial court should not have directed acquittal.

3.         In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that two views are possible. On the evidence on record the trial court had taken a view which is a possible one. Taking into account the limited scope for interference with the judgment of acquittal, the High Court should not have interfered in the matter. Further the alibi should have been accepted. There was no motive, no torture or no demand of dowry. There is no evidence for establishing the accusations either for Section 498A or Section 302 IPC.

4.         Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand supported the judgment.

5.         In the present case there are certain material aspects which were lost sight of by the trial court but have been noted by the High Court. The dead body was detected in the morning of 14.2.1994. Parents of the deceased informed the police and not the inmates. The parents were informed by neighbours and not by the inmates. DW2 has been disbelieved as he was nearly 70 years of age. It was highly improbable that he was in employment as a watchman. The trial court had held that the evidence of PWs.6 to 8 regarding pressing mark on the neck and injuries on the fore arms of the deceased are not corroborated by the medical opinion. This is factually incorrect. The doctor (PW2) had categorically stated that he was of the opinion that death was due to result of compression of the neck, and the post mortem report was accordingly issued. PW6 has stated that second opinion was sought for and then the report was given. The falsity of alibi is an additional link.

6.         In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra [2006 (10) SCC 681] it has been noted as follows:

"The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonise a neighbourhood family. The parents or other family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go unpunished.

If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1944 AC 315) quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [2003(11) SCC 271].) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: "(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him."

7.         That being so there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

                                                                 ........................................J.
                                                                    (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

                                                                .........................................J.
                                                                    (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi,
May 05, 2009

Husband's successors are the successors of wife's intested property though, she didn't live them for a day -Supreme Court of India

2009-05-08T05:13:00.000-07:00

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3241 OF 2009
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 460 of 2008]

OMPRAKASH & ORS.- V/S - RADHACHARAN & ORS.

JUDGMENT By- S.B. Sinha, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    One Smt. Narayani Devi was married to one Dindayal Sharma in the year 1955. She became widow within three months of her marriage. Concededly, she was driven out of her matrimonial home immediately after the death of her husband.     After that she never stayed in her matrimonial home. At her parental home, she was given education. She got an employment. She died intestate on 11.7.1996. She had various bank accounts; she left a huge sum also in her provident fund account.

3.    Ramkishori, mother of Narayani, filed an application for grant of succession certificate in terms of Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act. Respondents herein also filed a similar application. It now stands admitted that all her properties were self acquired.

4.    The question which arose for consideration before the courts below as also before us is as to whether sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act") or sub-Section (2) thereof would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.

      Section 15 of the Act reads as under:

             "15 - General rules of succession in the case of
             female Hindus. - (1) The property of a female
             Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to
             the rules set out in section 16.--
             (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters
             (including the children of any pre-deceased son or
             daughter) and the husband;
             (b)   secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
             (c)   thirdly, upon the mother and father;
             (d)   fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
             (e)   lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.

             (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
             section (1),--
             (a) any property inherited by a female Hindu
             from her father or mother shall devolve, in the
             absence of any son or daughter of the deceased
             (including the children of any pre-deceased son or
             daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in
             sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but
             upon the heirs of the father; and
             (b) any property inherited by a female Hindu
             from her husband or from her father-in-law shall
             devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of
             the deceased (including the children of any pre-
             deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs
             referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified
             therein, but upon the heirs of the husband."

5.    There is no doubt or dispute that the properties of the deceased were self-acquired ones and were not inherited from her parents' side. Appellants before us are her brothers, the original applicant being the mother of the deceased having died. Respondents are the sons of sister of the Narayani's husband.

6.    Mr. N.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would contend that in a case of this nature where the husband of the deceased or her in-laws had not made any contribution towards her education or had not lent any support during her life time, sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Act should be held to be applicable. It was urged that the Parliamentary intent as contained in clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Act should be the guiding factor for interpreting the said provision.

7.    Mr. Arvind V. Savant, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, would support the impugned judgment.

8.    Section 15 provides for the general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus. It lays down the mode and manner in which the devolution of interest of a female shall take place. Section 16 provides for the order of succession and manner of distribution amongst the heirs of a female Hindu, stating that the same shall be according to the rules specified therein. It reads as under:

             "Rule 1.--Among the heirs specified in sub-
             section (1) of section 15, those in one entry shall
             be preferred to those in any succeeding entry and
             those including in the same entry shall take
             simultaneously.
             Rule 2.--If any son or daughter of the intestate had
             pre-deceased the intestate leaving his or her own
             children alive at the time of the intestate's death,
             the children of such son or daughter shall take
             between them the share which such son or
             daughter would have taken if living at the
             intestate's death.
             Rule 3.--The devolution of the property of the
             intestate on the heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d)
            and (e) of sub-section (1) and in sub-section (2) of
            section 15 shall be in the same order and according
            to the same rules as would have applied if the
            property had been the father's or the mother's or
            the husband's as the case may be, and such person
            had died intestate in respect thereof immediately
            after the intestate's death."

9.    It has not been disputed that the respondents are the heirs and legal representatives of Dindayal, husband of Narayani. Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 lays down the ordinary rule of succession. Clause (a) of sub- Section (2) of Section 15 providing for a non-obstante clause, however, carves out an exception viz. when the property is devolved upon the deceased from her parents' side, on her death the same would relate back to her parents' family and not to her husband's family. Similarly, in a case where she had inherited some property from her husband or from her husband's family, on her death the same would revive to her husband's family and not to her own heirs. The law is silent with regard to self- acquired property of a woman. Sub-section (1) of Section 15, however, apart from the exceptions specified in sub-section (2) thereof does not make any distinction between a self-acquired property and the property which she had inherited. It refers to a property which has vested in the deceased absolutely or which is her own. The self-acquired property of a female would be her absolute property and not the property which she had inherited from her parents.

10.   In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Act would apply and not the sub-Section (2) thereof.

      This is a hard case. Narayani during her life time did not visit her in-laws' place.   We will presume that the contentions raised by Mr. Choudhury that she had not been lent any support from her husband's family is correct and all support had come from her parents but then only because a case appears to be hard would not lead us to invoke different interpretation of a statutory provision which is otherwise impermissible. It is now a well settled principle of law that sentiment or sympathy alone would not be a guiding factor in determining the rights of the parties which are otherwise clear and unambiguous.

      In M.D., H.S.I.D.C. and Ors. vs. Hari Om Enterprises and Anr [2008 (9) SCALE 241], this Court held:

            "54. This Court applied the doctrine of
            proportionality having regard to a large number of
            decisions operating in the field. This Court,
            however, also put a note of caution that no order
            should be passed only on sympathy or sentiment."

      In Subha B. Nair & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors. [(2008) 7 SCC 210], this Court held:

             "21. This Court furthermore cannot issue a
             direction only on sentiment/sympathy."

      In Ganga Devi vs. District Judge, Nainital & Ors. [(2008) 7 SCC 770], this Court held:

             "22. The court would not determine a question
             only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto
             sensu equity as such may not have any role to
             play."

      If the contention raised by Mr. Choudhury is to be accepted, we will have to interpret sub-section (1) of Section 15 in a manner which was not contemplated by the Parliament. The Act does not put an embargo on a female to execute a will. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 would apply only in a case where a female Hindu has died intestate. In such a situation, the normal rule of succession as provided for by the statute, in our opinion, must prevail.

      For the aforementioned purpose, the golden rule of interpretation must be applied.

11.   This Court in Bhagat Ram (Dead) vs. Teja Singh [(1999) 4 SCC 86], held as under:

             "6. On perusal of the two Sub-sections we find
             that their spheres are very clearly marked out. So
             far Sub-section (1), it covers the properties of a
             female Hindu dying intestate. Sub-section (2)
             starts with the words 'Notwithstanding anything
             contained in Sub-section (1)'. In other words, what
             falls within the sphere of Sub-section (2), Sub-
             section (1) will not apply. We find that Section
             15(2)(a) uses the words 'any property inherited by
             a female Hindu from her father or mother'. Thus
             property inherited by a female Hindu from her
             father and mother is carved-out from a female
             Hindu dying intestate. In order words any property
             of female Hindu, if inherited by her from her father
             or mother would not fall under Sub-section (1) of
             Section 15. Thus, property of a female Hindu can
             be classified under two heads : Every property of a
             female Hindu dying intestate is a general class by
             itself covering all the properties but Sub-section
             (2) excludes out of the aforesaid properties the
             property inherited by her from her father or
             mother.

             7.     In addition, we find the language used in
             Section 15(1) read with Section 16 makes it
             clearly, the class who has to succeed of property of
             Hindu female dying intestate. Sub-section (1)
             specifically state that the property of a female
             Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to
             the rules set out in Section 16. So, in case Sub-
             section (1) applies, then after the death of Santi,
             Indro can not inheritance by succession but it
             would go to the heirs of the pre-deceased husband
             of Santi."
12.   For the aforementioned reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
                                            .....................................J.
                                            [S.B. Sinha]
                                            .....................................J.
                                            [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
New Delhi;
May 5, 2009

A woman cannot be said to have an intention to commit rape.

2009-05-05T10:10:00.000-07:00

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 847 OF 2009

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 2207 OF 2008)

State of Rajasthan                                                ....Appellant
                                              Versus
Hemraj & Anr.                                                    ....Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1.         Leave granted.

2.         Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench dismissing the application for grant of leave to question correctness of the judgment of learned Additional District Sessions Judge (Fast track), No.2 Alwar.

3.         Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Respondents were facing the trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 342 and 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC'). PW1 was the victim. The trial court noticed that it was the accused Chandan who committed rape on her. There was no allegation of rape against the other accused persons namely Hemraj and Smt. Kamla. The accused Chandan was facing trial under the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 (in short the `Juvenile Act').The trial court as noted above held the accused Hemraj guilty of offence punishable under Section 342 IPC and held that the Accused Kamla cannot be convicted in terms of Section 376 (2) IPC. The State filed an appeal questioning acquittal of the respondent from the accusations relatable to Section 376(2) IPC. The High Court held that so far as the accused Hemraj is concerned his presence at the spot was doubtful. In any event both the respondents cannot be held guilty of offence punishable under Section 376(2) IPC.

4.         Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that scope and ambit of Section 376(2)(g) and the explanation appended thereto have been lost sight of by the High Court.

5.         Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the High Court rightly noted that the presence of accused Hemraj at the alleged time of rape has not been established. Additionally, a lady i.e. respondent No.2 cannot be held guilty even in terms of the Explanation to Section 376 (2)(g) of the IPC.

6.         In order to appreciate rival submissions Sections 375 and 376 need to be noted. They so far as relevant read as follows:-

"375. Rape
A man is said to commit "rape" who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:--
First.--Against her will.

Secondly.--Without her consent.

Thirdly.--With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.

Fourthly.--With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.

Fifthly.--With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.

Sixthly.--With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age.

Explanation.--Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.

Exception.--Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.]

376. Punishment for rape

(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (1), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either escription for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both:

Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.

(2) Whoever,--

xx                    xx                    xx                     xx                    xx

(g) commits gang rape,

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years,

Explanation I.--Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in
furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub-section.
x                      xx                    xx                    xx                    xx"

7.           A bare reading of Section 375 makes the position clear that rape can be committed only by a man. The section itself provides as to when a man can be said to have committed rape. Section 376(2) makes certain categories of serious cases of rape as enumerated therein attract more severe punishment. One of them relates to "gang rape". The language of sub-section(2)(g) provides that "whoever commits `gang rape" shall be punished etc. The Explanation only clarifies that when a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention each such person shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within this sub- section (2).    That cannot make a woman guilty of committing rape. This is conceptually inconceivable. The Explanation only indicates that when one or more persons act in furtherance of their common intention to rape a woman, each person of the group shall be deemed to have committed gang rape. By operation of the deeming provision, a person who has not actually committed rape is deemed to have committed rape even if only one of the group in furtherance of the common intention has committed rape. "Common intention" is dealt with in Section 34 IPC and provides that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. "Common intention" denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates a pre- arranged plan, a prior meeting of minds and an element of participation in action. The acts may be different and vary in character, but must be actuated by the same common intention, which is different from same intention or similar intention. The sine qua non for bringing in application of Section 34 IPC that the act must be done in furtherance of the common intention to do a criminal act. The expression "in furtherance of their common intention" as appearing in the Explanation to Section 376(2) relates to intention to commit rape. A woman cannot be said to have an intention to commit rape. Therefore, the counsel for the appellant is right in her submission that the appellant cannot be prosecuted for alleged commission of the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g).

8.        The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal, which we direct.

                                      .......................J.
                                                              (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
                            .................................J.
                                                              (ASOK KUAMR GANGULY)
New Delhi,
April 27, 2009

Legal marriage is not necessary for offence under Sec. 304B & 498A

2009-05-04T03:19:00.000-07:00

REPORTABLE JUDGMENT

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 867 OF 2009
                 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4496 of 2006)

Koppisetti Subbharao @ Subramaniam                       ...Appellant

                                   Versus

State of A.P.                                            ...Respondent

                              JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1     Leave granted.

2.    Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the petition filed under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').
The prayer in the petition was to quash the proceedings in C.C.No. 440 of1999 and CC No.325 of 2001 on the file of 3rd Additional Judicial First Class
Magistrate, Kakinada.
3.    Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
      A case was registered against three accused persons including the
present appellant for alleged commission      of offence punishable under
Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short
the `IPC'). Initially, the presence of A-1 could not be secured and therefore
court separated the case against A-1 and proceeded the trial against A-2 and
A-3. In the said case A-2 and A-3 were acquitted. Thereafter, the present
application was filed before the High Court taking the stand that the
complainant was not be the legally wedded wife of the appellant as he was
already married and, therefore, Section 498-A has no application to the facts
of the case.

      The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that disputed
questions of fact are involved.

4.    Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the
acquittal of the co-accused persons the proceedings against the appellant
should not proceed.

5.    Learned counsel for the respondent-State on the other hand submitted
that whether there was valid legal marriage subsisting qua the appellant is a
question of fact and, therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing
the application under Section 482 of Code.

6.    Parties to a marriage tying nuptial knot are supposed to bring about
the union of souls. It creates a new relationship of love, affection, care and
concern between the husband and wife. According to Hindu Vedic
philosophy it is sanskar - a sacrament; one of the sixteen important
sacraments essential to be taken during one's lifetime. There may be
physical union as a result of marriage for procreation to perpetuate the lineal
progeny for ensuring spiritual salvation and performance of religious rites,
but what is essentially contemplated is union of two souls. Marriage is
considered to be a junction of three important duties i.e. social, religious and
spiritual. A question of intricate complexity arises in this appeal where
factual scenario has to be also considered.

7.    Stand of the appellant was that it was required to be shown that the
victim-woman was the legally married wife of the accused. Since victim
claim to have married during the lifetime of the appellant, prosecution has
failed to establish that it stood dissolved legally. Prosecution having failed to
bring any material record in that regard, Section 498-A has no application.

8.    The marriages contracted between Hindus are now statutorily made
monogamous. A sanctity has been attributed to the first marriage as being
that which was contracted from a sense of duty and not merely for personal
gratification. When the fact of celebration of marriage is established it will
be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that all the rites and
ceremonies to constitute a valid marriage have been gone through. As was
said as long as 1869 "when once you get to this, namely, that there was a
marriage in fact, there would be a presumption in favour of there being a
marriage in law". (See Inderun Valungypooly v. Ramaswamy (1869 (13)
MIA 141.) So also where a man and woman have been proved to have lived
together as husband and wife, the law will presume, until contrary be clearly
proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage
and not in a state of concubinage. (See Sastry Velaider v. Sembicutty (1881
(6) AC 364) following De Thoren v. Attorney General (1876 (1) AC 686)
and Piers v. Piers (L.R.(2) H.L.C. 331). Where a marriage is accepted as
valid by relations, friends and others for a long time it cannot be declared as
invalid. In Lokhande's case (supra), it was observed by this Court "The
bare fact that man and woman live as husband and wife it does not at any
rate normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they
may hold themselves before the society as husband and wife and the society
treats them as husband and wife". These observations were cited with
approval in Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh and Ors. (AIR 1994 SC 135). At first
blush, it would seem that these observations run counter to the long catena
of decisions noted above. But on closer examination of the facts of those
cases it is clear that this Court did not differ from the views expressed in the
earlier cases. In Lokhande's case (supra), this Court was dealing with a case
of prosecution for bigamy. The prosecution had contended that second
marriage was gandharva form of marriage and no ceremonies were
necessary and, therefore, did not allege or prove that any customary
ceremonies were performed. In that background, it was held that even in the
case of gandharva marriages, ceremonies were required to be performed. To
constitute bigamy under Section 494 IPC, the second marriage had to be a
valid marriage duly solemnized and as it was not so solemnized it was not a
marriage at all in the eye of law and was therefore invalid. The essential
ingredient constituting the offence of Bigamy is the "marrying" again during
the lifetime of husband or wife in contrast to the ingredients of Section 498A
which, among other things, envisage subjecting the woman concerned to
cruelty. The thrust is mainly "marrying" in Section 494 IPC as against
subjecting of the woman to cruelty in Section 498A. Likewise, the thrust of
the offence under Section 304B is also the "Dowry Death". Consequently,
the evil sought to be curbed are distinct and separate from the persons
committing the offending acts and there could be no impediment in law to
liberally construe the words or expressions relating to the persons
committing the offence so as to rope in not only those validly married but
also any one who has undergone some or other form of marriage and thereby
assumed for himself the position of husband to live, cohabitate and exercise
authority as such husband over another woman. In Surjit Singh's case
(supra) the stand was that the marriage was in Karewa form. This Court held
that under the custom of Karewa marriage, the widow could marry the
brother or a relation of the husband. But in that case the man was a stranger.
Further even under that form of marriage certain ceremonies were required
to be performed which were not proved. Dealing with the contention relating
to presumption, reference was made to Lokhande's case (supra). As the
parties had set up a particular form of marriage which turned out to be
invalid due to absence of proof of having undergone the necessary
ceremonies related to such form of marriage, the presumption of long
cohabitation could not be invoked.

9.    The presumption may not be available in a case, for example, where
the man was already married or there was any insurmountable obstacle to
the marriage, but presumption arises if there is strong evidence by
documents and conduct. Above position has been highlighted in Mayne's
Hindu Law and Usage.

10.   The question as to who would be covered by the expression `husband'
for attracting Section 498A does present problems. Etymologically, in terms
of the definition of "husband" and "marriage" as given in the various Law
Lexicons and dictionaries - the existence of a valid marriage may appear to
be a sine qua non for applying a penal provision. In Smt. Yamunabai
Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr. (AIR 1988 SC 644) a
woman claimed maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C.'). This Court applied the provision of
the Marriage Act and pointed out that same was a law which held the field
after 1955, when it was enacted and Section 5 lays down that for a lawful
marriage the necessary condition that neither party should have a spouse
living at the time of the marriage is essential and marriage in contravention
of this condition therefore is null and void. The concept of marriage to
constitute the relationship of `husband' and `wife' may require strict
interpretation where claims for civil rights, right to property etc. may follow
or flow and a liberal approach and different perception cannot be an
anatheme when the question of curbing a social evil is concerned.
11.   The question of origin of dowry or dos has been the subject of study
by theoreticians. Mayne says that it was a contribution by the wife's family,
or by the wife herself, intended to assist the husband in bearing the expenses
of the conjugal household (Mayne on "Early History of Institution" page
319). While dos or dowry previously belonged to husband, his right over it
being unrestricted, all the property of the wife not included in the dowry was
called her "paraphra" and was her absolute property over which her husband
had no control. (See Banerjee on `Marriage and Stridhan' 345) In Pratibha
Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Anr. (AIR 1985 SC 628) after tracing out the
history of stridhan it was held that wife is the absolute owner of such
property under Section 27 of the Marriage Act. Property presented to the
husband and wife at or about the time of marriage belongs to them jointly.

12.   The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the `Dowry Act') was
introduced to combat the ever-increasing menace of dowry. The avowed
object is prohibition on giving and taking of dowry. Section 2 defines
"dowry". Section 4 provides the penalty for demanding "dowry", whileSection 5 is a significant provision making agreement for giving or taking
dowry to be void. Section 6 is another provision which reflects statutory
concern for prevention of dowry, be it taking or giving. It is provided therein
that pending transfer of the dowry, the person who received the dowry holds
it in trust for benefit of the woman. Amendment to Section 2 by Amendment
Act 43 of 1986 has made the provision clear and demand made after the
marriage is a part of dowry, in view of addition of words "at or before or
after the marriage". (See State of H.P. v. Nikku Ram (AIR 1996 SC 67).

13.   The definition of the term `dowry' under Section 2 of the Dowry Act
shows that any property or valuable security given or "agreed to be given"
either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to
the marriage "at or before or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the
marriage of the said parties" would become `dowry' punishable under the
Dowry Act. Property or valuable security so as to constitute `dowry' within
the meaning of the Dowry Act must, therefore, be given or demanded "as
consideration for the marriage."

14.   Section 4 of the Dowry Act aims at discouraging the very "demand"
of "dowry" as a `consideration for the marriage' between the parties thereto
and lays down that if any person after the commencement of the Act,"demands", directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a `bride'
or `bridegroom', as the case may be, any `dowry' he shall be punishable
with imprisonment or with fine or within both. Thus, it would be seen that
Section 4 makes punishable the very demand of property or valuable
security as a consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied, would
constitute the graver offence under Section 3 of the Act punishable with
higher imprisonment and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen
thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is
more.

15.     The definition of the expression `dowry' contained in Section 2 of the
Dowry Act cannot be confined merely to be `demand' of money, property or
valuable security' made at or after the performance of marriage. The
legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of `dowry'
emphasized that any money, property or valuable security given, as a
consideration for marriage, `before, at or after' the marriage would be
covered by the expression `dowry' and this definition as contained in
Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression `dowry' occurs in the Act.
Meaning of the expression `dowry' as commonly used and understood is
different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4,
mere demand of `dowry' is sufficient to bring home the offence to an
accused. Thus, any `demand' of money, property or valuable security made
from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his
parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of
`dowry' under the Act where such demand is not properly referable to any
legally recognized claim and is relatable only to the consideration of
marriage. Marriage in this context would include a proposed marriage also
more particularly where the non-fulfilment of the "demand of dowry" leads
to the ugly consequence of the marriage not taking place at all.           The
expression "dowry" under the Dowry Act has to be interpreted in the sense
which the statute wishes to attribute to it. The definition given in the statute
is the determinative factor. The Dowry Act is a piece of social legislation
which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it
makes punishable not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very
demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the marriage where
such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid
pro quo for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents
to the bride or the bridegroom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary
presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or the
bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not
as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection or regard, would
not fall within the mischief of the expression `dowry' made punishable
under the Dowry Act.

16.   Aryan Hindus recognised 8 forms of marriage, out of which four were
approved, namely, Brahma, Daiva, Arsha and Prajapatya. The dis-approved
forms of marriages were Gandharva, Asura, Rakshasa and Paisacha. In the
Brahma form of marriage, some amounts had to be spent by father/guardian,
as the case may be, to go ultimately to the spouses. The origin of dowry may
be traced to this amount either in cash or kind.

17.   The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with a marriage and
the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation to marriages. If the legality
of the marriage itself is an issue further legalistic problems do arise. If the
validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny, the demand of dowry in
respect of an invalid marriage would be legally not recognizable. Even then
the purpose for which Sections 498A and 304B-IPC and Section 113B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the `Evidence Act') were introduced
cannot be lost sight of. Legislations enacted with some policy to curb and
alleviate some public evil rampant in society and effectuate a definite public
purpose or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with certain element
of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper technically. The obvious
objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital
relationship with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for
money. Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to
take a shelter behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid
marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such legalistic niceties
would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such hairsplitting legalistic
approach would encourage harassment to a woman over demand of money.
The nomenclature `dowry' does not have any magic charm written over it. It
is just a label given to demand of money in relation to marital relationship.
The legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only the husband but
also his relations who are covered by Section 498A. Legislature has taken
care of children born from invalid marriages. Section 16 of the Marriage Act
deals with legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages. Can it be
said that legislature which was conscious of the social stigma attached to
children of void and voidable marriages closed eyes to plight of a woman
who unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the
marital relationship. If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further
the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown
by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of
money in relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has also
some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to
"any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared
void by a Court of competent jurisdiction". It would be appropriate to
construe the expression `husband' to cover a person who enters into marital
relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of
husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any
manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions -
Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for
the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation,
known and recognized as purposive construction has to come into play in a
case of this nature. The absence of a definition of `husband' to specifically
include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with
such woman, in the purported exercise of his role and status as `husband' is
no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A IPC,
viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations
introducing those provisions.

18.   In Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu (1979 (2) SCC 34), this
Court observed:

             "The primary principle of interpretation is that a
             constitutional or statutory provision should be construed
             "according to the intent of they that made it" (Coke).              Normally, such intent is gathered from the language of
              the provision. If the language or the phraseology
              employed by the legislation is precise and plain and thus
              by itself proclaims the legislative intent in unequivocal
              terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of
              the consequences that may follow. But if the words used
              in the provision are imprecise, protean or evocative or
              can reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of
              strict grammatical construction ceases to be a sure guide
              to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in
              order to ascertain the true meaning of the terms and
              phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go
              beyond the arid literal confines of the provision and to
              call in aid other well-recognised rules of construction,
              such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and
              framework of the statute as a whole, each portion
              throwing light, on the rest, the purpose of the
              legislation, the object sought to be achieved, and the
              consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in
              preference to the other possible interpretation.

19.   In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1988 SC 1883), this
Court held:

              "....But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any
              doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem it as out
              paramount duty to put upon the language of the
              legislature rational meaning. We then examine every
              word, every section and every provision. We examine
              the Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which
              gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs which the
              legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole
              situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not
              consider any provision out of the framework of the
              statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract
              principles separated from the motive force behind. We
              will consider the provisions in the circumstances to              which they owe their origin. We will consider the
              provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within
              the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable
              consequences.

20.   In District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. (JT 2001 (6) SC
183), this Court stated:

              "The legislation is primarily directed to the problems
              before the legislature based on information derived from
              past and present experience. It may also be designed by
              use of general words to cover similar problems arising
              in future. But, from the very nature of thing, it is
              impossible to anticipate fully in the varied situations
              arising in future in which the application of the
              legislation in hand may be called for the words chosen
              to communicate such indefinite referents are bound to
              be in many cases, lacking in charity and precision and
              thus giving rise to controversial questions of
              construction. The process of construction combines both
              literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the
              legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an
              enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the
              words used in the enactment in the light of any
              discernible purpose or object which comprehends the
              mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is
              directed".

21.   The suppression of mischief rule made immortal in Heydon's case (3
Co Rep 7a 76 ER 637) can be pressed into service. With a view to suppress
the mischief which would have surfaced had the literal rule been allowed to
cover the field, the Heydon's Rule has been applied by this Court in a
number of cases, e.g. Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd., v. State of Bihar and Ors.
(AIR 1955 SC 661), Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Anr. (AIR
1990 SC 781), P.E.K. Kalliani Amma and Ors. v. K. Devi and Ors. (AIR
1996 SC 1963) and Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd., v. Shapporji Data
Processing Ltd. (2003 (8) Supreme 634).

22.   In Reserve Bank of India etc. etc. v. Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. and others etc. etc. (1987 (1) SCC 424) while dealing
with the question of interpretation of a statute, this Court observed:

                    "Interpretation must depend on the text and the
             context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may
             well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives
             the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
             That interpretation is best which makes the textual
             interpretation match the contextual. A statue is best
             interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With
             this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole
             and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by
             phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at in the
             context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-
             maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the
             sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour
             and appear different than when the statute is looked at
             without the glasses provided by the context. With these
             glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover
             what each section, each clause, each phrase and each
             word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the
             scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no
             word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes             have to be construed so that every word has a place and
             everything is in its place."

23.   In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA),
Lord Denning, advised a purposive approach to the interpretation of a word
used in a statute and observed:

                     "The English language is not an instrument of
             mathematical precision. Our literature would be much
             the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of
             Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A
             Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed
             rule that he must look to the language and nothing else,
             laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or
             that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It
             would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of
             Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and
             perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect
             appears, a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and
             blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the
             constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament,
             and he must do this not only from the language of the
             statute, but also from a consideration of the social
             conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief
             which it was passed to remedy, and then he must
             supplement the written word so as to give `force and
             life' to the intention of the legislature......A Judge should
             ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act
             had themselves come across this ruck in this texture of
             it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do
             so as they would have doe. A Judge must not alter the
             material of which the Act is woven, but he can and
             should iron out the creases."

24.      These aspects were highlighted by this Court in S. Gopal Reddy v.
State of A.P. (1996 (4) SCC 596) and Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004
(3) SCC 199.

25.      The High Court was justified in holding that disputed questions of fact
are involved and the application under Section 482 of Code has been rightly
rejected. We do not find any scope for interference with the order of the
High Court. However, we make it clear that we have not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the case.

26.      The appeal is dismissed.

                                            ........................................J.
                                            (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

                                            ........................................J.
                                            (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

      New Delhi,
      April 29, 2009